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Summary 
 
 
This PhD thesis uses survey data and involves the application of latent factor 
structural equation methods to the study of the economics of disability and dis-
ability policy in later life, a topic which is currently very high on the policy 
agenda.  
It comprises four studies. The first chapter investigates the presence of health-
related sample attrition (the drop-out of eligible sample members over time) in 
the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA).  
The second chapter examines whether different indicators of disability, col-
lected in three widely-used household surveys, are consistent with a common set 
of findings relating to the targeting of disability benefits.  
In the third chapter we estimate the additional personal costs experienced by 
disabled older people to achieve the same material standard of living as similar 
people living without disability.  
Chapter 4 assesses the presence of socio-economic disparities in birth-cohort 
trends in later life physical and cognitive disability and in the receipt of non-
means-tested cash disability benefits.  
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Introduction 
 
 
The world’s population has been experiencing significant ageing. Ageing partly 
results from decreasing mortality, but because chronic and degenerative diseases 
are more common at older ages, it generally results in an increased prevalence of 
disability. Disability entails a range of immediate and long-term (financial and 
psychological) consequences that have important implications for the well-being 
of the individual, the family, and the society as a whole.  
How to promote more effectively healthy and active ageing while building an 
equitable and financially sustainable welfare system that meets the needs of older 
adults? This is a key policy challenge for many national and local governments 
and seeking an answer is no a simple task. To guide this process researchers 
should make an “intelligent application of quantitative methods to imperfect data 
in the hope of illuminating important social issues” (Cowell, 2000, p. 133). This 
study reflects my attempt to serve the complex and challenging field of the eco-
nomics of disability in old age.  
 
This thesis uses survey data and involves the application of latent factor struc-
tural equation methods to the study of the economics of disability and disability 
policy in later life, a topic which is currently very high on the policy agenda. It 
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comprises four chapters which share a similar statistical framework, applied to 
representative samples of older people living in private dwellings in the United 
Kingdom. Each chapter is written as a self-contained journal article and thus can 
be read independently of the others.  
The first two chapters deal with the representativeness and completeness of 
(longitudinal and cross-sectional) survey data, often used for studying disability 
in old age. Questions, such as ‘How ignorable is health-related survey non-re-
sponse at old age?’ and ‘Do different measures of disability collected in different 
surveys provide a consistent picture of the targeting of disability benefits?’ are 
addressed in these chapters, followed by a brief discussion of the policy implica-
tions of the results. 
The following two chapters provide further results relevant for policy evalua-
tion and policy design of public programmes of support for disabled people. ‘How 
much extra income does a person with a level of disability η and income y need, 
to be as well-off as (s)he would be with disability at reference level η0?’ is the 
main research question of Chapter 3 that we aim to address by fitting a structural 
welfare model and inferring the compensating income variation from estimates of 
its parameters. ‘What are the main determinants of the observed rise in the 
number of older people receiving disability benefits?’; ‘How much of their growth 
stems from trends in physical and cognitive disabilities?’; ‘Is there any diverging 
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trend by socio-economic status?’ are the research questions that Chapter 4 aims 
to answer using historical data to identify the lessons we can learn for the future.  
In the following paragraphs we will briefly introduce the measurement issues 
associated with disability and its consequences as well as the statistical approach 
that we use in this thesis – latent factor structural equation modelling – followed 
by a brief overview of the four chapters.  
 
 
Setting the scene 
Establishing a meaningful concept of “disability” is difficult and there is no 
single agreed definition which suits all purposes (Altman, 2001; Haveman & 
Wolfe, 2000; WHO, 2002). A medical approach would define disability in terms 
of deviations from medical norms (e.g., presence of diagnosed conditions). In this 
thesis we follow a functional approach that focuses on individuals’ performance 
by assessing their ability to perform “normal” tasks and roles by measuring for 
example, their “functional limitations”, “difficulties in performing everyday ac-
tivities”, or restrictions on “activities of daily living”.  
The “performance” criterion is often used to operationalise the concept of dis-
ability in economics (as opposed to medicine) where the purpose is to determine 
eligibility for public programmes and the need for care services. It is also linked 
more directly to the sociological concepts of social independence and social func-
tioning than are definitions of disability based on the presence/absence of medical 
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conditions. As we argue in Chapter 2, the functional approach of measuring dis-
ability also has analogies with Sen’s (1985) concept of “capabilities”: disability 
can be seen as a set of constraints on functioning which originate from the inter-
action of individuals’ personal characteristics (e.g., health impairments broadly 
defined) with their available goods (assets, income) and the surrounding cultural 
and socio-economic environment. 
Sen’s theoretical approach offers several advantages for the current study. First, 
it is a broad framework able to accommodate the conceptualisation of the disa-
blement process as formalised among gerontologists (see, among others, Johnson 
& Wolinsky, 1993; Verbrugge & Jette, 1994). It sees damage at the cellular level, 
eventually influencing functioning at the level of organs, which ultimately re-
stricts the individual’s capacity to perform tasks and social roles.1 
The link with Sen’s theory is not only important from the perspective of defin-
ing (and then measuring) disability. In Sen’s view, disability imposes two types 
of handicap. It reduces not only the ability to generate an income (earning hand-
icap) but also the ability to convert money into good living (conversion handicap). 
This framework helps in clarifying one limitation of current income-based analysis 
                                      
1  It would accommodate also a definition of disability more closely related to the International 
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health, which sees disability resulting from activity limitations 
and restrictions placed upon participation that emerge from the interaction between functional limitations 
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of poverty and inequality that substantially underestimate poverty and inequal-
ity for families with disabled members by accounting only for the earning hand-
icap (Kuklys, 2005). As we argue in Chapter 3, the conversion handicap can be 
taken into account when carrying out analysis of the distributional impact of tax 
and social security benefit reforms by making some allowance for the additional 
costs of living that different degrees of disability bring. 
 
How to measure disability? 
After a definition of disability has been chosen and a theoretical framework 
identified, we can tackle the disability-measurement problem. A great deal of 
attention has been devoted in the literature to developing (a vast range of) 
measures with satisfactory properties in terms of dimensionality, reliability and 
validity. The ADL (Katz et al., 1963) and IADL (Lawton & Brody, 1969) are 
perhaps the most successful examples.  
A counting approach (summing the number of functional difficulties reported 
or “indicators”) is typically used to derive a scale measuring the presence and 
severity of needs. The popularity of this type of aggregation is due to its trans-
parency and ease of interpretation. However, different indicators in a scale may 
indicate different degrees of disability. For example, needing help to eat is a more 
severe (and more gender-neutral) indicator of disability than needing help in pre-
paring a meal.  
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Attempts are sometimes made to scale indicators by “weighting” them on the 
basis of a theory, experience, or by consultation of experts. In any case, different 
judgements (e.g. due to a different panel of experts) will result in different value 
for the weights, which may drive different policy implications. Moreover, if in an 
available survey two or more scales for disability are collected (i.e. ADL and 
IADL), is there any valid reason to focus only on one?  
 
Why is a latent factor structural equation approach appropriate in 
our context? 
Two crucial issues in the above measurement approach are the 푎푑푒푞푢푎푐푦 of the 
chosen indicators in reflecting the corresponding dimension(s) of disability; and 
the 푎푟푏푖푡푟푎푟푖푛푒푠푠 in the choice of weights used to combine indicators into a sin-
gle measurement. We argue that such steps should be transparently justified 
given the relevance of value judgements in deciding that an indicator is redun-
dant or invalid or that it should count more than another one.  
An alternative approach would be to “let the data speak”, with weights as-
signed to the different indicators not chosen by the researcher, but derived sta-
tistically. In this thesis, we follow this alternative and propose the use of a latent 
factor structural equation approach to the study of the economics of disability in 
later life.  
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Latent variable Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is a general and flexible 
approach that enables us to test hypotheses about both measurement (how well 
observed indicators serve as a measurement instrument for the underlying latent 
construct(s)) and structural relations (how latent construct(s) are related to each 
other and with a set of observed variables believed to be important determinants 
or consequences of the latent constructs) simultaneously and within a single 
framework. Latent factor SEMs, commonly employed in psychology and the so-
cial sciences, are becoming increasingly important in economics thanks to the 
emerging body of research that: establishes the parallel importance of non-cogni-
tive skills (personality, social and emotional traits) as well as cognitive skills in 
producing social and economic success (Heckman et al., 2006); that operational-
ises the capabilities approach to welfare economics (Anand et al., 2011) and in 
the “happiness” literature (van Campen & Iedema, 2007; van Praag et al., 2003).  
This approach offers several advantages. First, it assumes that the underlying 
concept is not directly observable (i.e. is latent) but manifests itself in many 
observed variables (indicators) (Bollen, 1989).  
Second, in contrast with principal component analysis, a latent factor approach 
imposes a “structure” in the sense that the observed indicators are postulated to 
be (linear) functions of unobserved latent variables. Using Sen’s term, we can see 
each indicator identifying a particular “achievement” (or the lack of it). Each 
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indicator, however, provides only a partial measure of the underlying (possibly 
multi-dimensional) individual’s disability.  
Two main assumptions define the causal mechanisms underlying the responses. 
First, it is assumed that the responses on the indicators are the result of an 
individual’s position on the latent variable(s). The second assumption, known as 
the 푙표푐푎푙 푖푛푑푒푝푒푛푑푒푛푐푒 푎푥푖표푚 (Bollen, 2002), states that there are one or more 
latent variables that create the association between indicators, and when the 
latent variables are held constant, the indicators are independent.2 This is par-
ticularly important in addressing possible errors of measurement in the indicators, 
an issue that – while often neglected in applied research – is very relevant for 
any application that uses indicators in the form of individual reports of self-
assessed measures collected through surveys, especially in the health domain 
(Bound, 1991).  
 
Recalling that the main idea behind the latent variable approach is that ob-
served indicators are manifestations of latent concepts, it is important to allow 
the possibility that other exogenous variables might “cause” and influence the 
                                      
2  Formally: [ , , . . . ,  	|] 	= 	[|][|] 	 ··· 	[ 	|]  where , , . . . ,   are 
observable indicators of functional disability,   is a vector of latent variables, 
[, , . . . , |	]	is the joint probability of the indicators  for given , that equals the product 
of the conditional probabilities, [|][|] 	 ··· 	[|] , when the latent variables are 
responsible for the dependencies among the indicators. A latent factor approach permits the use 
of both continuous and discrete observed variables as indicators.  
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latent factor(s). In all chapters we allow latent constructs to vary significantly 
with observable characteristics. For disability, we emphasise the importance of 
modelling observable sources of heterogeneity induced by individuals’ socio-de-
mographic and economic characteristics (SES). This is not only because of the 
well-known SES-health gradient (Deaton, 2002; Deaton & Paxson, 2001; Graham, 
2009) and the “valuation neglect” problem (Sen, 1985) but also because the rela-
tionship between disability and income has important implications for the public 
cost of disability support policy.  
If we assume the presence of two or more latent dimensions, we would expect 
to model how these mutually influence one another and hence it is important to 
explicitly specify these interactions in the form of a structural model. This can 
be done in different ways and this thesis offers a broad range of applications.  
 
Four empirical analyses of the consequences of disability in old age 
Longitudinal health-related surveys are valuable sources of data for monitoring 
population health and for the evaluation and design of policy programmes for 
disabled people. However, the failure of interviewing all eligible individuals for a 
survey (unit non-response) can seriously distort results, in particular if the mech-
anism that causes it is related to the phenomena of interest. In Chapter 1, I 
investigate the 푟푒푙푒푣푎푛푐푒 and 푖푔푛표푟푎푏푖푙푖푡푦 of initial health-related non-response 
at the beginning of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). In doing 
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so, I integrate the measurement of latent constructs (one of which is poor health) 
in a rational choice approach for survey participation. A second latent construct 
captures the individuals’ engagement with the scope of the survey and it is al-
lowed to be correlated with latent poor-health. The “engagement” index, while 
highly correlated with latent health, plays the most important role in explaining 
participation so that it dilutes the health gradient with non-response, whose rel-
evance however is not completely eliminated. Structural parameters are then used 
to derive new survey weights for estimating the distribution of health status and 
receipt of disability-related benefits among older people interviewed at follow-ups. 
Results suggest that initial non-response is problematic and mainly determined 
by additional factors not captured in the ELSA weights. 
 
Chapter 2 compares statistical models of the prevalence of receipt of Attend-
ance Allowance (AA) – the main non-means-tested disability benefit available for 
older people – estimated from three UK surveys: the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), the Family Resources Survey (FRS) and the ELSA. It employs 
a structural equation approach in which probabilities of receiving AA depend on 
latent disability. Two aspects of this comparability issue are specifically: whether 
the questionnaire content generates disability indicators that are capable of re-
flecting all the multiple dimensions of disability (completeness); and whether the 
different indicators available in the three surveys of any particular dimension of 
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disability give the same undistorted picture of the underlying concept (compati-
bility). We conclude that compatibility is not a serious difficulty although there 
are some signs that completeness is a problem for the BHPS.  
 
Chapter 3 applies the compensating variation principle for estimating –
parametrically – disability costs among older people. A two-latent factor struc-
tural model (which fully recognises the latent nature of the constructs “disability” 
and “deprivation”) is used to estimate a base-dependent equivalence scale (i.e. 
one which varies by income level) which takes account of the severity of disability. 
The estimated costs are large (on average £100 per week, in 2007 prices) and rise 
significantly with disability. The restrictions on preferences imposed by the as-
sumption of a base-independent equivalence scale for disability are not supported 
by FRS data, implying that the extra income that disabled people on higher 
incomes need to be as well-off as their non-disabled counterparts is lower than 
the equivalent proportion of income needed by disabled people on lower incomes. 
Comparing the estimated costs of disability with the amounts of existing disabil-
ity benefits suggests that public provision falls considerably short of total disa-
bility costs for older people in Great Britain. Estimates have clear implications 
also for analyses on the targeting and redistributive efficiencies of existing bene-
fits as well as for the design of disability-related public programmes.  
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The current and future financial sustainability of public programmes of support 
for disabled people is at the heart of the recent policy debate. After controlling 
for the “pure” demographic effect of population ageing, a fundamental question 
is how much of the growth of social security benefits for disabled people can be 
explained by trends in the underlying prevalence and severity of disability. In 
Chapter 4, I use a two-latent factor structural equation approach to estimate the 
(birth-)cohort-year effects in physical and cognitive functionings and in the re-
ceipt of non means-tested cash disability benefits (DBs) for older people born 
between 1924 and 1945. The chapter also investigates the extent to which the 
overall disability trends have been more favourable among advantaged than dis-
advantaged socioeconomic groups and how the public disability programmes re-
acted. Drawing from a pooled sample of the last 10 years of FRS available, the 
chapter concludes with a series of relevant messages for current and planned 
policy reforms aimed at supporting older people with care needs. 
 
A final chapter concludes and sets research plans that build upon these achieve-
ments. 
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Chapter 1: 
 
 
Participation of older people in 
health-related longitudinal studies. 
Microlevel evidence at the beginning 
of the English Longitudinal Study of 
Ageing (ELSA)* 
 
 
Abstract:  
As with many longitudinal studies, non-response in ELSA is unlikely to be ignorable. 
We investigate health-related bias in participation in the first wave of ELSA and its 
consequences for assessing both health and receipt of disability-related benefits among 
those born in or before 1937 (aged 65+ in 2002) at follow-up. We propose a structural 
equation framework with two latent factors that builds upon the rational choice ap-
proach. Results indicate a non-linear relationship between latent health and future non-
response. Controlling for latent survey engagement considerably increases the overall 
explained variance of the model and significantly reduces the (direct) impact of latent 
health and other exogenous covariates on survey participation. We find that the selec-
tivity in non-response behaviours has important consequences for making inference from 
univariate analyses on health status and receipt of disability-related benefits from the 
subsample of respondents at follow-up. Findings have clear implications for fieldwork 
procedures.  
 
Keywords: disability, disability benefits, birth-cohort trends, latent factor, structural 
equation model. 
                                      
* I am grateful for comments and suggestions from Cheti Nicoletti, Amanda Sacker, Ruth Hancock and 
Stephen Pudney. Data from the ELSA were developed by researchers based at University College London, 
the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) and are made available 
through the UKDA. I wish to thank NatCen for helpful clarifications on the nature of the data and for 
providing geographical indicators used for the analyses. Neither the collectors of the data nor the UKDA 
bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. 
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1 Introduction 
 
People older than 65 years of age, and especially those aged over 80 years, are 
the fastest growing age groups of the population in many countries and also the 
most demanding of care (Colombo et al., 2011). In such a context, a key policy 
challenge is to promote healthy and active ageing while building an equitable and 
financially sustainable welfare system that meets the needs of older adults.  
Longitudinal studies such as the US Health Retirement Study (HRS), the Eng-
lish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) and the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) provide valuable information to study popula-
tion health dynamics and associations with economic behaviours and status in 
the later part of life.  
A major challenge for inference with longitudinal studies is that a considerable 
portion of the designed sample fails to participate, so that many outcomes of 
interest are confounded with the individual’s decision to participate in the study. 
For instance, if panel members’ participation is influenced by their health, then 
analysis of the socioeconomic determinants and consequences of health based on 
people who remain in the panel may be biased.  
Post-collection weighting adjustment strategies are commonly employed to 
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minimise the selection bias that results from non-response,3 under the assumption 
that the mechanism generating non-response is Missing at Random (MAR) (Lit-
tle & Rubin, 1987); that is, conditional on a set of observables, the non-response 
mechanism is random.  
Although weighting adjustment methods are nowadays highly refined, the main 
concern remains that information predicting non-response may not be completely 
observed, leading to violation of the MAR assumption and to invalid inferences 
about population parameters of interest. 
The object of this paper is to investigate the existence of health-related survey 
non-response among older people and its consequences for assessing their health 
and receipt of disability-related benefits at follow-up. Our results will help to 
identify which eligible members are likely to drop out of successive follows-up, 
and inform both the design of instruments that incentivise retention and post-
collection procedures that adjust for non-response. 
We begin by presenting our theoretical framework, which builds on the Dillman 
(1978) and Hill and Willis (2001) rational choice approach for survey participa-
tion. The proposed empirical framework makes use – for the first time to our 
knowledge – of a latent factor structural equation approach.  
                                      
3 These typically involve the assignment of weights to sample respondents in order to compensate for 
systematic differences between their characteristics and those of non-respondents. 
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We postulate that two latent constructs, together with other exogenous (as-
sumed error-free) variables, influence panel members’ participation at follow-up. 
The first of these is health status, which we assume is imperfectly measured by 
self-reported indicators of health status and health conditions (see, for example, 
the original papers of Lee, 1982; Van Vliet & Van Praag, 1987; Wolfe & Behrman, 
1984), and correlated with individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics (Dea-
ton, 2002; Deaton & Paxson, 2001; Graham, 2009).  
Perceived costs and benefits of participation are also assumed to be influenced 
by an individual’s underlying attitude towards the study, measured imperfectly 
by indicators found highly influential in determining survey participation (Banks 
et al., 2010; Copas & Farewell, 1998; Hawkes & Plewis, 2006; Hill & Willis, 2001; 
Kapteyn et al., 2006; Loosveldt et al., 2002; Nicoletti & Peracchi, 2005; Tou-
rangeau et al., 2000; Watson, 2003; Watson & Wooden, 2009; Zabel, 1998). We 
call this second latent factor “engagement”, to emphasise its role in measuring 
how individuals comply with the scope of the survey. Observed indicators of 
engagement available for our empirical analysis are: item non-response for ques-
tions about financial resources in the previous wave; consent to merge survey 
responses with administrative data; whether the self-completion questionnaire 
was returned; and completion of the more intrusive health modules.  
The engagement index is allowed to covary with individuals’ socio-demographic 
characteristics and to be correlated with latent health, since poor health may 
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limit respondents’ ability to retrieve the information needed to answer the most 
difficult questions (Beatty & Herrmann, 2002) or make them more sensitive to 
the issue of privacy (Jenkins et al., 2006; Johansson & Klevmarken, 2006). 
In the empirical section of this paper, we are concerned with non-response at 
the beginning of the ELSA study. Non-response in the first wave of a panel is 
typically much higher and relevant than in subsequent waves (Laurie et al., 1999; 
Lepkowski & Couper, 2002; Pyy-Martikainen & Rendtel, 2008; Watson & 
Wooden, 2009) and it is often viewed as the most relevant source of non-sampling 
errors in a panel. The fact that the ELSA sampling frame (the so-called wave 0) 
is composed of households that participated in previous Health Survey for Eng-
land (HSE), enables us to model participation into ELSA wave 1 by using infor-
mation gathered from previous HSEs. 
We find evidence of a non-linear effect of health on older people’s retention in 
ELSA at follow-up, although its significance is considerably reduced when “en-
gagement” is taken into account. Using non-response weights derived from our 
estimates, we find that non-response bias substantially affects the results of static 
and dynamic analyses of health status and receipt of disability-related benefits 
at follow-up. 
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The paper is organised as follows. We begin by reviewing existing literature on 
survey participation which is relevant to our empirical application. Section 3 
presents the econometric formulation of the general framework. Section 4 sum-
marises the main features of ELSA and discusses sample inclusion at each follow-
up, up to wave 6. Section 5 presents estimates of the retention model for the first 
wave of ELSA, using characteristics observed at wave 0. Estimates of the reten-
tion model are then used to build a post-collection adjustment technique based 
on the Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) estimator (Horvitz & Thompson, 
1952). The performance of the new weights is assessed in describing health status 
and receipt of disability-related benefits among the subsample of respondents in 
waves 1 and 2. A final section draws conclusions and suggests directions for future 
research. 
2 Literature review 
Many researchers from different disciplines have devoted effort to understand 
the determinants of survey participation with the aim of finding effective policies 
to reduce non-response and/or to develop post-collection procedures for dealing 
with possible sample selection bias. 
Sociologists and psychologists are mainly concerned with the psychological and 
social processes involved in survey participation to trace out good survey practice 
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and develop preventive policies that minimise non-response. Sample representa-
tiveness, the role of incentives, and the development of robust post-collection 
adjustment strategies are issues mainly raised in the statistical and economic 
literature.  
A comprehensive treatment of the literature on survey participation and its 
determinants is available, for example, in Groves and Couper (1998),Uhrig (2008), 
Watson and Wooden (2009). By drawing on the sparse literature, this section 
reviews the salient features relevant to our application. 
It has been found that the propensity to participate in a survey varies according 
to survey design features, the interview situation and interviewer workload 
(Groves et al., 1992; Groves & Couper, 1998; Hill & Willis, 2001; Lepkowski & 
Couper, 2002; Nicoletti & Buck, 2004); therefore the well-design of a survey is 
the key aspect for ex-ante minimisation of non-participation. However, individual 
characteristics, personality traits and attitudes play important roles in the for-
mulation of the decision to take part in the study (Copas & Farewell, 1998; 
Groves et al., 1992; Hill & Willis, 2001; Norris, 1985; Tourangeau et al., 2000; 
Zabel, 1998).  
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In empirical studies, poor health has often been found to be associated with 
lower participation in general multi-topic household surveys4 (Groves & Couper, 
1998; Lepkowski & Couper, 2002), but with no common pattern. Empirical stud-
ies which specifically explored the retention behaviours of older people in longi-
tudinal health-related survey have typically found mixed results.  
More often than not, compared with participants, dropouts have been found 
to have poor physical health and cognitive impairments (see for example the 
systematic reviews conducted by Bhamra et al., 2008; Chatfield et al., 2005). 
Kapteyn et al. (2006) found that the onset of health conditions such as diabetes, 
hypertension, or mental health problems or severe problems such as heart and 
lung disease or stroke are significantly positively associated with future non-re-
sponse in the HRS for males but are not statistically significant for women. For 
women, only the onset of a limitation in performing daily activities has a signifi-
cant negative effect on survey participation. However, Banks et al. (2010) found 
no significant relation between disease prevalence and future unit non-response 
in the ELSA and the HRS. Similarly, other studies have found no significant 
difference in future non-response by self-reported health (Van Beijsterveldt et al., 
                                      
4 As an example, Contoyannis et al. (2004) found that those reporting very poor initial health had a 
probability of dropping-out from the British Household Panel (BHPS) between 2 and 6 times greater than 
those who reported excellent health. In their study however, a dynamic model of health status is estimated 
correcting for non-response as well as cases of “individuals becoming ineligible because of incapacity or death” 
(p. 288). Because of the strong relation between health status and future death, the inclusion of ineligibles 
in the category of non-respondent is likely to make the selectiveness of unit non-response stronger than it 
actually is. 
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2002) in the Maastricht Aging Study nor by using physical and mental health 
measures (Deeg et al., 2002) in the Longitudinal Aging Study Amsterdam. Mat-
thews et al. (2006) reported that only about 30% of refusals of eligible members 
for year 6 onwards of the Medical Research Council Cognitive Function and 
Ageing Study (MRC-CFAS) were in poor health, whereas the remaining 70% 
were “active” but not willing to be re-interviewed. Deeg et al. (2002) reported 
that some members who refused to participate at follow-up were in better health 
and reported fewer chronic conditions than participants.  
The difficulty in assessing health-related non-response arises largely from the 
difficulty of measuring individuals’ health and we are not aware of any study on 
survey participation that has addressed all these complexities systematically. The 
use of just a single health indicator has typically been found to have a large 
influence on estimated relationships with survey non-participation (Jones et al., 
2006; Uhrig, 2008). But health, covers many interrelated dimensions, including 
the presence or absence of medical conditions (diseases), cognitive and physical 
functioning, and self-perception of health (Johnson & Wolinsky, 1993; Verbrugge 
& Jette, 1994). Each of these dimensions may influence costs and benefits of 
participating in different ways and such relations can also be non-linear. Costs 
can be very high for cognitively-impaired individuals, and for those in perfect 
health who may face higher opportunity costs of participating. Benefits might be 
higher for those with low/mild medical conditions who may benefit more from 
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free medical checks (Tinker et al., 2009) as well as for physically impaired indi-
viduals who might be more likely to be at home or may welcome the diversion of 
an interview (Stoop, 2005).  
 
Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the eligible sample have 
been found to be associated with both the probability of being contacted and, 
once contacted, the probability of co-operating with the scope of the survey. 
Their estimated relationships, however, vary according to specific features of the 
survey, timing and also with the set of covariates used in the econometric speci-
fication.  
Despite the large use of socio-demographics in modelling survey participation,5 
some researchers (see e.g., Zabel (1998)) pointed out their limited impact when 
indicators of individuals’ attitudes, beliefs and perceptions of the scope of the 
survey are included. Copas and Farewell (1998) proposed to include additional 
indicators of the interviewers’ enthusiasm to respond when modelling survey par-
ticipation.6 Hill and Willis (2001) found that the most influential predictors of 
future non-response in the third wave of HRS were respondents’ engagement with 
the aims of the survey and their cognitive reaction to the questionnaire.  
                                      
5 As Watson and Wooden (2009) pointed out, they are the type of variables readily available (to all 
researchers) for all sample members, at least at the time before the unit non-response is manifested. This 
would explain their wide use in the empirical analyses of the determinants of survey participation. 
6 Norris (1985) reported that the group of “disinterested” was the major source of dropout at the 
beginning of a health-related longitudinal study among old residents in Kentucky. 
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Item non-response and the degree of imputation on crucial variables were also 
used as proxies of unpleasant experience and low engagement or lack of interest 
with the scope of the survey. They were all found to be good predictors of future 
unit non-response (Hawkes & Plewis, 2006; Loosveldt et al., 2002; Nicoletti & 
Peracchi, 2005; Watson, 2003; Watson & Wooden, 2009; Zabel, 1998).  
Individuals’ engagement with the scope of the study might be also elicited by 
indicators of their willingness to comply with additional requests from the survey 
teams. As an example, Banks et al. (2010) found that failure to return the “self-
completion questionnaire” was strongly predictive of subsequent non-response in 
the ELSA. Similarly, Kapteyn et al. (2006) found that those who did not consent 
to data linkage were more likely to drop-out from the HRS study.   
As far the econometric approach is concerned, the common procedure is to 
treat the manifested indicators of low engagement with the scope of the survey 
as explanatory (proxy) predictors of future choice of remaining in the study. One 
exception –and in this respect, the study most closely related to our own – was 
that conducted by Hill and Willis (2001). They adopted a two-stage approach in 
which indicators were first used to derive factors (assumed to be independent) 
which then entered as explanatory predictors in the individual’s survey partici-
pation model.  
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It is important to note that both the proxy variable and the two-stage ap-
proaches are problematic. Specifically, incorporating the observed items as ex-
planatory predictors in the survey-participation model ignores the fact that they 
“are highly correlated – so much so that if we include them all as predictors in a 
model of participation, multicollinearity becomes a serious problem”(p. 427 Hill 
& Willis, 2001). Moreover, such proxy indicators – while usually highly correlated 
– generally contain sizeable measurement errors given their imperfect ability to 
fully capture the underlying concept intended to measure, so that traditional 
statistical methods (such as multiple regression, analysis of variance, simultane-
ous equation) provide biased results (Kline, 2011; Liu, 1988; Wang & Wang, 
2012).  
A two-stage approach does not take explicit account of the co-variation be-
tween latent factors. As an example, Hill and Willis (2001) found in the first step 
that the latent variable “easy” – a measure of interviewee’s cognitive reaction to 
the questionnaire – loaded positively on ease of remembering and understanding 
the questions and negatively on the “engagement” with the scope of the survey 
indicators. In their second step, the engagement index was positively associated 
with survey participation, whereas contrasting signs were found on “easy” ac-
cording to whether principal component factors were rotated or not (Table 3, p. 
431), thus whether the negative association between the two factors were re-
moved or not.  
26 
 
For our specific focus, it is also important to note that individual health was 
not included in the set of covariates used by Hill & Willis in modelling survey 
participation. This would lead to potential miss-specification problems due to the 
likely correlation of health with the factors “engagement” and “easy”. This would 
certainly be the case if people with poor health sustain higher costs in retrieving 
all the information required in formulating a response or are more sensitive to 
the issues of invasion of privacy (Beatty & Herrmann, 2002; Dunn et al., 2004; 
Jenkins et al., 2006; Kho et al., 2009). 
In the next session we attempt to develop a sufficiently general econometric 
approach that can take into account these aspects. 
3 Empirical framework 
In this section, we present an organising framework for our empirical analysis, 
building on the rational choice approach of survey participation proposed by 
Dillman (1978) and Hill and Willis (2001). According to this approach, an indi-
vidual takes part in a survey if the expected utility exceeds the expected costs.  
Let 푆푖∗ denote the net utility an individual derives from selecting a certain 
decision regarding participation in the survey and 푅푖 denote a binary variable 
indicating his or her actual decision (so 푅푖 = 1 if the individual remains in the 
study and 푅푖 = 0 otherwise). Assuming utility maximisation: 
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 푅푖 = 1 푖푓 푆푖∗ ≥ 0,푅푖 = 0 표푡ℎ푒푟푤푖푠푒 (1) 
 
the net utility 푆푖∗ is determined by evaluating the costs and benefits of partici-
pating in the survey.  
Non-participation increases with the costs and declines with the perceived ben-
efits of answering. Benefits may be financial (such as payments and free gifts), 
tangible but not financial (receiving medical tests and feedback on medical results, 
the diversion of a home visit for a person) or psychological (such as a feeling of 
taking an active role in society). Costs include the time spent in providing an 
answer, psychological stress in responding to sensitive questions or in providing 
an accurate answer, psychological and physical tension in taking part in medical 
and cognitive tests which may be felt to be too difficult, intrusive or humiliating 
(Tinker et al., 2009).  
The net utility 푆푖∗ can be decomposed into a systematic component, assumed 
to be a function of observed exogenous variables7 and a random disturbance term, 
with a setup that could take a fairly complex formulation, with non-linearities 
both in variables and parameters.  
In our framework, health is viewed as an endogenously determined capital stock 
(Grossman, 1972), difficult to quantify empirically but proxied by self-reported 
                                      
7  The vector of observables would include variables that have been suggested to affect survey 
participation, available within the data. Since they cannot be generally observed at the time when non-
participation is manifested, they are used to be proxied with information gathered from the previous wave, 
when 푖 was fully respondent. 
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health indicators. We follow the methodology adopted by, for example, Lee 
(1982); Van Vliet and Van Praag (1987); Wolfe and Behrman (1984), who inter-
pret self-reported health indicators (general health, anthropometric measures, 
clinical disease etc.) 푯 as imperfect indicators of underlying health status (ℎ∗).  
Latent health is then assumed to vary according to individuals’ socio-demo-
graphic and economic (SES) characteristics (풙ℎ), capturing both observable 
sources of heterogeneity in “true” health, such as the SES-health gradient (Dea-
ton, 2002; Deaton & Paxson, 2001; Graham, 2009) and differences, for a given 
level of “true” health, in the individuals’ survey reporting style (d’Uva et al., 
2011).  
Individual engagement with the scope of the survey (푒∗) is also treated as a 
latent concept, imperfectly indicated by a number of observed variables 푬 which 
covary with 풙푒 to capture possible observed heterogeneity around its mean. The 
equations for this 2-latent factor structural model are: 
 푆푖∗ = 휶푠풙푖푠 + 푓(ℎ푖∗; 휸푠) + 훿푒푖∗ + 휀푖푠 (2) 
 
 퐻̃푖푗 = ퟏ(λ푗ℎℎ푖∗ + 휖푗ℎ) (3) 
 
 ℎ푖∗ = 휶ℎ풙푖ℎ + 휀푖ℎ (4) 
 
 퐸̃푖푘 = ퟏ(λ푘푒푒푖∗ + 휖푘푒) (5) 
 
 푒푖∗ = 휶푒풙푖푒 + 휀푖푒 (6) 
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Equation (2) gives the net utility 푆푖∗ as a function of: a vector of exogeneous 
predictors of survey participation 풙푖푠; 푓(ℎ푖∗; 휸푠) which represents a flexible con-
tinuous function of ℎ푖∗, and 푒푖∗ representing the individual’s latent attitude to-
wards the survey; 훼, 훾 and 훿 are the corresponding coefficient vectors and 휀푖푠 is 
a random disturbance term.  
Equations (3) and (4) represent the measurement and the structural models of 
latent health, where  푗 = 1,2,… , 퐽  indices the indicators of latent health; λ푗ℎ is 
the coefficient of the impact of ℎ푖∗ on the j-th indicator, 휖푗ℎ is a random measure-
ment error with 퐸(휖푗ℎ) = 0 and 퐶표푣(휖푗ℎ, ℎ∗) = 0.  
Equation (3) is a generalised measurement part which allows the use of dichot-
omous and ordered categorical indicators in addition to continuous ones. We 
consider here a situation with 푯 being dichotomous or ordinal (i.e. Likert-scale) 
indicators which could imply an ordered probit link function generating the ob-
servable indicators 퐻푖푗 from its unobservable continuous form 퐻̃푖푗: 퐻̃푖푗 = 푚 if 
and only if 퐴푗푚−1 ≤ 퐻̃푖푗 ≤ 퐴푗푚, 푚 = 1, … ,푀푗 with 푀푗 being the number of re-
sponse categories for indicator 퐻푖푗 and 퐴푗푚 are threshold parameters.  
Equations (5) and (6) represent the measurement and the structural compo-
nents of latent engagement, where 푘 = 1,2,… , 퐾 indices the observable indica-
tors of latent engagement towards the survey, λ푘푒 is the coefficient of the impact 
of 푒푖∗  on the k-th indicator, 휖푘푒 is a random measurement error with 퐸(휖푘푒) = 0 
and 퐶표푣(휖푘푒, 푒∗) = 0. The latent variable 푒푖∗ is linearly determined, subjected to 
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a disturbance 휀푒, by a set of observable exogenous variables 풙푒 in equation (6), 
with 퐸(휀푒) = 0 and 퐶표푣(휀푒, 풙푒) = 0.  
The model described in equations (2)–(6) is a recursive triangular system of 
equations for latent health, latent engagement with the scope of the survey and 
future retention in the study. We allow possible overlaps in the elements of the 
vectors 풙풔, 풙풉 and 풙풆. We also assume that 퐶표푣(휀푠, 휀ℎ) = 퐶표푣(휀푠, 휀푒) = 0 and 
that 퐶표푣(휖푗ℎ, 휖푘푒) = 0 and 퐶표푣(휀푠, 휖푗ℎ) = 퐶표푣(휀푠, 휖푘푒) = 0.  
Finally, we accommodate the possibility that unhealthy people are less engaged 
(Beatty & Herrmann, 2002) or have greater sensitivity to issues of privacy (Dunn 
et al., 2004; Jenkins et al., 2006; Kho et al., 2009) by allowing the error terms for 
latent health and engagement (equations (4) and (6)) to be correlated.  
Figure 1 shows the path diagram for this model. A more general structural 
model of survey participation with q-latent exogenous variables is developed in 
Appendix 1.  
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FIGURE 1: Path diagram of a latent variable structural equation model of 
the determinant of survey participation 
Notes: In path diagrams, latent (unobserved) variables are represented by ovals and observed 
variables are represented by boxes. Straight one-headed arrows designate direct association. En-
dogenous variables (indicators) are inter-correlated, as indicated by the bi-directional arrows. 
Latent variables are correlated as indicated by the bi-directional dashed line.  
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4 The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing 
(ELSA) 
 
ELSA is a nationally representative survey collecting data on health and disa-
bility and the financial circumstances and well-being of people aged 50 and over 
and their partners living in private households in England.8 Many of the health 
measures adopted in ELSA are comparable with measures used in the HRS 
(Banks et al., 2010; Wallace & Herzog, 1995) and the SHARE (Börsch-Supan et 
al., 2005).  
The original ELSA sample consists of people born on or before 29 February 
1952 and their households, selected from three separate years of the Health Sur-
vey for England (HSE) (1998, 1999 and 2001)9.  
In the first wave of ELSA, conducted between March 2002 and May 2003, 
around 11,500 men and women aged 50 and over and approximately 600 partners 
aged below 50 were interviewed face-to-face. Surviving sample members living in 
residential addresses in England were re-contacted every two years, tracking 
changes in their health and economic circumstances. To encourage response in 
                                      
8 The ELSA is the result of collaboration between the University College London, the Institute of Fiscal 
Studies (IFS), and the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen). The universities of Cambridge, Exeter 
and East Anglia provided expert advice on specific modules. For a fuller description of ELSA we refer to 
the ELSA user documentation and technical report available at: http://www.elsa-project.ac.uk/. 
9 The HSE is an annual government-funded general health survey of people living in England, carried 
out by the Department of Epidemiology at University College London and NatCen. Its sample design is 
drawn from the Royal Mail’s small users’ Postcode Address Files, stratified by health authority and 
proportion of households in the non-manual socio-economic groups. User documentation and technical 
reports are available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/hssrg/studies/hse.  
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ELSA, an advance letter was sent to each respondent, giving information about 
the survey, including the promise of a £10 gift voucher at the end of the inter-
view.10  
While ELSA was influenced by and modelled on the US-HRS, panel member-
ship in ELSA differs from that of the HRS in one important respect: the ELSA 
sample is drawn from participants in separate HSE cross-sections. The use of 
HSE as a sample frame has the advantages of:  
a) identifying eligible individuals at reasonable cost;  
b) availability of information about respondents’ health and other characteris-
tics before they took part in ELSA;  
c) increased probability of participation in ELSA due to previous participation 
in another health-related survey.  
 
The main drawback is that selection into ELSA occurs twice: first as a result 
of selective non-response in HSE sweeps,11 and second as a result of selective 
refusal of HSE sample members to participate in ELSA (Taylor et al., 2007). 
Non-response and calibration weights were developed by the ELSA team as post-
                                      
10 Average interview length was around one hour and twenty–five minutes for each individual, with high 
variation by household size and health status. A total of 277 interviewers were used for wave 1. Interviews 
were clustered and issued to interviewers according to postcode sector. The average number of achieved 
interviews by interviewer at wave 1 was 44, with a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 112. Given the length 
of the interview, interviewers were asked to fix an appointment before conducting the interview. The average 
number of calls to achieve an interview in wave 1 was 3.3, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 20. 
Unfortunately, these details at an individual level are not available to researchers and could not be included 
in the vector 풙푠 of our study.  
11 Individual response rates in the HSE cross-sections 1998, 1999 and 2001 were 69%, 70% and 67%, 
respectively (Sholes et. al, 2009; Table 2-1 p. 6). 
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collection compensation for differences in sampling probabilities, non-response 
and non-coverage. A detailed description of the ELSA weighting strategy is pre-
sented in section 6.  
Here we focus on the sample selection problem into the ELSA study. The anal-
ysis is restricted to those born on or before 1937 (aged 65+ in 2002), fully inter-
viewed in wave 0, tracking their participation throughout the first six waves of 
ELSA. This sample selection excludes almost all involvement in the labour force, 
so that both endogeneity problems of survey participation and labour supply 
decisions12 and between health status and labour market participation can be 
avoided. In addition, over-65s are more likely than younger age groups to expe-
rience health conditions and disabilities, so that the presence of health-related 
non-response is a major concern. 
4.1 The unit non-response problem in the ELSA 
We distinguish between eligible and non-eligible sample members. Ineligible 
people are those who died prior to the fieldwork,13 moved into institutions or 
outside England, or were erroneously selected as part of the sampling frame (Tay-
lor et al., 2007). Eligible people are divided into respondents and non-respondents. 
                                      
12 For those people in paid work, in fact, the opportunity cost of participating in the survey would be 
rather different than for a retired counterpart. 
13 A linkage with the national registration system enables the identification of deceased people before 
attempting an interview. 
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Respondents are those who completed interviews in person (푓푢푙푙), who were in-
terviewed by proxy or were partially interviewed in person (푝푎푟푡푖푎푙). The non-
respondent group contains those who were non-contactable or who were con-
tacted but refused to co-operate.  
Table 1 shows the outcomes of interviews for the designated sample of members 
born in or before 1937. From the 9,840 respondents selected from wave 0, 1,005 
were ineligible for wave 1: about 96% of those who became ineligible died before 
the first ELSA interviews took place. The high proportion of deaths observed 
from wave 0 to wave 1 appears to be connected to the choice of the sample frame 
which reflects the household composition at the time when the HSE interview 
took place. From that time to the first ELSA interview (wave 1), between one 
and four years elapsed, with the result that most of the oldest people selected for 
the ELSA study died.  
The sample contains 8,835 eligible adults aged 65 and over for wave 1. Of these, 
about 63% were interviewed in wave 1 with 96% providing a full interview, 31% 
refused and 6% were not contacted. Between waves 1 and 2, 670 sample members 
became ineligible. A significant subgroup of eligible sample members was not 
issued for follow-up in wave 2 because all members of their household had explic-
itly refused to be re-contacted after wave 1. For reasons still under investigation,14  
                                      
14 Personal communication with the ELSA team. 
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TABLE 1: Sample frame, non-eligible and eligible members in the ELSA 
Wave   
(fieldwork period) 
INELIGIBLE  ELIGIBLE 
Total  
(cumulative) 
Respondents Non respondent 
Full main 
interview Partial  Total 
As % of 
eligibles  
contact 
failure refusal Total 
As % of 
eligibles 
                
0 (1998, 1999 and 2001)* - 9,840  9,840 - - - - - 
1 (3/2002 - 3/2003) 1,005 5,371 223 5,594 63.32% 497 2,744 3,241 36.68% 
2 (6/2004 - 7/2005) 1,675+ 2,941a 4,055 99 4,154 79.52% 270 800 1,070 20.48% 
3 (5/2006 - 8/2007) 5,173 3,307 164 3,471 74.37% 161 1035 1,196 25.63% 
4 (5/2008 - 7/2009) 5,842 2,730 184 2,914 72.89% 165 919 1,084 27.11% 
5 (6/2010 - 7/2011) 6,260 2,361 214 2,575 71.93% 172 833 1,005 28.07% 
6 (5/2012 - 6/2013)          
Note:  (*) Wave 0 refers to the selected sample born in or before 1937 (aged 65+ in 2002) who provided a full interview in wave 0. Our analysis uses the file 
index_file_wave_0-wave_5_v2 provided by ELSA team (last access 13/10/2014), mainly using the wave specific variables outind and issue. Outcomes 
of the interview are not currently available for wave 6. Contact failure is defined as cases of no contact, broken appointment, away/ill in hospital during survey 
period, physically/mentally unable/incompetent, contact made but not with eligible resident, address not attempted, address inaccessible, unable to locate 
address, duplicate address, moved – unable to trace”. Refusal is defined as cases of refusal before or during the interview, ill at home during survey period, 
productive interview but respondent requested deletion. See text for details.   (a) 2,941 eligible members were not issued for follow-up in wave 2 because all 
wave 1 respondents in the household explicitly refused to be re-contacted and were consequently considered ineligible by the ELSA team. See text for details.
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they were flagged as ineligible members by the ELSA team (Scholes et al., 2008 
p.40). In our designated sample they number 2,941 and for our analysis in section 
6.2 they are treated as cases of non-response. Whether they are treated as ineli-
gible or non-responders makes a substantial difference. For example, the response 
rate for those born by 1937 at wave 2 is 80% if they are treated as ineligible, and 
51% if they are treated as non-respondents.  
A number of important messages emerge from the numbers presented in Table 
1. Firstly, only about a quarter of the initial sample of those born in or after 1937 
can be tracked to wave 5. This is not surprising given the age of the sample and 
the associated risk of becoming ineligible.  
Among eligible members, there was a heavy loss at the beginning of the study. 
This is in line with reported lower response rates in the first follow-up of other 
longitudinal studies (Fitzgerald et al., 1998; Laurie et al., 1999; Pyy-Martikainen 
& Rendtel, 2008; Watson & Wooden, 2009).15 High dropout rate at the beginning 
of the ELSA study motivates the focus of this study.  
Second, we are able to distinguish ineligibles from non-respondents. The dis-
tinction between non-participation due to ineligibility and unit non-response is 
of paramount importance when we wish to make inferences that related to the 
                                      
15 Lepkowski and Couper (2002) argue that the response process in the first wave is fundamentally 
different from that of subsequent waves. This is both because of self-selection of the least committed sample 
units and because of the extra information and organisational experience gained by the survey agencies at 
each follow-up. 
38 
 
whole population. As pointed out by Nicoletti and Peracchi (2005), dropouts 
because of ineligibility reproduce the dynamics of the target population whereas 
survey non-response truncates the sample incidentally. For our sample in ELSA, 
ineligibility is mainly due to death, as the link with mortality register available 
for ELSA has documented.  
Finally, non-response in ELSA is much more often due to refusal than to con-
tact failures. The low rate of contact failure could reflect ELSA’s specific focus 
on older people, who have relatively low household mobility, and its sample being 
selected from those already participating in another survey. Given this, we com-
bine non-contacts and refusals in a single class of non-respondents for our analy-
sis.16  
5 Results 
The model comprising equations (2)–(6) has been estimated simultaneously 
allowing for the discrete nature of the dependent variables, using robust maxi-
mum likelihood as implemented in MPlus version 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-
2012). Standard errors were clustered by household to allow for intra-household 
                                      
16 As an example, Nicoletti and Peracchi (2005) allow for conditional correlation in a bivariate probit 
model which distinguishes between contact and co-operation in the European Community Household Panel. 
They found that estimated coefficients were almost invariant when conditional independence was relaxed. 
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correlation. The final outcome (푅) in the subsequent wave is categorised as fol-
lows: 1 fully or partial respondent; 0 non-contact, refusal or interview by proxy17. 
The sample is restricted to those born in or before 1937 (aged 65+ in 2002), fully 
interviewed in wave 0 and eligible for wave 1. Excluding eligible sample members 
with missing values in our list of explanatory variables measured at baseline, the 
sample size reduces from 8,835 to 8,420, with a loss of 415 observations.   
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
A complete list of variables and their descriptive statistics by final outcome of 
the interview in wave 1 used for the empirical part of this paper is given in Table 
2. Women are more prone to drop out from the study, in line with the idea that 
older women, although more readily contacted, tend to be more sensitive to issues 
of invasion of privacy (Johansson & Klevmarken, 2006) and less prone to partic-
ipate in health-related studies (Lynn & Clarke, 2002). Also in line with literature, 
unit non-response is higher among older people (Lepkowski & Couper, 2002; 
Uhrig, 2008), un-partnered (Groves & Couper, 1998), non-white (Zabel, 1998), 
those with low education and those in lower social classes (Groves & Couper, 
1998). Being a homeowner (Lepkowski & Couper, 2002) and living in a non-urban 
                                      
17 Proxy interviews in subsequent waves are coded as non-respondent because self-reported  and objective 
information on individual health status/disability was not collected for proxy respondents. Thus, proxy 
interviews are generally excluded in studies on health and health-care utilisation.  
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area (DeMaio, 1980; Stoop, 2005) is positively associated with survey participa-
tion.  
Two types of health indicator are consistently collected in the three waves of 
HSE from which ELSA wave 0 sample was drawn.18 One is the individual’s self-
assessed health (SAH) as very bad, bad, fair, good or very good. Those with bad 
and very bad self-assessed health are more likely to drop out from the study, in 
line with previous studies. Conversely, those in very good health are more likely 
to take part in wave 1.   
The second type of indicator is related to self-reported medical conditions. In 
line with Banks et al. (2010), descriptive analysis suggests that once ineligibles 
are excluded from the analysis, the group of non-respondents in wave 1 does not 
report significantly higher prevalence of medical conditions than respondents. 
The only exception is for the indicator of cardiovascular problems, which suggests 
a counter-intuitive positive relationship between that condition and future re-
sponse. 
Engagement with the scope of the survey is significantly higher among respond-
ents in wave 1, providing an early and consistent indication of the importance of 
such indicators in explaining future response in the ELSA. Dramatic differences 
                                      
18 Strictly speaking, the HSE uses modules of questions on specific issues that vary year on year and our 
empirical analysis uses indicators consistently collected in the three HSEs from which the initial ELSA 
sample was drawn. It should be noted, however, that the econometric framework proposed can be extended 
by allowing missing by design of some of the endogenous indicators.  
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TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics ELSA wave 0 sample according interview out-
come in wave 1 
 
  Non-respondent  Respondent  Difference 
  mean sd mean sd  
Covariates       
Women 0.579 0.494 0.543 0.498 0.0364** 
Age of the respondent at year 2002(a)  75.302 6.882 74.069 6.478 1.2320*** 
Have a partner 0.588 0.492 0.610 0.488 -0.0220* 
Left education before 14yrs old 0.537 0.499 0.462 0.499 0.0749*** 
Left education after 19yrs old   0.056 0.230 0.077 0.266 -0.0210*** 
Non white 0.029 0.168 0.021 0.143 0.0080* 
Home owner 0.729 0.444 0.762 0.426 -0.0330*** 
Social class: manual worker 0.519 0.500 0.462 0.499 0.0570*** 
Interviewed in 1998 0.361 0.480 0.433 0.496 -0.0722*** 
Interviewed in 1999 0.196 0.397 0.190 0.392 0.0058 
Interviewed in 2001 0.443 0.497 0.377 0.485 0.0664*** 
Urban >10k 0.788 0.409 0.760 0.427 0.0279** 
Health indicators 
Self-assessed health (SAH):       
     Very bad 0.040 0.195 0.021 0.145 0.0181*** 
     Bad 0.091 0.288 0.076 0.265 0.0150* 
     Fair 0.301 0.459 0.284 0.451 0.0174 
     Good 0.359 0.480 0.378 0.485 -0.0192 
     Very good 0.209 0.407 0.241 0.428 -0.0313*** 
Medical conditions (suffer from):       
Infectious disease 0.033 0.177 0.029 0.168 0.0033 
Neoplasms & benign growths 0.098 0.297 0.103 0.304 -0.0055 
Endocrine & metabolic 0.022 0.148 0.019 0.138 0.0028 
Blood & related organs 0.035 0.184 0.034 0.182 0.0008 
Mental disorders 0.062 0.241 0.059 0.236 0.0028 
Nervous system 0.049 0.216 0.053 0.225 -0.0041 
Eye complaints 0.275 0.447 0.274 0.446 0.0016 
Ear complaints 0.099 0.299 0.100 0.300 -0.0009 
Heart & circulatory system 0.075 0.263 0.091 0.288 -0.0163** 
Respiratory system 0.033 0.178 0.033 0.178 0.0001 
Digestive system 0.019 0.135 0.016 0.125 0.0027 
Genital-urinary system 0.333 0.471 0.332 0.471 0.0005 
Musculoskeletal system 0.009 0.096 0.009 0.093 0.0006 
Engagement indicators    
Consent link survey data with adminis-
trative data  
0.806 0.395 0.958 0.201 -0.1520*** 
Complete and return the self-completion 
booklet 
0.913 0.282 0.972 0.164 -0.0592*** 
Non-missing value at financial questions  0.958 0.200 0.978 0.147 -0.0196*** 
Consent having a nurse visit 0.793 0.405 0.958 0.201 -0.1650*** 
Observations 3,012 5,408   
Sample size: 8,420 see text for details. Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. (a) collapsed at 90. 
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in future interview outcomes are found in the percentage of those who consent to 
link survey records with administrative records, those who did complete/return 
the self-booked questionnaire, those who gave answers to the income questions in 
the HSE and those who consented to a nurse visit. 
5.2 The measurement equations  
Table 3 presents results from the measurement equations in (3) and (5) of the 
full SEM comprising equations (2)–(6).  
Factor loadings(휆푗ℎ, 휆푘푒), which represent respectively the effects of latent 
health (ℎ∗)  and latent engagement (푒∗) on manifested indicators 푯 and 푬, are 
in line with expectation. The factor loadings associated with latent heath index 
are positive and highly significant for all the indicators in use. This means that 
풉∗ is a decreasing function of health. We also report the squared correlation of 
each indicator with the underlying latent construct.  
It is important to note that we combine items from different health concepts 
to extract a single latent factor of poor-health,19 without assuming any tem-
poral/causal ordering. A broad accepted conceptual framework (see, among oth-
ers, Johnson & Wolinsky, 1993; Verbrugge & Jette, 1994)   
                                      
19 Exploratory principal component factor analysis on health-related items indicates the existence of a 
single latent factor with an eigenvalue of about 2. The second factor has an eigenvalue of 1.1, which is very 
weak and does not strictly fall below the conventional 1.0 cut-off. Thus, a unique latent poor-health factor, 
explaining about 20% of the variance in the 14 health-related items, is assumed in the econometric specifi-
cation. 
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TABLE 3: Factor loadings and squared correlations of observables indicators 
with latent indices 
indicator 
Factor load-
ings 
S.E R2 
Indicators of ℎ∗    
SAH - Self-assessed health status (1 very good;…; 5 very bad) 4.458*** 0.257 0.960 
(D) Infectious disease 0.313*** 0.031 0.100 
(D) Neoplasms & benign growths a 0.291*** 0.020 0.086 
(D) Endocrine & metabolic 0.316*** 0.032 0.099 
(D) Blood & related organs 0.245*** 0.028 0.064 
(D) Mental disorders 0.212*** 0.024 0.045 
(D) Nervous system 0.135*** 0.024 0.019 
(D) Eye complaints 0.459*** 0.018 0.189 
(D) Ear complaints 0.398*** 0.022 0.150 
(D) Heart & circulatory system 0.334*** 0.022 0.110 
(D) Respiratory system 0.250*** 0.030 0.065 
(D) Digestive system 0.211*** 0.037 0.047 
(D) Genito-urinary system 0.459*** 0.017 0.187 
(D) Musculoskeletal system 0.221*** 0.043 0.049 
Indicators of 푒∗    
(D) Consent link survey data with admin data 1.126*** 0.102 0.739 
(D) Complete and return the self-completion booklet 0.538*** 0.039 0.399 
(D) Respondent provides a non-missing value at financial 
questions (income sources and savings) 0.205*** 0.030 0.063 
(D) Consent having a nurse visit 0.873*** 0.063 0.659 
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. (a) we excluded minor skin cancers. (D) denotes 
dummy variables.  R2 is the squared correlation between factor loadings and latent factors. Esti-
mates in the table refers to specification “D” (see later in the text) but factor loadings obtained 
from other specifications are virtually identical. 
 
would see damage at the cellular level eventually influencing functioning at the 
level of organs, which ultimately restricts the individual’s capacity to perform 
tasks and social roles. That is, disease leads to impairment, which leads to func-
tional limitations, which in turn cause disability and affect SAH. Therefore one 
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can view medical condition outcomes as 푑푖푠푡푎푙 and SAH as 푝푟표푥푖푚푎푙 measures 
of current latent poor-health.  
In our application, we treat all 푯 as being determined by ℎ∗ for mainly two 
reasons. First, causal or temporal ordering cannot be conclusively assessed in 
cross-sectional data as in our case. Second, a given disablement process can 
prompt new pathologies and associated dysfunctions, leading to endogeneity is-
sues.20 However, we found that SAH has substantially higher squared correlation 
with ℎ∗ than the others, though we cannot know for sure that this is due to the 
higher explanatory power of SAH with respect to medical condition indicators or 
because it is a 5-point scale indicator with a higher statistical explanation power 
than binary ones.  
The factor loadings associated with latent engagement are all positive and 
highly significant.21 The highest correlation with the engagement index is found 
for the indicators of consent to merge survey data with social security records 
and participation in the nurse visit. The indicator most widely used by other 
researchers, item non-response on income questions, is the least sensitive, with 
                                      
20 For example, a woman with painful arthritis may reduce her mobility which eventually has an impact 
on her SAH and starts a vicious circle with possible reduction of her cardiopulmonary function and ability 
to participate in social activities, with potential effects on her mental health. While detecting the 
chronological/causal path would be an interesting line of research, our attempt here is limited to describing 
a broader concept of health which goes beyond the one-indicator – and almost atheoretical – vision of “true” 
health. 
21 Exploratory principal component factor analysis suggests the presence of a single factor of engagement 
given that the eigenvalue associated with a second factor falls far below the conventional 1.0 cut-off. 
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almost 94% of its variance unassociated with latent engagement. 
5.3 The structural equations 
Structural parameters of the health and engagement equations (4) and (6) are 
provided in Table 4. The latent poor-health index (ℎ∗) is higher for non-white 
women and is non-linearly associated with age of the respondent.22 SES-related 
differences in health are clearly evident by looking at the magnitude and signifi-
cance of the coefficients associated with educational attainments, social class and 
home-ownership. Highly educated individuals have significantly better average 
health than otherwise similar less educated people. Similarly, high social class 
and housing wealth are also associated with better health.  
TABLE 4: Structural parameters of the health (ℎ∗) and engagement (푒∗) equa-
tions 
Covariate 
ℎ∗ 푒∗ 
Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E 
Female 0.050** 0.024 -0.260*** 0.045 
Spline age 65-74 -0.006* 0.001 -0.016 0.011 
Spline from age 74+ a 0.017*** 0.003 -0.042*** 0.008 
Married/cohabiting 0.032 0.028 0.149** 0.066 
Completed education before 14 years old 0.186*** 0.028 -0.055 0.066 
Completed education after 19 years old -0.245*** 0.051 -0.172 0.117 
Non-white 0.543*** 0.083 -0.865*** 0.154 
Home-owner -0.302*** 0.031 0.137* 0.072 
Social class: manual worker 0.177*** 0.027 -0.187*** 0.061 
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. (a) collapsed at 90. Estimates in the table refers 
to model D specification (see later in the text). The model also includes dummy variables on 
region of residence, if living in urban area (>10K), and from which HSE cross-section the eligible 
person was drawn. Standard errors were clustered at household level. 
                                      
22 Sample members’ age enters in all structural equations in the form of a spline with a knot at the 
median age (74). It accounts for possible non-linearities in its relation with health (equation (4)), engagement 
(equation (6)) and retention to the study (equation (2)). 
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Engagement with the scope of the survey (푒∗) is lower for older non-white 
women and higher for partnered individuals. One might expect a SES-engage-
ment gradient, in line with the idea that high SES individuals are more likely to 
perceive the social benefits of complying with the scope of the survey (Uhrig, 
2008), but our results are not consistent with that. Home-owners show a higher 
level of engagement (significant at 10% level) and low social class is negatively 
associated with engagement (p-value <0.001) but, surprisingly, we do not find 
any significant association of 풆∗ with level of education. This result is consistent 
with findings in Jenkins et al. (2006) where education was not significantly asso-
ciated with consent behaviours to data linkage.  
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TABLE 5: Estimates of retention in the survey in wave 1 of ELSA 
Covariate 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E 
Female -0.107*** 0.023 -0.111*** 0.023 0.001 0.032 -0.002 0.032 
Spline age 65-74 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.008 
Spline from age 74+ a -0.027*** 0.004 -0.027*** 0.004 -0.012** 0.006 -0.012** 0.006 
Married/cohabiting -0.079** 0.036 -0.081** 0.036 -0.175*** 0.048 -0.177*** 0.048 
Completed education before 14 years old -0.096*** 0.036 -0.095*** 0.036 -0.099** 0.048 -0.097** 0.048 
Completed education after 19 years old 0.082 0.064 0.087 0.065 0.208** 0.082 0.211** 0.082 
Non-white -0.230** 0.102 -0.226** 0.102 0.155 0.137 0.157 0.137 
Home-owner -0.001 0.041 -0.003 0.041 -0.061 0.052 -0.063 0.052 
Social class: manual worker -0.104*** 0.033 -0.104*** 0.033 -0.039 0.044 -0.040 0.044 
ℎ∗ -0.042*** 0.016 -0.047*** 0.016 -0.016 0.021 -0.023 0.021 
(ℎ∗)2    -0.030** 0.013   -0.026* 0.015 
푒∗     0.521*** 0.030 0.520*** 0.03 
푐표푣(ℎ∗, 푒∗)         -0.072** 0.030 -0.073** 0.03 
Free  parameters 45 46 55 56 
Log-likelihood -49783.925 -40620.272 -49434.928 -49433.378 
Correction for non-normality factor 1.1286 1.548 1.1333 1.1321 
AIC 99769.85 81452.544 99075.856 99074.756 
BIC 100480.725 82198.611 99800.808 99806.746 
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. (a) collapsed at 90. All models also include dummy variables on region of residence, if living in urban area 
(>10K), and from which HSE cross-section the eligible person was drawn. Standard errors were clustered at household level. 
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Structural parameters of the retention model (equation (2)) are provided in 
Table 5 in four different variants. Model A is a reduced version in which latent 
health enters linearly and we do not control for latent engagement. Model B 
introduces a quadratic term for health aiming at testing its possible non-linear 
relationship with retention in wave 1. Models C and D introduce latent engage-
ment in the set of covariates when ℎ∗ is entered linearly and in a quadratic form. 
For model A, we found results in line with previous research. Older married 
women are less likely to remain in the study as well as the non-white population. 
Lower education and social class are negatively associated with participation in 
wave 1 of ELSA but we did not find any significant relationship with home own-
ership.  
In model A, there is a positive relationship between health and survey partici-
pation: poor-health significantly reduces the likelihood of retention in wave 1 but 
model B, which fits the data slightly better than model A, reveals a significant 
U-shape relationship, meaning that, while unhealthy individuals are less likely to 
remain in the study at follow-up, very healthy individuals do not show signifi-
cantly lower dropout probabilities with respect to the remaining sample popula-
tion. This is consistent with the view that healthy people might have concerns 
about the time cost of participating and in taking part in medical and cognitive 
tests which, apart from being time-consuming, may also be felt to be humiliating.  
Models C and D introduce the latent engagement index in the set of covariates 
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for retention when latent health enters in the model linearly and in a quadratic 
form, respectively. Both specifications show that the latent engagement index 
plays the most important role in explaining retention decision for wave 1, by 
increasing the explained variance significantly, as shown from the goodness of fit 
statistics available at the bottom of Table 5.  
Controlling for engagement, the effect of other covariates is significantly weak-
ened. Gender, race, home-ownership and social class no longer play a significant 
effect in explaining retention in the study. The coefficient associated with the 
second spline of age23 is almost halved, whereas the effect of being partnered is 
now about 2.2 times higher those obtained in models A and B. Similarly, the 
effect of level of education is significantly increased, with an emerging significant 
retention bias in favour of those more educated.  
Controlling for engagement, latent health is no longer significantly related to 
wave 1 participation when its effect is assumed to be linear (model C). The coef-
ficient of the quadratic term of ℎ∗ in model D is now significant only at the 10% 
level. Both specifications provide evidence that, controlling for the individual’s 
engagement at baseline, health plays a minor role in explaining participation in 
wave 1.  
There is a small but significant correlation between ℎ∗ and 푒∗ of about -0.07, 
                                      
23 See previous footnote for a definition. 
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p<0.05, consistent with the idea that people in poor health face higher costs in 
retrieving all the information required in formulating a response or are more 
sensitive to privacy concerns (Beatty & Herrmann, 2002; Dunn et al., 2004; Jen-
kins et al., 2006; Kho et al., 2009) and are less engaged. This has to be taken into 
account when drawing conclusions from estimates in Table 5. A series of robust-
ness checks are confined in the Appendix. For example, constraining the correla-
tion between the two latent constructs to zero increases the importance of ℎ∗ in 
explaining retention in wave 1 but leaves other structural coefficients virtually 
unaffected (see Appendix Table A1).  
5.4 Implications 
Figure 2 shows the implications of the estimates of model D in table 5, for 
three illustrative 75-year old individuals, each with a low level of education and 
living alone.24 Engagement with the scope of the survey is set at the values ob-
served at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of its Empirical Bayes’ (EB) sample 
prediction25 distribution. Predicted probabilities of remaining in the study in 
wave 1 vary considerably according to the level of engagement at wave 0. The 
weakly engaged individual has on average a predicted retention probability of 
                                      
24 Given the non-significance of other 풙푠 but age, marital status and education in explaining retention in 
wave 1, we set their values to zeros. 
25 EB predictors of the latent variables ξ{ℎ∗, 푒∗} are the means of the empirical posterior distribution 
with the parameter estimates 휽(.) = {λ(.), 휶(.)} replaced with their estimated model parameters 휽(.)̂ and are 
calculated by approximation of the following multivariate integral: ∫ ξ휔(푢|푯, 푬,풙; 휽)̂푑ξ.  
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about 38%; rising to 54% and 65% at the medium and high levels of engagement.  
Retention rates increase with latent health up to a certain level and decrease 
slightly thereafter. For a low (high) engaged individual, the predicted probability 
of participating in wave 1 of ELSA is about 38% (64%) in the bottom 5% percent 
of the latent poor-health distribution, 40% (66%) at its median level, felling to 
34% (60%) for those in the top 5% of the latent health distribution.  
FIGURE 2: Predictions of the probability of remaining in the ELSA study by 
latent health index for three 75-year-old representative individuals with differ-
ent level of engagement with the scope of the study 
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities computed using estimates of model D in Table 5 (see text for 
details). To facilitate the interpretation, the labels for the x-axis in the figure refer to the cate-
gories of the 5-scale SAH indicator (the most influential factor in determining latent health) 
which corresponds to the mean values of the EB prediction of latent health observed in the 5 
categories of the SAH question.   
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6 Post-estimation analysis 
In this section we assess whether the sample comprised of those who were 
observed at follow-up (푅 = 1) remains representative for the population of inter-
est and, if not, how estimates from the system comprising equations (2)–(6) can 
be used to correct for the sample selection bias caused by unit non-response.  
Suppose we are interested in estimating in wave 푠 (푠 = 1, … ,6) a conditional 
mean 퐸(푌푖푠|푾푖푠) or the entire conditional distribution of 푌 . In the ELSA study, 
푌푖푠 can be, for example a measure of disability or a SES outcome observed in 
wave 풔. Since we can observe 푌푖푠 only for those who remain in the sample in 
wave 풔, the simplest assumption we can make is that 푌푖푠 is Missing Completely 
at Random (MCAR), which implies independence between 푌푖푠 and 푅푖푠: 퐸(푌푖푠) =
 퐸(푌푖푠| 푅푖푠 = 1). Under MCAR, we make the strong assumption that no other 
characteristics affect either 푌푖푠 or 푅푖푠.  
A less restrictive assumption is Missing at Random (MAR) (see Little and 
Rubin (1987)) or Selection on Observables (Fitzgerald et al., 1998). Under MAR, 
the missingness mechanism which affects 풀풊풔 does not depend on unobservables, 
conditional on observables (푾풊풔): 퐸(푌푖푠| 푾푖푠) =  퐸(푌푖푠| 푾푖푠,푅푖푠 = 1). Decom-
pose 푾풊풔 into (풙풊, ℎ푖∗, 푒푖∗) and the MAR condition can be re-written as follows: 
퐸(푌푖푠| 푾푖푠) =  퐸(휃푖푠, 푅푖푠, 푌푖푠) with 휃푖푠 = 1푃푟(푅푖푠=1|풙푖푠,ℎ푖∗,푒푖∗) denoting the vector of 
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individual weights which can be used to obtain consistent estimates of 푌푖푠.26 This 
procedure is the so-called “Inverse Probability Weights” (IPW) (Horvitz & 
Thompson, 1952).  
It has been shown that, under certain conditions,27 IPW is efficient in presence 
of exogenous covariates and it has been used extensively in recent years as the 
basis of many post-collection adjustment procedures aiming at attenuating, under 
MAR, sample selection bias.  
For the core-member sample of ELSA, non-response weights were constructed 
by the ELSA team at household level using a propensity score weighting method. 
For wave 1, a logistic regression of retention in the study was used based only on 
age of the oldest household member, regional health authority, household size, 
social class, year of HSE interview and presence of long-standing illness as ob-
tained in wave 0 (Taylor et al., 2007).  
By using auxiliary population information, a post-stratification adjustment is 
often made to ensure that the sample matches the population the study intends 
to represents. In the case of ELSA calibration weights were used for wave 1 to 
account for any potential bias caused by unequal selection probabilities (in the 
                                      
26  To see this, observe that: 퐸(휃푖푠, 푅푖푠, 푌푖푠) = 퐸[퐸(휃푖푠, 푅푖푠, 푌푖푠|풙푖푠, ℎ푖푠∗ , 푒푖푠∗ ] = 퐸[푃푟(푅푖푠 = 1|풙푖푠, ℎ푖푠∗ , 푒푖푠∗ )휃푖푠퐸(푌푖푠|풙푖푠, ℎ푖푠∗ , 푒푖푠∗ )] = 퐸(푌푖푠|풙푖푠, ℎ푖푠∗ , 푒푖푠∗ ) = 퐸(푌푖푠)  where 풙푖푠  may contain 
time-invariant as well as time-variant characteristics. The latter can be observed only for those with 푅푖푠 =1. A usual assumption in longitudinal analysis is to instrument 풙푖푠 with its lagged value (i.e. the values 
observed in wave 푠 − 1 of ELSA), available for both respondents and non-respondents of wave 푠. 
27 We refer to Wooldridge (2002) for a detailed presentation of IPW theory.  
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HSE) and refusals to be contacted for the ELSA study. Such further round of 
weights were constructed as the ratio of the sample size in the Census 2001 non-
institutionalised population and ELSA, in cells defined by gender and age groups. 
Calibration weights were then multiply with the non-response IPW weights to 
better align the sample to the target population (Taylor et al., 2007, pp. 45-46).   
If non-response in wave 풔 is totally random, using calibration weights that 
match the ELSA sample with census estimates would be enough to restore the 
representativity of ELSA at wave 1. If sample selection bias is determined only 
by factors included in the ELSA weights, then such weights are required for 
making inference at follows-up. But the issue of importance here is to see if sam-
ple selection is determined by additional factors that are not captured in the 
ELSA weights (but included in our application) that can lead to biased inference 
on the population of interest.  
6.1 Implications of selection on observables for ELSA wave 
1 tabulations 
 
Table 6 shows the effect of weighting on cross-sectional distribution of a large 
number of SES, health and disability indicators, together with the proportion of 
those in receipt of disability-related benefits as observed in wave 1. We show four 
estimates. The first one refers to the unweighted statistics; the second corrects 
for non-response using ELSA wave 1 weights; and the third and fourth columns 
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show sample statistics corrected by the inverse of the individual’s fitted proba-
bility of retention from model D of Table 5 (IPW-model D, henceforth),28 with 
and without applying calibration weights defined by the ELSA team. The third 
and fourth columns are meant to provide evidence of how far the alternative 
weights we propose affect statistics of interest. 
The differences between unweighted and weighted sample statistics provides a 
measure of how selection on observables influences 푌푖. In most instances, using 
weights has a considerable effect. Under the MAR assumption, the sample is 
older and in lower SES 29 than under MCAR. Moreover, weighted estimates 
pointed towards a slightly more disabled population with some important differ-
ences according to the weighting procedure in use.  
By contrasting estimates in columns two and three of Table 6 we found samples 
which are similar in age but with important differences in term of SES and health 
status, being the sample weighted using IPW-model D less advantaged in term 
of SES and more functionally disabled – both in terms of reported Activity Daily 
Living (ADL) (Katz et al. (1963)) and Instrumental ADL (IADL) limitations, 
(Lawton and Brody (1969)) than the one weighted with ELSA original weights. 
                                      
28 It should be noticed that the standard IPW method does not involve latent variables. This analysis 
differs from previous studies allowing for the use of latent factors that have been constructed from estimates 
(i.e. not assumed directly observed).  
29 SES is measured by level of education, home-ownership, housing and financial wealth and in term of 
current income reported by the benefit units. 
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This sample also reflects a slightly higher prevalence of reported medical condi-
tions, and ultimately, a higher percentage of individuals in receipt of the two 
main disability-related benefits: Attendance Allowance (AA) and Disability Liv-
ing Allowance (DLA).   
TABLE 6: Descriptive statistics ELSA wave 1 sample according different 
weighting procedures 
indicator 
Un-weighted sam-
ple (MCAR) 
Weighted samples (MAR) 
ELSA weights IPW-model D 
IPW-model D* 
calibration 
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Age of the respondent a 73.8 6.702 74.3 6.927 74.2 6.856 74.2 6.843 
Married/partnered 0.590 0.492 0.580 0.494 0.580 0.494 0.575 0.494 
Level of education         
 No qualifications 0.387 0.487 0.388 0.487 0.382 0.486 0.385 0.487 
 lT high-school 0.312 0.463 0.324 0.468 0.334 0.472 0.333 0.471 
 High-school graduate 0.102 0.303 0.098 0.297 0.098 0.297 0.097 0.296 
 Some college 0.123 0.329 0.118 0.323 0.116 0.320 0.115 0.319 
 College and above 0.076 0.265 0.072 0.259 0.070 0.255 0.069 0.254 
Home-ownership 0.763 0.425 0.754 0.431 0.753 0.431 0.753 0.432 
Net housing wealth 148,617 119,653 147,974 118,838 147,461 119,504 147,469 119,730 
Non-housing financial wealth 44,858 91,515 43,043 88,920 42,693 89,294 42,512 88,733 
Total benefit unit income 13,708 16,226 13,427 16,279 13,310 15,545 13,275 15,759 
Difficulties in ADLs         
 none 0.716 0.451 0.714 0.452 0.704 0.457 0.704 0.457 
 1 0.138 0.345 0.141 0.348 0.139 0.346 0.138 0.345 
 2 0.065 0.246 0.066 0.248 0.067 0.249 0.067 0.249 
 3 0.035 0.183 0.036 0.185 0.036 0.187 0.037 0.188 
 4 or more 0.046 0.210 0.044 0.206 0.054 0.227 0.055 0.227 
Difficulties in IADLs         
 none 0.818 0.386 0.814 0.389 0.803 0.398 0.802 0.398 
 1 0.099 0.299 0.102 0.302 0.102 0.303 0.102 0.303 
 2 0.039 0.194 0.041 0.199 0.042 0.200 0.042 0.201 
 3 0.014 0.117 0.015 0.123 0.016 0.126 0.017 0.128 
 4 or more 0.030 0.172 0.028 0.165 0.037 0.189 0.037 0.189 
Medical conditions         
 high blood pressure 0.440 0.496 0.438 0.496 0.440 0.496 0.441 0.497 
 diabetes 0.094 0.291 0.092 0.290 0.097 0.295 0.096 0.295 
 cancer 0.077 0.267 0.078 0.269 0.074 0.262 0.075 0.263 
 lung disease 0.073 0.259 0.072 0.258 0.073 0.261 0.073 0.259 
 heart problems 0.253 0.435 0.252 0.434 0.255 0.436 0.253 0.435 
 stroke 0.069 0.254 0.070 0.254 0.073 0.260 0.071 0.258 
 arthritis 0.383 0.486 0.382 0.486 0.384 0.486 0.387 0.487 
 psychiatric problems 0.044 0.205 0.044 0.204 0.044 0.206 0.045 0.206 
 memory problems 0.008 0.089 0.008 0.091 0.009 0.096 0.009 0.096 
Receipt of cash disability bene-
fits (AA or DLA) 
0.124 0.330 0.129 0.336 0.133 0.340 0.134 0.340 
Notes: Author's computation based on the sample of respondents interviewed in both wave 0 and wave 1 (N=5,432). 
(a) collapsed at 90.  
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Sample statistics in column three are virtually identical to those in column four 
of Table 6. In other words, calibration weights modify only marginally the non-
response weights, indicating limited bias due to the use of HSEs in defining the 
ELSA sampling frame.  
Comparisons with administrative data are not straightforward, because they 
include the care home population.30 Our weighting strategy gives an estimate of 
the number of AA/DLA recipients in England in 2002 about 80,000 higher than 
the one estimated using ELSA weights, and about 160,000 higher that the un-
weighted estimate.31 Our weighting strategy brings the estimate much closer to 
the figure in the official statistics.   
Three main messages emerge from this analysis. First, as suggested in Taylor 
et al. (2007), descriptive analysis of the ELSA sample should be based on 
weighted data. Under the MAR assumption, the weighting strategy adopted does 
not play a very crucial role. However, our weighting approach tends to reduce 
SES statistics and increase prevalence of disability and receipt of related benefits, 
with potentially important consequences for evaluating reforms to the public sys-
tem of care and support for disabled people. Finally, the small impact of calibra-
tion weights gives very little evidence of selection bias caused by the use of HSEs 
to draw the ELSA sample. 
                                      
30 We refer to Hancock et al. (2015) for details. 
31 Our figures refer to the non-institutionalised population in England, aged 65+.  
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6.2 Implications of selection on observables for ELSA wave 
2 follow-up 
 
Longitudinal studies such as the ELSA enable analysis of the dynamics of 
health. In what follows we extend previous analysis looking at the effects of sam-
ple selection at successive ELSA follow-up.  This analysis requires re-estimating 
the system comprising equations (2)–(6), with 푅푖 redefined as an indicator of 
retention (for eligible members only)32 in all of the preceding waves up to the 
point of analysis. We do this up to wave 2 of ELSA only, but such analysis could 
be potentially extended up to the last wave currently available.  
Structural parameters for the probability of remaining in the study in both 
waves 1 and 2 (conditional on being respondent in wave 0) are available in the 
Appendix Table A3.33 The implications of the estimates are summarised in Ap-
pendix Figure A1 for the three illustrative 75-year-old individuals defined in sec-
tion 4.  
As before, fitted probabilities of retention are used to construct longitudinal 
weights for the subset of fully respondent members in wave 2. Tables 7 and 8 
                                      
32 We therefore excluded from the analysis 429 sample members who become ineligible for wave 2 of 
ELSA but we considered as refusals the 2,941 sample members who were not issued in wave 2 because all 
wave 1 respondents in the household explicitly refused to be recontacted. See sub-section 3.2 for details. 
33 They can be contrasted with structural parameters of retention for wave 1 only. With respect to 
estimates of model D in Table 5, we found a few important differences. The effect of the second spline of 
age is almost three times higher whereas living with a partner makes the probability of dropping out 1.4 
times higher than the estimated effect of retention in wave 1. The signs of the educational attainments 
variables are in line with expectations and similar to those obtained in modelling retention for wave 1. Social 
class is now no longer associated with retention. While the coefficient associated with engagement is stable, 
the latent poor-health index increases considerably its significance in explaining retention, with its 
correlation with engagement virtually unaffected.   
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displays tabulations of some health indicators for the unweighted sample (column 
1) and the weighted samples using ELSA weights available for wave 2 (column 
2) and using our vector of weights built according estimates for Appendix Table 
A3.   
Table 7 reports prevalence data for ELSA wave 2 respondents born on or before 
1937. Weighted data indicate a higher prevalence of (I)ADL limitations and cor-
respondingly higher percentage of individuals receiving disability benefits (DBs) 
than unweighted data, in particular when our set of weights is in use.  
TABLE 7: Prevalence of (I)ADL limitations and receipt of DBs in wave 2 for 
those born in or before 1937  
  
No weights 
(MCAR) 
ELSA weights 
(MAR) 
IPW-model D*cali-
bration weights 
% by number of ADLs reported   
0 71.89 70.90 68.41 
1 15.21 15.59 16.55 
2 6.75 7.07 7.26 
3 3.39 3.47 3.76 
4 1.97 2.09 2.77 
5+ 0.80 0.88 1.24 
% by number of IADLs reported  
0 81.97 80.62 77.92 
1 9.99 10.45 11.16 
2 4.53 4.86 5.44 
3 1.27 1.45 1.60 
4 1.12 1.32 1.50 
5+ 1.12 1.31 2.37 
% in receipt of DBs   
No 87.34 86.49 84.85 
Yes 12.66 13.51 15.15 
Notes: Estimates based on the (weighted) sample of 3,955 individuals born in or before 1937 (aged 
65+ in 2002), fully respondent (and without item non-response on relevant variables) in waves 0, 
1 and 2 of ELSA as observed in wave 2.  
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Table 8 assesses the effects of different weighting strategies on estimates of the 
onset of new medical conditions34 and functional limitations and the rate of new 
DBs receipt from wave 1 (2002/03) to wave 2 (2004/05). Overall, about 23.3% 
of the unweighted sample reported new medical conditions in wave 2 in addition 
to any reported in wave 1.  
TABLE 8: Changes in reported medical conditions, functional limitations and 
receipt of DBs since last interview (wave 1) by age groups at baseline 
  
No weights 
(MCAR) 
ELSA weights 
(MAR) 
IPW-model D*cali-
bration weights 
Reported new medical conditions since wave 1 
65-74 22.2% 22.5% 22.3% 
75-84 25.1% 25.4% 26.0% 
85+ 23.9% 24.0% 26.7% 
overall 23.3% 23.6% 24.0% 
Number of new medical conditions reported since  wave 1 
65-74 1.16 1.16 1.16 
75-84 1.20 1.20 1.20 
85+ 1.15 1.13 1.14 
overall 1.17 1.17 1.18 
Reported a change in functional limitations (ADLs) since  wave 1 
65-74 12.6% 12.8% 13.4% 
75-84 20.4% 20.6% 22.4% 
85+ 22.3% 20.8% 23.3% 
overall 15.8% 16.1% 17.6% 
Number of new ADLs reported since  wave 1 
65-74 1.37 1.39 1.39 
75-84 1.42 1.44 1.44 
85+ 1.64 1.52 1.54 
overall 1.42 1.42 1.43 
Reported being in receipt of DBs since last interview 
65-74 3.6% 3.8% 3.7% 
75-84 9.3% 9.4% 9.9% 
85+ 17.3% 19.6% 23.1% 
overall 6.2% 6.8% 7.6% 
Notes: Estimates based on the (weighted) sample of 3,955 individuals born in or before 1937 (aged 
65+ in 2002), fully respondent (and without item non-response on relevant variables) in waves 0, 
1 and 2 of ELSA as observed in wave 2.   
                                      
34 The following medical conditions are considered: high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, 
heart problems, stroke, arthritis, psychiatric and memory problems. 
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Dividing the sample by age group,35 we found that incidence of new medical 
conditions increase non-linearly both under MCAR and MAR, whereas they fol-
low a more plausible increasing age-related trend using our IPW weights. All 
results show a significant selection on observables bias, which increases with age 
of the respondent.  
We also found an increase of about 0.6% over a two-year period of the number 
of new DB recipients when MCAR assumption is relaxed in favour of MAR using 
ELSA weights. This difference increases to 1.4% when our weights were used. 
Again, the main contribution to this bias comes from the group of people aged 
85+. Among them and over a two-year period, we estimated about 17.3% of new 
recipients under MCAR, +2.3% using ELSA weights and +5.8% using non-re-
sponse weights we computed. 
 
7 Discussion 
This study investigated the existence of health-related non-response among 
eligible older members at the beginning of the English Longitudinal Study of 
Ageing (ELSA) and its consequences for assessing their health and receipt of 
disability–related benefits at follow-up. 
                                      
35 With age observed at baseline (year 2002). 
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Building on a rational choice approach, a latent factor structural equation ap-
proach was used – for the first time in our knowledge – to study the effect of 
individuals’ health on the survey participation, controlling for socio-demographics 
and individuals’ attitudes towards the survey.  
The model uses a latent representation of individuals’ health status, with self-
reported indicators of health status assumed to be imperfect indicators of the 
underlying “true” health status. Individual “engagement” with the scope of the 
survey is also assumed to be a latent factor, measured by a range of proxy indi-
cators and assumed to covary with individuals’ observable characteristics and 
latent health.  
We found evidence of a non-linear relationship between health and successive 
drop-out of eligible members from the ELSA study. In other words, while un-
healthy individuals are less likely to remain in the study at follow-up, very 
healthy individuals do not show significantly lower dropout probabilities with 
respect to the remaining sample population. This is consistent with the view that 
while unhealthy members face higher physical and cognitive costs in participating, 
healthy individuals might have high concerns about the time cost of participating 
and in taking part in medical and cognitive tests which, apart from being time-
consuming, may also be felt to be humiliating.  
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Despite the existence of a non-linear health-related retention bias, controlling 
for individuals’ engagement increases the explanatory power of the survey par-
ticipation model and dilutes the health gradient, the relevance of which, however, 
is not completely eliminated.  
The “engagement” index we derived in fact played the largest and most signif-
icant role in explaining participation, providing empirical support for the idea 
that the collection of indicators of individuals’ attitudes towards the survey (or 
interviewers’ views concerning interviewees’ attitudes) could lead to great gains 
at no excessive extra cost to the data collection agency. Such gains could be in 
the form of: 
1. An early identification of sample members who are more at risk of drop-
ping out at successive waves. We would perhaps be tempted to focus our efforts 
on maintaining participation of the subgroup of less engaged eligible members 
rather than on those in worse health status. The finding here, however, suggests 
that the less engaged are also those in worst health and therefore such a choice 
might be less competing than it would seem.  
2. Designing specific instruments that could incentivise members’ retention 
in the study. For instance, future research could perhaps considering ways of 
reducing costs of survey participation, particularly for those more at risk of drop-
ping out (e.g. by conducting condensed, shorter interviews to obtain key infor-
mation from those more at risk of dropping out) or by boosting the benefits of 
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participating (e.g. by finding effective ways of communicating medical feedback 
to the sample members from nurse visits, blood tests and other objective tests); 
3. Better informing post-collection adjustment procedures that deal with the 
selective nature of non-participation, as we documented in the section 6 of this 
paper where we have investigated the extent to which initial sample selection in 
ELSA would introduce bias in univariate analyses aiming at describing the health 
status and disability benefit receipt at follow-up.  
Our strategy was to investigate the performance of a new vector of non-re-
sponse weights built upon our structural estimates to correct for potential selec-
tion bias under Missing at Random (MAR). Our study can be also seen as an 
assessment of whether dropouts at the beginning of ELSA are determined by 
additional factors not captured in the ELSA weights.  
Under MAR, we documented a downward of the socio-economic status and an 
upward of disability estimates that would emerge by assuming Missing Com-
pletely at Random (MCAR). As a result, using our non-response weights we 
documented a larger (and then closer to official statistics) proportion of older 
people in receipt of disability-related benefits (Attendance Allowance and Disa-
bility Living Allowance) than the one obtained by assuming MCAR or by using 
ELSA weights for wave 1. More worryingly, we found that the selectivity of non-
response behaviours is even more severe in wave 2 of ELSA, with important 
implications for making inference on the population of interest. On the other 
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hand, as the use of calibration weights has shown, we found very little evidence 
of selection bias caused by the use of HSEs to draw the ELSA sample after 
conditioning non-response weights on a proper set of observable characteristics. 
Additional research is needed. For example, it is required to better understand 
the determinants of such a significant loss of eligible sample members in wave 2 
(see section 4.1) which seems mainly driven by the manifestation of a complete 
disinterest of all (eligible) household members to the study. Only then can the 
analysis be successfully extended up to the last wave currently available, making 
use of a fuller set of health and engagement indicators available in the ELSA 
follow-up. This would be of particular interest also for new longitudinal studies, 
such as the new Scottish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (THSLS).  
As far as the econometric framework is concerned, this paper should be con-
sidered as a call for further research on this topic. Motivated by the desire to use 
– in a more structured way – as much as possible of the information available in 
survey data, it should not be advocated as a panacea but rather a possible alter-
native way to test theories and provide new insight into pre- and post- data 
collection processes.  
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Appendix 
A generalised SEM of survey participation with q-la-
tent variables 
 
We allow the integration of latent factors in the general framework used in 
modelling survey participation. Let 푆푖∗ denote the net utility an individual de-
rives from selecting a certain decision in regards participation to the survey and 
푅푖 denote a binary variable indicating his or her actual decision (so 푅푖 = 1 if the 
individual remains in the study and 푅푖 = 0 otherwise). Assuming utility maxi-
misation: 
 
푅푖 = 1 푖푓 푆푖∗ ≥ 0,푅푖 = 0 표푡ℎ푒푟푤푖푠푒   (A1) 
 
Following notation in Bollen (1989), the net utility 푆푖∗ can be modelled as: 
 
푆푖∗ = 휶풛풊 + 푓(ξ풊; 휸) + 휀푖    (A2) 
 
where 풛풊 denote a vector of exogenous predictors of survey participation and 휶 
the associated coefficients; ξ풊 is a vector of q-latent exogenous variables with 
manifested indicators denoted by w and 휸 is a vector of fixed coefficients reflect-
ing the importance of each latent factor on 푆푖∗. The mapping of manifested indi-
cators to the q-latent factors is accomplished by a general measurement equation: 
 
푤푘 = ퟏ(λ푘푞ξ풒 + 훿푘 > 0)     (A3) 
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where 푤푘 is a random vector of manifested indicators (푘 = 1,2,…퐾), λ푘푞 are fac-
tor loadings that map manifested indicator k on to latent factor 푞 through the 
indicator function 1(.), and ξ푞and 훿푘 are latent factors and errors, respectively, 
which are assumed to be uncorrelated. Note that this model can be easily ex-
tended to include a mixture of continuous and ordered indicators in 푤. For iden-
tification purposes, given that the scales of the 푞 latent variables are arbitrary, 
we need normalising them by setting either a factor loading λ1푞 to be equal to 1 
or the residual variance of ξ푞 to be equal to 1.  
Because only 풘 and 푅 can be observed, any inference must be based on the 
joint distribution whose density can be written generally as: 
 
푃(푅푖 = 1, 풘|풛; 휃) = ∫ 푃(푅푖 = 1|풛; ξ; 휶, 휸) 푔(푤|ξ; λ,Ψ)ℎ(ξ)푑ξ  (A4) 
 
where ∫  is the support of ξ. The first term of the integrand is the retention 
probability conditional on the latent variables ξ, where 풛 and 휶 denote again the 
(error-free) explanatory variables in the retention equation that may influence 
survey participation and the associated coefficients, respectively; the second term 
푔(푤|ξ; λ,Ψ) corresponds to the measurement equation and is the conditional dis-
tribution of the manifested items 푤 given the latent variables ξ.  
The vector 휃 represents the model parameters (휶, 휸, λ,Ψ), with Ψ being the 
covariance of the random disturbance terms of Equation A3.  
Notice that Equation A4 assumes that, conditional on the latent variables ξ, 
the retention probability 푃(푅푖 = 1|풛; ξ; 휶, 휸) and the distribution of the indica-
tors 푔(푤|ξ; λ,Ψ) are independent; that is, the joint distribution of the two can be 
given by the product of the marginals.  
Model parameters 휃 can be estimated by means of maximum likelihood proce-
dure, maximising the following:  
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퐿(. ) = ∑ 푃(푅푖 = 1,풘|풛; 휃)
푖
= 
∑ ∫ 푃(푅푖 = 1|풛; ξ; 휶, 휸)푁 푔(푤|ξ; λ,Ψ)ℎ(ξ)푑ξ 푖         (A5) 
 
In developing the basic formulation we have described the survey participation 
model as being influenced by exogenous latent variables ξ . It should be noticed 
that Equation A3 contains only the latent variables on the right-hand-side. How-
ever, they may also contain individual characteristics which might capture sys-
tematic response bias when the individual is providing response to the indicators. 
Moreover, note that 푓(. ) in Equation A2 is deliberately undefined. Typically, the 
function is specified to be linear in its parameter, but this is not necessary. Finally, 
note that the distribution of the error terms must be specified, leading to addi-
tional unknown covariance parameters. 
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Robustness checks: uncorrelated latent factors 
 
Table A1: Structural parameters for the probability of retaining the study in wave 1: Model D no correlation between ℎ∗ and 푒∗ 
Covariate 
Latent poor-health equa-
tion 
Latent engagement equa-
tion 
Retention equation 
Coefficient  S.E Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E 
Female 0.050** 0.023 -0.184*** 0.032 -0.001 0.032 
Spline age 65-74 -0.006*** 0.001 -0.011 0.008 0.01 0.008 
Spline from age 74+ a 0.017*** 0.003 -0.030*** 0.005 -0.012** 0.006 
Married/cohabiting 0.032 0.028 0.106** 0.047 -0.177*** 0.048 
Completed education before 14 years old 0.185*** 0.028 -0.038 0.047 -0.094** 0.048 
Completed education after 19 years old -0.244*** 0.051 -0.122 0.082 0.206** 0.082 
Non-white 0.542*** 0.083 -0.611*** 0.109 0.167 0.136 
Home-owner -0.301*** 0.031 0.095* 0.051 -0.069 0.052 
Social class: manual worker 0.177*** 0.027 -0.131*** 0.043 -0.037 0.044 
ℎ∗         -0.046** 0.02 
(ℎ∗)2      -0.025* 0.015 
푒∗     0.734*** 0.042 
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Estimates obtained from the sample composed by 5,050 core member individuals (65+) interviewed in wave 0 and eligible 
for wave 1 and wave 2. (a) collapsed at 90. All models also include dummy variables on region of residence, if living in urban area (>10K), and from which HSE cross-
section the eligible person was drawn. Standard errors were clustered at household level. 
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Robustness checks: SEM vs. single-equation ap-
proach  
Estimates in Table 5 can be contrasted with the reduced-form estimates com-
monly used in modelling survey participation. These, available in the Appendix 
Table A2, are obtained by fitting maximum-likelihood probit models. The first 
model includes controls for socio-demographic characteristics only but we have 
progressively included 푯 (model 2) and 푬 (model 3), treated as exogenous (er-
ror-free) explanatory variables.  
A reduced-form approach is correct and not without interest if we are con-
cerned with the “ultimate” determinants of survey participation rather than iso-
lating the effect of 풙 on health and engagement. This approach yields similar 
results the one displayed in Table 5 in the sense that corresponding coefficient 
estimates have the same sign. However, the standard errors are generally lower 
the one obtained using a SEM approach, yielding higher significance level for 
some covariates. This is because a reduced form aims at capturing the “total” 
effect that 풙 would have on survey participation, whereas a “structural” frame-
work allows to separate the direct impact that 풙 has in explain survey participa-
tion from the indirect impact that 풙 would have via its gradient with health and 
engagement.  
Female gender, age and low SES are associated with lower retention in wave 1 
for all reduced-form specifications. The structural approach, however, revealed 
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that gender and social class play only an indirect role in explaining survey reten-
tion, with most of their effects mediated by the latent variables. Only three of 
the fourteen health indicators play a significant role (model 2), due to the high 
multicollinearity among 푯 indicators. The inclusion of 푬 as covariate (model 3) 
reduces further the significance of 푯 indicators. However, in this reduced-form 
approach, the most influential predictors of non-response are those which were 
most influential in determining 푒∗ in the structural equation approach.  
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Table A2: Parameter estimates for proxy-variables models used to predict in-
dividual’s retention in the study in wave 1 
Covariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Female -0.109*** -0.114*** -0.081*** 
Spline age 65-74 0.002 0.001 0.004 
Spline from age 74+ a -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.023*** 
Married/cohabiting -0.080* -0.077* -0.112** 
Completed education before being 14 years old -0.104** -0.101** -0.096** 
Completed education after being 19 years old 0.092 0.081 0.130* 
Non-white -0.252* -0.218* -0.093 
Home-owner 0.012 0 -0.025 
Social class: manual worker -0.111*** -0.097** -0.088** 
Self-reported health status  
(1 very good;…; 5 very bad)  -0.087*** -0.064*** 
Infectious disease  -0.015 -0.044 
Neoplasms & benign growths a  0.087 0.053 
Endocrine & metabolic  -0.065 -0.066 
Blood & related organs  0.026 0.052 
Mental disorders  0.05 -0.005 
Nervous system  0.107 0.084 
Eye complaints  0.056 0.029 
Ear complaints  0.062 0.029 
Heart & circulatory system  0.177*** 0.161** 
Respiratory system  0.011 -0.06 
Digestive system  -0.069 -0.096 
Genito-urinary system  0.077* 0.06 
Musculoskeletal system  0.035 0.048 
Consent link survey data with admin data   0.663*** 
Complete/return the self-completion booklet   0.257** 
Respondent to financial questions (income sources 
and savings)   0.289** 
Consent having a nurse visit   0.826*** 
constant 0.674 0.823 -1.256* 
N 8,420 
Log-likelihood -5389.101 -5367.72 -5018.958 
Pseudo-R2 0.018 0.022 0.086 
AIC 10820.203 10805.44 10115.916 
BIC 10968.009 11051.783 10390.412 
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. (a) collapsed at 90. Estimates in the table refers to 3 
different probit specifications (see section 4) of the determinants of retaining the ELSA study in wave 1. 
The model also include dummy variables on region of residence, if living in urban area (>10K), and from 
which HSE cross-section the eligible person was drawn. Standard errors were clustered at household level. 
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Modelling survey-participation in both waves 1 
and 2 
 
Table A3: Structural parameters for the probability of retaining the study in 
both waves 1 and 2 
Covariate 
Latent poor-
health equation 
Latent engage-
ment equation 
Retention equa-
tion 
coefficient  S.E coefficient S.E coefficient S.E 
Female 0.059** 0.024 -0.242*** 0.047 0.019 0.033 
Spline age 65-74 -0.007*** 0.001 -0.017 0.012 0.012 0.009 
Spline from age 74+ a 0.017*** 0.003 -0.048*** 0.008 -0.031*** 0.006 
Married/cohabiting 0.027 0.029 0.154** 0.067 -0.250*** 0.049 
Completed education before 14 
years old 
0.185*** 0.028 -0.038 0.067 
-0.083* 0.048 
Completed education after 19 years 
old 
-0.244*** 0.052 -0.167 0.119 
0.249*** 0.085 
Non White 0.572*** 0.085 -0.888*** 0.156 -0.015 0.137 
Home owner -0.291*** 0.033 0.180** 0.074 0.028 0.054 
Social class: manual worker 0.178*** 0.027 -0.184*** 0.062 -0.135*** 0.045 
ℎ∗         -0.088*** 0.023 
(ℎ∗)2      -0.046*** 0.016 
푒∗     0.511*** 0.031 푐표푣(ℎ∗, 푒∗)         -0.073** 0.031 
Free  parameters 104 
Log-likelihood -46883.195 
Correction for non-normality factor 1.1234 
AIC 93974.39 
BIC 94370.45 
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Estimates obtained from the sample composed by 7,791 
individuals born in or before 1937 (aged 65+ in 2002), fully interviewed in wave 0 and eligible for wave 1 
and wave 2 with no missing values at the indicators used for the analysis. (a) collapsed at 90. All models 
also include dummy variables on region of residence, if living in urban area (>10K), and from which HSE 
cross-section the eligible person was drawn. Standard errors were clustered at household level. 
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Figure A1: Predictions of the probability of remaining in the ELSA study up 
to wave 2 by latent health index for three 75-old representative individuals 
with different level of engagement with the scope of the study 
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities computed using estimates in Appendix Table A3. To facilitate the 
interpretation, the labels for the x-axis in the figure refer to the categories of the 5-scale SAH 
indicator (the most influential factor in determining latent health) that corresponds to the mean 
values of the Empirical Bayes prediction of latent health observed at the 5 categories of the SAH 
question. 
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Chapter 2: 
 
Do household surveys give a coherent 
view of disability benefit targeting? A 
multi-survey latent variable analysis 
for the older population in Great 
Britain* 
 
Abstract: We compare three major UK surveys, BHPS, FRS and ELSA, in terms of 
the picture they give of the relationship between disability and receipt of the Attendance 
Allowance (AA) benefit. Using the different disability indicators available in each survey, 
we use a structural equation approach involving a latent concept of disability in which 
probabilities of receiving AA depend on disability. Despite major differences in design, 
once sample composition is standardised through statistical matching, the surveys de-
liver similar results for the model of disability and AA receipt. Provided surveys offer a 
sufficiently wide range of disability indicators, the detail of disability measurement ap-
pears relatively unimportant.  
 
Keywords:  disability indices, disability benefits, multiple surveys.  
JEL codes: C81, I18, I38.
                                      
* This chapter has been published in the Journal of Royal Statistical Society, series A: Statistics in Society 
and it is a joint work with Ruth Hancock, Stephen Pudney and Francesca Zantomio. An earlier version is 
available as HEG working paper 13-03:  https://www.uea.ac.uk/medicine/health-economics-
group/working-papers. S. Pudney conceptualized ideas and supervised all aspects of its 
implementation. M. Morciano derived the dataset from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), 
conducted the statistical analysis and synthesized and interpreted findings. R. Hancock derived the dataset 
from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) whereas F. Zantomio derived the dataset from the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). All authors contributed to the writing of the article and reviewing drafts.  
Data from the FRS are made available by the UK Department of Work and Pensions through the UK 
Data Archive. Material from the FRS is Crown Copyright and is used by permission. The BHPS data used 
were originally collected by MiSoC at the University of Essex (now incorporated within the Institute for 
Social and Economic Research) and are made available through the UK Data Archive (UKDA). Data from 
the ELSA were developed by researchers based at University College London, the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
and the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) and are made available through the UKDA. NatCen 
provided geographical indicators. Neither the collectors of the data nor the UKDA bears any responsibility 
for the analyses or interpretations presented here. 
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1 Introduction 
Developed countries like the UK will face severe problems in supporting the 
projected future growth in the disabled population (McVicar 2008), and in the 
older disabled population in particular (Karlsson et al. 2006, OECD 2005, Pickard 
et al. 2007). In the UK, there has been a long series of policy reviews by a Royal 
Commission (Sutherland 1999), the independent King’s Fund (Wanless 2006), 
the government (Department of Health 2009), the Commission on Funding of 
Care and Support (CFCS 2011) and various parliamentary select committees. 
The current UK government has recently announced changes to some aspects of 
the long-term care funding system (Department of Health 2013) but debate con-
tinues on how best to provide public support to older people with care needs. 
Such debate and associated policy reform should ideally be evidence-based. This 
requires a robust and accurate baseline picture of the distribution of support for 
people with disabilities, allowing the development of statistical models to project 
changes in this picture as disability levels rise and alternative policy structures 
are implemented. In turn, this requires good survey data on patterns of disability 
and receipt of support. 
The importance of disability as a policy issue is matched only by the vast range 
of survey questions that have been used to measure it, and the proliferation of 
disability indicators across surveys presents difficulties for empirical research. 
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There are many available question designs, supported by limited testing of ex-
ternal validity, internal consistency and test-retest reliability, and some cognitive 
evaluation of specific question designs (see Sturgis et al. 2001 and Jagger et al. 
2009 for reviews of UK surveys). It is widely recognised that any particular set 
of disability indicators may give an imperfect description of the concept of disa-
bility relevant to the analysis and that bias may result from neglect of the meas-
urement error problem (Bound 1991). However, there has been little cross-survey 
comparative work which considers the consistency of the empirical ‘story’ that 
policy-makers would get from surveys offering different sets of disability indica-
tors. In practice, researchers often use disability indicators that happen to be 
available in a survey chosen for convenience or to meet other requirements, and 
the robustness issue is rarely considered systematically. The Green Paper (De-
partment of Health 2009), State of the Nation’ report (Cabinet Office 2010) and 
the report of the Commission on Funding Care and Support (CFCS 2011) are 
examples of policy documents based on research using a mixture of different 
survey sources for different purposes.  
For policy purposes, we are interested not only in the measurement of disability, 
but also in its relationship with other key variables like receipt of public support. 
In this study, we focus on a particular form of public support: the disability-
linked cash benefits which are available to older people. The main disability ben-
efit for people aged 65 or over in the UK is Attendance Allowance (AA), which 
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is administered by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and designed 
to help meet the extra costs arising from disability. Besides the age restriction, 
eligibility for AA requires the claimant to be in need of care in order to perform 
daily activities. The AA claim form says “you may get Attendance Allowance if 
your disability means that you need help with your personal care or you need 
someone to supervise you for your own or someone else’s safety”. It defines help 
with personal care as “day-to-day help with things like washing (or getting in or 
out of the bath or shower), dressing, eating, going to and using the toilet, or 
telling people what you need or making yourself understood”; and supervision as 
needing “someone to watch over you to help you avoid substantial danger to 
yourself or other people” (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013). The benefit 
is not means tested and (in 2012/13) is worth either £51.85 per week, if care is 
needed during either day or night, or £77.45, if care is needed during both. Eli-
gibility for AA is difficult to assess from survey data. In practice, decisions on 
claims are made by programme administrators on the basis of claimants’ reported 
health problems and consequent care needs. Once the claim is made, written 
evidence is examined by administrative assessors, who can require a medical ex-
amination of the claimant. An element of judgement is inevitable, so eligibility is 
uncertain, even with access to the same information as the administrative asses-
sor. A further challenge is that the information on which the award decision is 
made is not observable directly in survey data. Rather, surveys offer a set of 
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disability-related eligibility indicators, from which inference on the success of 
disability targeting must be drawn. AA is assessed solely on an individual’s need 
for care. It is not means-tested (nor taxable), and is unaffected by the presence 
or circumstances of other household members. So it is possible for more than one 
household member to receive AA. 
Our policy motivation has implications for the appropriate conceptualisation 
of disability. We are not concerned here with medical concepts of impairment, 
but rather disability conceived as a set of constraints on functioning which orig-
inate from health impairments broadly defined. This corresponds to Sen’s (1985) 
“capabilities” approach, which sees the individual choosing a consumption vector 
x from a choice set 푋 and a pattern of commodity utilisation 푓(. ) from a set of 
possible utilisation functions 퐹 . The individual’s chosen vector of “functionings” 
is 푏 =  푓(푥), which is thus constrained by his or her economic entitlements (푋) 
and available ways of using economic resources (퐹). We view the concept of 
disability as a health-related limitation on the set 퐹  relative to some socially-
agreed minimal norm 푁 . The aim of disability policy is to offer support to people 
for whom 퐹 ⊂ 푁. Support may take the form of cash or services, both of which 
expand the individual’s choice set 푋, and it may be universal, in which case 
support is independent of the pre-intervention 푋, or means-tested, in which case 
entitlement depends on 푋. The important point here is that the concept of disa-
bility is concerned with constraints on basic functionings, rather than medical 
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conditions themselves. The survey indicators used to measure disability should 
therefore focus on potential difficulties with everyday activities rather than health 
or disease. 
The contribution of this paper is to investigate whether different indicators of 
disability, collected in three widely-used household surveys, are consistent with 
a common set of findings relating to the targeting of disability benefits for older 
people. If we admit the possibility that underlying disability is multi-dimensional, 
there are two aspects to this comparability issue: completeness and compatibility. 
A survey is complete in its coverage of disability if its questionnaire content 
generates disability indicators that are capable of reflecting all the multiple di-
mensions of disability. Two surveys are mutually compatible if their respective 
indicators of any particular dimension of disability give the same undistorted 
picture of that underlying concept. For researchers using similar methods but 
different data sources to be sure of agreeing on their conclusions, both complete-
ness and compatibility are necessary in general. We investigate three British sur-
veys, the Family Resources Survey (FRS), the English Longitudinal Survey of 
Ageing (ELSA) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which have 
been widely used for research on health, disability and related topics. We find 
that compatibility is not a serious difficulty, although there are some signs that 
completeness is a problem for the BHPS. 
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Typically, the statistical analysis of disability benefit receipt employs a single-
equation framework, in which a variety of disability indicators (or a count index 
of them) are used as explanatory covariates, together with several other charac-
teristics related to socio-economic status (SES) (see Berthoud and Hancock 2008, 
Forder and Fernandez 2009 and Zantomio 2013 for examples). Instead, we use a 
structural equation approach involving a latent concept of disability to study the 
relationships between disability status, SES characteristics, and receipt of AA in 
the BHPS, ELSA and the FRS, at (almost) a single time point, 2002/03. We 
assume that an individual’s disability status is not directly observable but re-
flected in varying degrees by members of a set of imperfect but observable survey 
indicators. In this respect we follow a number of authors since Lee (1982), Van 
de Ven and Van der Gaag (1982) and Wolfe and Behrman (1984) in considering 
health status as a latent concept. We assume that the underlying latent disability 
measure (η) is influenced by a set of SES characteristics and the probability of 
receiving AA is a function of η and SES characteristics. See Bollen (1989) for a 
review of this class of latent variable simultaneous equation models. 
This methodological approach has two major advantages. First, overcoming 
the arbitrariness of approaches based on a limited set of disability indicators or 
a scalar (usually unweighted) count of them, the latent variable framework allows 
us to develop an index of disability which makes use of all available sample in-
formation. This composite index can then be used as a sounder basis for policy 
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analysis focused on the targeting of disability benefit. Second, the latent variable 
framework reduces the scope for bias arising from the measurement error in ob-
served disability-related indicators and therefore gives more reliable estimates of 
the relationship between benefit receipt and influences like disability and income 
– again improving the robustness of an analysis of benefit targeting. To our 
knowledge the latent disability approach has not been applied in multiple surveys 
each with different indicators of disability and the application to disability benefit 
receipt is also novel.   
In sections 2 and 3 of the paper, we describe the methodological framework 
and the three surveys, documenting the distributional characteristics of the var-
iables used. Results from the model fitted to the full (unmatched) samples are 
discussed in Section 4. Statistical models are best seen as local approximations, 
so comparison of evidence from different surveys may be influenced by differences 
in sample composition as well as the design of survey instruments. In section 5 
we discuss ways of harmonising the samples, and opt for matching techniques to 
obtain samples with a (near-) common distribution for the SES covariates. This 
reduces the scope of the comparison slightly (the common support constraint) 
but has the advantage of removing differences due to model approximation errors 
at the periphery of the region covered by the survey samples. In section 6, we 
establish the robustness of our findings by examining their sensitivity to various 
aspects of the analytical approach.  
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2 A latent structural model of disability status and 
benefit receipt 
 
In the gerontology literature, Johnson and Wolinsky (1993) conceptualise the 
dynamics of health status in the older population, viewing functional limitations 
as outcomes of latent disability. Consistent with this view, we model ‘true’ disa-
bility status as an unobservable, possibly multidimensional, phenomenon, which 
is influenced by socio-economic characteristics and circumstances. We observe a 
set of survey indicators, each of which provides a ‘noisy’ measure of underlying 
disability, satisfying the classical measurement error assumption that all correla-
tion with other socio-economic characteristics is explained by latent disability. 
The main outcome of interest, receipt of AA, depends on latent disability and 
the set of socioeconomic characteristics which influence an individual’s propensity 
to claim and be awarded AA.  
Analysis is based on independent samples of 푛푠 individuals in surveys 푠 =
 1, 2, 3. Each sampled individual 푖 is characterised by: unobserved Q-dimensional 
‘true’ disability 휼푖 = (휂푖1 …휂푖푄); socio-economic individual characteristics 풁푖  ob-
servable in all surveys; a set of survey-specific disability-related discrete indica-
tors 퐷푖푗푠  , 푗 = 1 …퐽 푠 ; and a binary indicator of benefit receipt (푅푖   =  1) or 
non-receipt (푅푖   =  0). We aim to draw inferences about the conditional distri-
butions 푃(휼|풁) and 푃(푅|휼,풁) which describe respectively the distribution of 
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disability in the population and the relationship between benefit receipt and the 
individual’s disability and other characteristics. By definition, these population 
distributions are independent of any survey used to draw inferences about them. 
An important question is whether the distributions 푃 푠(푅,퐷1푠 … 퐷퐽푠푠 |풁) pro-
duced by the three surveys with their different disability indicators nevertheless 
give a coherent indication of underlying ‘true’ disability 휼 and its relationship 
with benefit receipt 푅.  
We estimate a Structural Equation Model (SEM) which comprises three com-
ponents: a measurement model, a disability model and a benefit receipt model. 
We use an ordinal quasi-linear structure for disability measurement: 
퐷̃푖푗푠 = 훼푗푠 + 휆푗1푠 휂푖1 + ⋯ + 휆푗푄푠 휂푖푄 + 휀푖푗푠  (1) 
 
 퐷푖푗푠 = 푚       iff        퐴푗푚−1푠  ≤  퐷̃푖푗푠  < 퐴푗푚푠  , 푚 = 1, … , 푀푗푠 (2) 
where: the coefficients 휆푗푞푠  are factor loadings relating observed indicators in sur-
vey s to underlying disability; 휀푖푗푠  is a normally-distributed residual term repre-
senting random response error, implying an ordered probit link function generat-
ing the observable indicator 퐷푖푗푠  from its unobserved continuous form 퐷̃푖푗푠 . 푀푗푠 is 
the number of response categories for indicator 퐷푖푗푠  and the 퐴푗푚푠  are threshold 
parameters. In the following we refer to equations (1) and (2) as the measurement 
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model. The qth disability component 휂푖푞 is related to 풁푖 through a linear rela-
tionship representing the processes leading to disability (disability model): 
  =  + υ (3) 
where 휽푞 is a vector of coefficients. The residual υ푖푞 captures other unobservable 
factors and satisfies 퐸(υ푖푞|풁푖) = 0. Benefit receipt is modelled by a probit spec-
ification (benefit receipt model): 
  =  +  +⋯+  +  (4) 
 
where the observed benefit receipt status 푅푖  =  1 when  > 0 and 푅푖  =  0  
otherwise; 휷 and the 훾푞 are coefficients and 푢푖푠 is a stochastic disturbance term. 
While allowing correlation between the 푄 latent constructs, we make the stand-
ard assumption underlying probit models that the stochastic residual ui is inde-
pendent of (풁푖, 휼푖) and the residuals in the measurement equations (1). In writ-
ing (3) and (4), we allow the same covariates to represent the influences on dis-
ability and on benefit claim behaviour. This is not necessary, and there may be 
exclusion restrictions (which are not necessary for identification) on the vectors 
휷 and 휽푞.  
We say that survey 푠 is 풄풐풎풑풍풆풕풆 if the 퐽 × 푄 loadings matrix {휆푗푞푠 } is of 
full column rank 푄; this requires that, for each dimension of disability 푞, at least 
one of the 푗 observed indicators 퐷푖푗푠  has a non-zero loading 휆푗푞푠 . In the Online 
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Appendix, we show that completeness is sufficient to identify the model under 
our assumptions. The surveys are said to be 풄풐풎풑풂풕풊풃풍풆 if the assumption of 
common parameters across surveys in equations (3) and (4) is valid.  
Several studies have shown that, in the older population, women tend to report 
significantly higher rates of functional difficulties than comparable men (Rahman 
and Liu 2000, Crimmins et al. 2011). Some researchers have attributed this ap-
parent female functional disadvantage to higher true prevalence of nonfatal but 
disabling conditions such as arthritis and osteoporosis (Wingard 1984, Verbrugge 
and Wingard 1987). Others have found that, even when controlling for chronic 
conditions, women still report higher mean levels of functional disability (Waltz 
and Badura 1984). This could be due to a higher propensity for women to report 
ill health than men with the same underlying true health status (Verbrugge 1980, 
Hibbard and Pope 1983); or to heightened sensitivity to symptoms because of 
gender-specific social expectations and life experience (Verbrugge and Wingard 
1987); or to task speci^city if women are more engaged than men in household 
tasks that require actions such as bending and lifting. This measurement issue 
has been termed variously: ‘state-dependent reporting bias’ (Kerkhofs and Linde-
boom 1995), ‘scale of reference bias’ (Groot 2000) and ‘response category cut-
point shift’ (Lindeboom and van Doorslaer 2004). However, unless we can specify 
a 푝푟푖표푟푖 a subset of indicators in each survey for which response behaviour is 
gender-invariant, it is impossible to distinguish the causal effect of gender on true 
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latent disability from its effect on reporting behaviour. We allow for the possibil-
ity of inherent gender differences in disabilities by allowing the parameters of the 
measurement equations (1)-(2) to be gender-specific.  We therefore exclude gen-
der from equation (3).     
We estimate the system comprising all equations (1)–(4) simultaneously allow-
ing for the discrete nature of the dependent variables, using robust maximum 
likelihood as implemented in 푀푃푙푢푠 version 6.11 (Muthén and Muthén, 2010). 
This is done separately for each survey, to avoid imposing by assumption any 
homogeneity across surveys. All standard errors are clustered by household to 
allow for intra-household correlation. However, since we do not have access to 
indicators of the geographical primary sampling units used in the sampling de-
signs in the FRS, we are not able to allow for geographical clustering, and the 
quoted standard errors are expected to understate sampling variation to a small 
extent. We have been able to confirm this for the ELSA sample, where psu and 
stratum indicators are available; standard errors increase to a negligible extent 
(details available on request). This suggests that the true size of our tests of 
between-survey parameter stability is very slightly larger than the nominal sig-
nificance level, giving a small tendency to over-reject parameter stability, which 
increases the force of our eventual conclusions. 
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3 Data  
The analysis is based on three sample surveys: the first wave of ELSA; the 
corresponding twelfth wave of BHPS; and the 2002/03 cross section of FRS. All 
three surveys have been widely used for research on physical health and disability: 
see, for example, Melzer et al. (2005), Banks et al. (2006), Mayhew et al. (2010), 
Chan et al. (2012) for ELSA; Benítez-Silva et al. (2009), Oswald and Powdthavee 
(2008), Banks et al. (2009) for BHPS; and Kasparova et al. (2007), Hancock and 
Pudney (2013) and Morciano et al. (2014) for FRS. Although the three surveys 
are broadly similar in sampling design, they differ considerably in their initial 
response, degree of cumulated attrition, and in methods of constructing weights 
intended to deal with departures from uniform sampling; see Table 1 for a sum-
mary of these differences. 
The FRS has a sample size of over 25,000 private households. It is an annual 
cross-section and therefore suffers from nonresponse but not accumulated attri-
tion. The FRS response rate in 2002/3 was 64% of eligible households (Campbell 
2004). The BHPS started in 1991 and followed a sample of approximately 10,000 
households annually, so our sample has come through twelve waves of attrition 
and possible panel conditioning. The initial BHPS response rate was 74% and 
67% of those original respondents gave a full interview in wave 12 (Lynn et al. 
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2006). ELSA is a panel of individuals aged 50+ and their partners in approxi-
mately 8,000 private households in England. Panel membership is based on in-
terview in the 1998, 1999 or 2001 Health Surveys for England (HSE). The wave 
1 ELSA data are thus potentially affected by nonresponse in the HSE and a 
further round of attrition; HSE response rates were 74% (1998), 76% (1999) and 
74% (2001) and of those selected for ELSA, around 70% responded to its first 
wave (Taylor et al. 2003). We choose the first wave of ELSA as our common 
time point to avoid the effects of subsequent attrition. We limit our analysis to 
people aged 65 years or over, living in England. The former restriction is because 
only people aged 65 or over can claim AA. The latter is imposed by the ELSA 
sampling frame. We also exclude respondents receiving Disability Living Allow-
ance (a similar benefit that can be claimed before age 65) because DLA recipients 
cannot also claim AA.  
The three surveys also differ in questionnaire content. The FRS collects very 
detailed income and benefit information, used as the basis for most official sta-
tistics on welfare and disability program targeting, but a limited set of disability 
indicators. ELSA provides a richer range of health and disability measures but 
slightly more limited income data than the FRS (for example, ELSA collects 
some income components gross of tax and others net). In the BHPS, it is not 
always possible to distinguish whether a particular income source is gross or net. 
BHPS information on health and disability is more detailed than the FRS in  
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Table 1: Comparing the FRS, ELSA and BHPS along sample design and structure, data collection and weighting procedures† 
  FRS (2002/03) ELSA (wave 1) BHPS (wave 12) 
Population coverage  People in private dwellings, UK People in private dwellings, England People in private dwellings, Great Britain 
Timing Cross-section, Apr 2002-Mar 2003 Longitudinal study, Mar 2002-Mar 2003 Longitudinal study, Sep 2002-Dec 2002 
Frame 
Royal Mail’s small users’s Postcode Address 
File (PAF) 
1998, 1999 and 2001 Health Survey for England (HSE) 
samples drawn from different vintages of PAF. ELSA 
includes households with an adult of 50 or older who 
agreed to re-contact  
PAF 
Sample design 
Sample design is an equal probability selec-
tion mechanism (EPSEM), with two-stage 
stratified random sampling 
Two-stage stratified EPSEM design in the HSE  Two-stage stratified EPSEM design at wave 1 (1991)  
Stratification variables 
Region, socio-economic group profile, adult 
economic activity rate, male unemployment 
rate 
Health Authority, proportion of households with a 
head of household in a non-manual occupation 
Region, socio economic group profile, proportion of 
pensionable age, proportion of employed persons work-
ing in agriculture 
Response rate 64% HSE response rate 69%; 92% consent rate; 70% re-
sponse rate at ELSA wave 1, giving 44% response 
overall 
74% at wave 1; 50% allowing for cumulated attrition 
to wave 12 
Weighting Design weights adjust for selection of house-
holds within addresses. Nonresponse 
weighting is not used. 
Calibration weights are based on age, gender, 
lone parents/all families with children, hous-
ing tenure and Council Tax Band distribu-
tions from official statistics  
Nonresponse weights compensate for unit nonresponse 
at HSE, refusal post-HSE and nonresponse in ELSA 
wave. ELSA phase uses inverse response probability 
from a logistic regression on age of the oldest house-
hold member, Regional Health Authority, household 
size, social class, year of HSE interview and long-
standing illness, as observed in HSE datasets. Calibra-
tion weights match age-sex cell frequencies from the 
non-institutionalised population of the 2001 Census  
Design weights adjust for selection of households 
within addresses. Nonresponse weights at household 
level based on region, socio-economic group and type 
of accommodation. At individual level, inverse re-
sponse probability from logistic regression on region, 
housing tenure, affluence, household size, marital and 
employment status, age, sex. Calibration weights use 
1991 and 2001 Census marginal distributions for 
household tenure, household size, no. of cars, age and 
sex  
Question Wording on 
AA receipt 
And looking at this card, are you at present 
receiving any of the  
 state benefits shown on this card - either in 
your own right or on behalf  
of someone else in your household? [Attend-
ance Allowance] 
Have you/you or your husband/wife/partner received 
any of these health or disability benefits in the last 
year?  [Attendance Allowance] 
Which of these health or disability benefits have you 
received in the last year?  [Attendance Allowance]  
Which of these health or disability benefits are you re-
ceiving at the moment? [Attendance Allowance] 
I am going to show you four cards listing different 
types of income and payments. Please look at this 
card and tell me if, since September 1st 2001, you 
have received any of the types of income or payments 
shown, either just yourself or jointly? [Attendance Al-
lowance] 
† Source: Campbell (2004), Taylor et al. (2003), Taylor et al. (2006), Taylor et al. (2007), Lound and Broad (2013). 
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some respects but less so than ELSA. The surveys differ in the information they 
collect by proxy for participants who are not able to provide responses themselves, 
in particular FRS collects information on disability and AA receipt from proxy 
respondents, whereas BHPS and ELSA do not. We return to treatment of proxy 
respondents below. Campbell (2004), Taylor et al. (2003) and Taylor et al. (2006) 
respectively give detailed descriptions of FRS, ELSA and BHPS sample design 
and data collection procedures.  
In each survey, information about receipt of AA, recorded by the binary vari-
able Ri, is collected through questions following those on health and disability. 
Thus, none of the three surveys is especially vulnerable to the justification bias 
in disability measurement that is a concern when the benefits module precedes 
the health module within the questionnaire (Crossley and Kennedy 2002). There 
are differences in the reference period for questions on AA receipt: the BHPS 
covers the year preceding interview; the FRS refers specifically to the time of 
interview; and ELSA asks separately about different reference points. For ELSA 
we use receipt of AA at the time of interview, to give comparability with the 
FRS.  
A wide range of disability indicators is available in one or more of the three 
surveys. In this study, we use subjective indicators which are the most widely 
available in social surveys. Appendix Table A1 reports the functional limitation 
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indicators Dj offered by each survey and used in our analysis, with their preva-
lence rates among AA recipients and non-recipients. Binary indicators in the FRS 
cover difficulties in eight areas of life. ELSA provides a longer list of indicators 
including limitations to specific Activities of Daily Living (ADL) (Katz et al., 
1963) or Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs) (Lawton and Brody 
1969). The BHPS indicators include binary variables representing activities lim-
ited by health and a set of 6-point categorical variables, built from two questions 
on whether the respondent usually manages to perform a set of mobility and 
personal care activities alone or only with assistance, and whether he/she finds 
it very easy, fairly easy, fairly difficult or very difficult. There is a considerably 
higher sample prevalence of reported functional limitations among AA recipients 
than non recipients, consistently across surveys and specific indicators.  
The choice of other personal characteristics included in Z is governed by pre-
vious work on the socio-economic gradient in health or disability (e.g. Goldman 
2001) and on older people’s benefit claim behaviour (for example Zantomio 2013 
in relation to AA; Hernandez et al. (2007) and Pudney et al. (2006) for means-
tested benefits). We use age (in the form of a spline with a knot at the median 
age across all samples of 73 to allow for  non-linearity in the age gradient of 
disability and receipt of AA), gender, being educated beyond the compulsory 
minimum, housing tenure, and log equivalised pre-benefit income in both equa-
tions. Information on past occupation is not collected from pensioners in the FRS 
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and therefore are not included in Z. Income represents both the socio-economic 
gradient in health and the basic need for financial support which underlies benefit 
claim behaviour. It is derived as the sum of income from pensions, earnings, 
savings and other sources received by any member of the benefit unit (defined as 
an adult plus their spouse (if applicable) plus any dependent children they are 
living with), but excludes disability and means tested benefits. Disability benefits 
must be excluded from the latent disability equation because they are a conse-
quence, and not a cause, of disability, and from the AA equation as it is income 
in the absence of AA that influences the decision to claim. Means-tested benefits 
are excluded because their level can also depend on disability through the Severe 
Disability Premium, an addition to the income thresholds used to assess entitle-
ment to means-tested welfare benefits and applies where the claimant is receiving 
AA . To account for differences in benefit unit size we apply the modified OECD 
equivalence scale to income. For this older population, our income measure is 
dominated by pension income, which is a good indicator of past labour market 
success, itself strongly related to lifestyle characteristics which have associated 
health implications. Thus estimates of the impact of income on disability should 
be interpreted in this wide sense. Log income is entered as a spline with a knot 
at the median log income level (log of £615.70 per month, 2002 prices). Our 
definition of housing tenure distinguishes those who own their homes outright 
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from those who rent or are still repaying their mortgage. Outright home-owner-
ship is used to capture an additional long-term socio-economic influence on health. 
It also allows for the lower financial need (lower housing costs) that outright 
owners have compared with those who face rent or mortgage costs, to influence 
their benefit claim behaviour. Current partnership status (married/cohabiting 
versus single) is also included as a covariate in the AA receipt equation since it 
has previously been found to affect benefit claim behaviour (Hernandez et al. 
2007; Pudney et al. 2006). 
All variables have been derived in a consistent manner as far as possible, alt-
hough perfect comparability cannot be guaranteed (sample means and standard 
deviations for the socio-economic characteristics Z observed in each sample are 
given in Table O3 of the Online Appendix). There are some differences between 
surveys: for example, ELSA sample members are significantly younger and more 
educated than their BHPS and FRS counterparts; the proportion of outright 
homeowners is higher in ELSA and the BHPS than in the FRS; and the mean of 
(log) income is significantly higher in the BHPS than in ELSA and the FRS. FRS 
reports a higher rate of AA receipt (9.7%) than ELSA or BHPS (7.2%). Compar-
isons with administrative data are not straightforward because they include AA 
recipients in the care-home population. We estimate that of the over 65 non-care 
home population, excluding those who received DLA, between 12.7 and 13.8% 
received AA in 2002. This is based on DWP statistics on recipients of AA and 
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DLA which include, but do not separately distinguish, recipients in care homes, 
together with estimates from Comas-Herrera et al. (2010) on the numbers of over 
65s resident in care homes and the proportions of them who receive public sup-
port with the care home fees and are therefore not eligible to receive AA. All 
three surveys therefore seem to under-represent AA recipients but FRS less so 
than ELSA or BHPS. 
Ideally we would use all proxy cases since they are likely to include some of 
the most severely disabled respondents. This view is supported by an analysis of 
proxy respondents in the FRS, revealing AA receipt to be about twice as high 
among proxy respondents as non-proxy respondents (18.1% against 9.1%). How-
ever we are forced to exclude proxy responses in ELSA (1.9%) and BHPS (4.1%) 
as their proxy questionnaires do not collect the respondent’s disability (ELSA) 
or AA receipt (BHPS). We retain the larger proportion of proxy cases (6.5%) in 
the FRS which does collect this and other relevant information for proxy cases, 
using a proxy response as an additional disability indicator in the measurement 
model. After these exclusions and dropping cases with missing values for variables 
used in the analysis, the sample sizes are 1,042, 5,142 and 6,744 individuals from 
the BHPS, ELSA and FRS respectively. We also assess the sensitivity of the 
results to the exclusion of FRS proxy cases in which case the FRS sample is 
reduced to 6,308.  
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In the next section, we present results based on the full unweighted samples, 
and return to the issue of sample comparability in section 5. 
4 Estimation results  
4.1 The measurement model 
To implement the model, we must specify the dimensionality of latent disabil-
ity and choose a normalisation to deal with its non-observability and lack of 
natural units of measurement. Our main results come from survey-specific SEMs 
with a single latent disability factor and a simple normalisation. For the latter, 
we choose a priori one indicator from each survey that appears to be based on 
essentially the same question. These are: the FRS question about mobility (‘mov-
ing about’); the ELSA question about capacity to ‘walk 100 yards’; and the BHPS 
question about ‘walking more than 10 minutes’. We then normalise the factor 
loading for each of these indicators to be unity.  In section 6, we explore the 
sensitivity of the results to our choice of normalisation and number of factors. 
Controversy exists over whether functional disability should be treated as a one 
dimensional or multi-dimensional construct (see for instance Fitzgerald et al. 1993; 
Spector and Fleishman 1998). As a check on the robustness of our main model, 
in section 6 we also estimate a 2-factor model distinguishing physical and cogni-
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tive disabilities. Although passing reference is often made to the multi-dimen-
sional nature of disability, we are not aware of any previous estimates of multi-
factor models of this kind in the existing literature. 
The estimates of the measurement model are presented in Table 2: the factor 
loadings 휆푗푞푠 , representing the effect of latent disability 휂 on each indicator 퐷푖푗푠 , 
are positive and highly significant in each survey. Although the pattern of esti-
mated factor loadings is similar for male and female respondents in each survey, 
there are significant differences. In FRS, the loading associated with ‘lifting, car-
rying or moving objects’ is significantly higher for women. In ELSA, factor load-
ings associated with reported difficulties in ADLs like ‘bathing or showering’, 
‘eating’, ‘getting in or out of bed’ and ‘using the toilet’ and IADLs like ‘doing 
work around the house or garden’ are significantly lower for women; in BHPS, a 
significantly lower factor loading for women is also found for difficulties in bed 
transfers and ‘bathing or showering’.  
The Akaike information criterion suggests that the unrestricted models (which 
allow the parameters of the measurement equations (3) to be gender-specific) 
provide slightly better balances of model fit and parsimony. This result is also 
confirmed by the Satorra-Bentler (2001) test at the 1% level for each of the three 
surveys.   
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Table 2: Estimated 1-factor models 
Disability Indica-
tor§§ 
Factor load-
ing 
Standard 
error 
Disability Indica-
tor§§ 
Factor 
loading 
Standard 
error 
MEN 
FRS ELSA 
MOBILITY 1  - WALK100 1  - 
LIFTING 1.005† (0.088) SITTING 0.386† (0.031) 
DEXTERITY 0.723† (0.065) CHAIR 0.581† (0.040) 
CONTINENCE 0.395† (0.037) CLIMBSEV 0.724† (0.049) 
COMMUNIC 0.385† (0.042) CLIMB1 0.990† (0.066) 
MEMORY 0.420† (0.042) STOOP 0.641† (0.043) 
DANGER 0.510† (0.093) ARMS 0.503† (0.042) 
OTHER 0.098† (0.027) PULL/PUSH 1.008† (0.078) 
PROXY 0.116† (0.029) LIFTING 0.934† (0.066) 
BHPS COIN     0.379† (0.047) 
HOUSEWORK 0.851† (0.126) DRESSING 0.661† (0.048) 
STAIRS 0.959† (0.129) WALKING 1.052† (0.134) 
DRESS 0.660† (0.114) BATH 0.863† (0.068) 
WALKING 1  - EATING 0.596† (0.087) 
STAIRS 1.112† (0.180) BED 0.879† (0.085) 
MOBILITY 1.358† (0.275) TOILET 0.738† (0.091) 
BED 1.346† (0.259) CONTINENCE 0.299† (0.030) 
NAILS 0.585† (0.085) MAP 0.406† (0.049) 
BATH 1.001† (0.171) MEAL 0.806† (0.101) 
ROAD 1.151† (0.176) SHOPPING 1.018† (0.084) 
    PHONE 0.358† (0.046) 
    MEDICATION 0.477† (0.071) 
    HOUSEWORK 1.132† (0.086) 
      MONEY 0.453† (0.057) 
WOMEN 
FRS  ELSA 
MOBILITY 1  - WALK100 1  - 
LIFTING 1.186† (0.102) SITTING 0.399† (0.029) 
DEXTERITY 0.643† (0.047) CHAIR 0.532† (0.033) 
CONTINENCE 0.431† (0.035) CLIMBSEV 0.671† (0.043) 
COMMUNIC 0.365† (0.037) CLIMB1 0.899† (0.053) 
MEMORY 0.416† (0.036) STOOP 0.653† (0.040) 
DANGER 0.426† (0.052) ARMS 0.500† (0.035) 
OTHER 0.060‡ (0.024) PULL/PUSH 0.899† (0.056) 
PROXY 0.121† (0.024) LIFTING 0.900† (0.058) 
BHPS COIN     0.433† (0.037) 
HOUSEWORK 0.968† (0.149) DRESSING 0.650† (0.042) 
STAIRS 1.201† (0.168) WALKING 0.959† (0.090) 
DRESS 0.910† (0.167) BATH 0.722† (0.047) 
WALKING 1  - EATING 0.428† (0.055) 
STAIRS 0.911† (0.129) BED 0.686† (0.054) 
MOBILITY 1.066† (0.164) TOILET 0.577† (0.051) 
BED 0.965† (0.151) CONTINENCE 0.251† (0.022) 
NAILS 0.582† (0.080) MAP 0.343† (0.029) 
BATH 0.777† (0.112) MEAL 0.811† (0.074) 
ROAD 1.110† (0.163) SHOPPING 1.135† (0.080) 
    PHONE 0.327† (0.045) 
    MEDICATION 0.479† (0.073) 
    HOUSEWORK 0.926† (0.061) 
      MONEY 0.479† (0.048) 
Statistical signi^cance: † p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. §§ A more detailed description for each Djs indi-
cator can be found in Online Appendix Table O1.
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4.2 The disability model 
Estimates for the model (3) of latent disability status are reported in Table 3, 
together with t-tests of individual coefficient equality and the overall χ2 Wald 
tests for equality of the whole coefficient vector for each pair of surveys. The 
conditional mean of latent disability η increases with age: the FRS and ELSA 
display a nonlinear relation between age and disability, with a higher gradient 
beyond age 73. In the BHPS we find a strong and near-linear relationship between 
age and disability. Higher education and pre-benefit income are associated with 
lower disability, giving evidence of a socio-economic gradient in disability that is 
consistent across surveys. Being a homeowner decreases the conditional mean of 
휂, particularly in ELSA. The variance of the latent disability factor is greater in 
the BHPS than in the FRS or ELSA, but we find that the factor variances are 
quite comparable across surveys (a 10% significant difference is found only for 
the FRS-ELSA contrast). The estimated coefficients for FRS and ELSA are sim-
ilar in size and the Wald test cannot reject the hypothesis of equality; when the 
BHPS is used as the basis for comparison, the null hypothesis of joint equality of 
coefficients is rejected  (P-values 0.064 and 0.028). 
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Table 3: Estimates of the latent disability equation  
Covariates 
Coefficients  Tests and coefficient differences 
FRS ELSA BHPS FRS-ELSA FRS-BHPS ELSA-BHPS 
Spline age 65-73 
0.038†        
(0.013) 
0.035†        
(0.012) 
0.127†        
(0.036) 
0.003          
(0.018) 
-0.089†         
(0.038) 
-0.092†         
(0.038) 
Spline from age 73+ 
0.091†        
(0.008) 
0.099†        
(0.008) 
0.128†        
(0.020) 
-0.008          
(0.011) 
-0.037§         
(0.022) 
-0.029          
(0.022) 
Post-compulsory education 
-0.279†        
(0.065) 
-0.28†        
(0.061) 
-0.182         
(0.149) 
0.001          
(0.089) 
-0.096          
(0.163) 
-0.097          
(0.161) 
Income spline to median  
-0.162†        
(0.047) 
-0.046         
(0.052) 
-0.172§        
(0.104) 
-0.116§         
(0.070) 
0.009          
(0.114) 
0.125          
(0.116) 
Income spline from median 
-0.336†        
(0.085) 
-0.310†        
(0.072) 
-0.558†        
(0.206) 
-0.025          
(0.111) 
0.223          
(0.223) 
0.248          
(0.218) 
Outright owner 
-0.382†        
(0.064) 
-0.487†        
(0.064) 
-0.185         
(0.151) 
0.105          
(0.090) 
-0.197          
(0.164) 
-0.302§         
(0.163) 
Variance (휎휐2)  
3.012†        
(0.275) 
2.543†        
(0.225) 
3.298†        
(0.788) 
0.469§         
(1.320) 
-0.286          
(0.343) 
-0.755        
(0.921) 
  Sample size Coefficient equality 2(6) 
  6,744 5,142 1,042 4.361  11.920§ 14.139‡ 
Statistical significance of the coefficient, t-test cross-sample coefficient difference and χ2 statistic: † p < 
0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
 
4.3 The benefit receipt model   
Estimates for equation (4), describing the relationship of AA receipt with socio-
economic characteristics and latent disability, are reported in Table 4. Receipt of 
AA is clearly disability-related in each of the surveys, and disability consistently 
emerges as the dominant variable in explaining AA receipt. Although disability 
might raise barriers to claiming and at the same time reduce individuals’ capacity 
to benefit from additional cash income, the survey evidence suggests there is 
successful targeting of AA on the disabled older population, irrespective of the  
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Table 4: Estimates of the equation for receipt of Attendance Allowance 
Covariates 
Coefficients Coefficient differences 
FRS  ELSA BHPS FRS-ELSA FRS-BHPS ELSA-BHPS 
Latent disability η 0.569
†        
(0.041) 
0.477†        
(0.035) 
0.538†        
(0.095) 
0.092§         
(0.054) 
0.031          
(0.103) 
-0.060          
(0.101) 
Female 
0.122§        
(0.065) 
0.251†        
(0.073) 
-0.068         
(0.172) 
-0.129          
(0.098) 
0.190          
(0.184) 
0.319§         
(0.187) 
Spline age 65-73 
-0.040†        
(0.008) 
-0.036†        
(0.007) 
-0.084†        
(0.021) 
-0.004          
(0.011) 
0.043§         
(0.022) 
0.048‡         
(0.022) 
Spline from age 73+ 
0.058†        
(0.006) 
0.046†        
(0.007) 
0.028§        
(0.015) 
0.012          
(0.009) 
0.030§         
(0.016) 
0.017          
(0.016) 
Post- compulsory education 
-0.161‡        
(0.065) 
-0.238†        
(0.071) 
-0.070         
(0.155) 
0.077          
(0.096) 
-0.090          
(0.168) 
-0.167          
(0.171) 
(ln) income spline to median  
-0.008         
(0.048) 
-0.092§        
(0.049) 
-0.041         
(0.090) 
0.083          
(0.069) 
0.033          
(0.102) 
-0.050          
(0.102) 
(ln) income spline from median 
-0.392†        
(0.120) 
-0.422†        
(0.154) 
-0.411§        
(0.247) 
0.030         
(0.195) 
0.019          
(0.274) 
-0.011          
(0.291) 
Outright owner 
-0.136‡        
(0.062) 
-0.006         
(0.071) 
-0.265         
(0.164) 
-0.130          
(0.095) 
0.128          
(0.175) 
0.259          
(0.178) 
Married/cohabiting 
-0.076         
(0.064) 
0.087         
(0.076) 
-0.171         
(0.182) 
-0.163          
(0.100) 
0.094          
(0.193) 
0.257          
(0.198) 
χ2( 9) test of coefficient equality 14.398 14.685§ 14.844§ 
Statistical significance of the coefficient, t-test cross-sample coefficient difference and χ2 statistic: † p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. Standard Errors in parentheses.
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source of survey data. This is clear from Figure 1, which shows the mean preva-
lence of AA receipt within each decile of the distribution of the posterior predic-
tion of latent disability for each individual. The strong disability-targeting of AA 
emerges very clearly for all three surveys.  
The estimated probability of receiving AA declines nonlinearly with income. 
We find that, below median income, the coefficient is significant at the 10% level 
only in ELSA, so the income gradient in AA receipt operates primarily among 
higher-income people. The negative gradient is due both to the low incidence of 
disability among high-income groups (Pudney 2010) and to the low propensity 
of these groups to claim benefit (Hernandez et al. 2007). Consequently, although 
AA is not means-tested, patterns of receipt mimic to some degree the effect of 
means testing for those in the top half of the pensioner income distribution. 
We find significant evidence of a negative association between the level of ed-
ucation and AA receipt in both ELSA and FRS. This suggests that any advantage 
that more educated people may have in navigating the benefits system is out-
weighed by factors such as less contact throughout their lives with the benefit 
system, or greater perceived stigma from claiming benefits (as also found in Zan-
tomio 2013). Owning one’s home outright reduces significantly the probability of 
AA receipt in the FRS and the BHPS. This could reflect a lower financial need 
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among homeowners, or the same factors that may be at work for more educated 
people could play a similar role for outright homeowners.  
 
Figure 1: Proportion of people in receipt of AA by predicted severity of 
disability 
 
Note: Smoothed local linear regressions applied on the FRS (solid line), the ELSA (long dashed 
line) and the BHPS (dotted line) samples. Bandwidth set equal to 0.4. 
 
 
Receipt of AA appears gender-related in the FRS and the ELSA, where men 
are less likely to receive AA than women; gender differences are insignificant in 
the BHPS. In all three surveys, age affects the probability of AA receipt non-
linearly, with a convex age profile. There is again a significant difference between 
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the presence of a partner significantly affects the probability of receiving AA. 
Inspection of coefficients in this piecemeal way creates a bias in favour of finding 
significant differences, because of the multiple comparisons involved. However, a 
joint Wald test finds a significant difference between BHPS and the other two 
samples (P-values 0.100 and 0.095). We do not reject coefficient equality between 
the FRS and ELSA. 
In Figure 2(a), we compare the implications of the estimated models, for two 
illustrative individuals: a 65-year old man living with his partner as an outright 
homeowner with income 50% above the median; and an 85-year old non-home-
owner widow, with equivalised income 75% of the median. Both have compulsory 
minimum education. In Figure 2a, the between-survey differences in their AA-
disability profiles are modest in comparison with the predicted differences be-
tween hypothetical individual types. For example, at a disability level one stand-
ard deviation above the mean, the three models predict a 4-7% rate of receipt for 
the couple compared to a 50-71% rate for the widow. At disability level of 2.5 
standard deviations above the mean, the ranges are 16-26% for the couple and 
77-92% for the widow. 
In Figure 2(b), we compare the estimated AA-income profiles. Again, the be-
tween-survey differences in these profiles are modest in comparison with the pre-
dicted differences between hypothetical individual types. The rate of receipt for 
the low-disability type (at the 25th percentile of the disability index distribution) 
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couple is essentially zero, whereas the rate of receipt for the high-disability type 
(at the 75th percentile of the disability index distribution) ranges from 31% to 
37% in the income interval we consider. The rate of receipt is nonlinear in income: 
almost flat below median equivalised income and steadily declining thereafter. 
For example, the rate of receipt for the highly-disabled widow ranges from 34 to 
39% at the 25th (£435 per month) and at the 50th percentile of the income distri-
bution, and 27-33% at the 75th percentile (£917 per month). 
In general, the three surveys show similar patterns in terms of their empirical 
AA-disability relationship. However at some disability levels between survey dif-
ferences in predicted probabilities of AA receipt are sizeable. The between-survey 
differences are statistically significant when the BHPS is used as the basis for 
comparison. In the next section we investigate the extent to which these differ-
ences might be attributable to differences in sample composition.   
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of AA receipt by survey for two bench-
mark cases 
 
(a) The AA-disability relation 
 
 
(b) The AA-income relation 
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5 Controlling sample composition 
If statistical models are empirical approximations local to the region spanned by 
the sample data, then cross-survey differences in model estimates might result only 
from differences in their covariate distributions rather than any more fundamental 
measurement problem. As Table 1 makes clear, there are important differences in 
the empirical distribution of the covariates in the three surveys, resulting from the 
differences in design and patterns of response.  
In single-survey analysis, the standard method of controlling sample composition 
is to use survey weights. Broadly, these have three elements: 푑푒푠푖푔푛 푤푒푖푔ℎ푡푠 which 
compensate for deliberate non-uniform sampling rates across the population; 
푛표푛푟푒푠푝표푛푠푒 푤푒푖푔ℎ푡푠 which compensate for variations in response probabilities 
across individuals and households with different characteristics; and 푐푎푙푖푏푟푎푡푖표푛/
푝표푠푡 − 푠푡푟푎푡푖푓푖푐푎푡푖표푛 푤푒푖푔ℎ푡푠 used as a final step to bring the sample composition 
in line with whatever is known about the structure of the population. If the as-
sumptions underlying the derivation of weights (e.g. missingness at random (MAR)) 
are valid and if the weights are implemented in the “correct” way by each survey, 
then separate weighted samples should identify essentially the same population 
parameters, if the questionnaires have the same informational content. However, 
the weighting strategies are not harmonised across the three surveys (see Table 1 
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for a summary of the weighting procedures). Different covariates appear in re-
sponse models used to generate nonresponse weights and the calibration stage is 
done in different ways. Given these methodological conflicts, it is unlikely that the 
use of the weights supplied with each survey will solve the comparability problem, 
and it is even possible for weighting to impair, rather than improve, comparability. 
Nevertheless, we have carried out weighted analyses and found that weighting does 
not fully eliminate the between-survey differences we found in section 4.  For the 
disability equations, the Wald χ2 of coefficient equality P-value slightly rises from 
0.064 to 0.102 for the FRS-BHPS comparison and it decreases from 0.028 to 0.026 
for the ELSA-BHPS comparison (see Appendix Table A2). For the Attendance 
Allowance equation, the Wald χ2 P-value decreases from 0.100 to 0.048 for the 
FRS-BHPS comparison and it rises from 0.095 to 0.142 for the ELSA-BHPS com-
parison (see Appendix Table A3).  
Matching techniques provide another way of reducing bias from differences in 
the sampling distribution of covariates across surveys. They involve estimating the 
models using survey-specific subsamples which are balanced in terms of the set of 
common covariates thought to influence disability and AA receipt. The matching 
approach has not been widely used in this context, but there are some precedents 
(Rosenbaum, 2002; D’Orazio et al., 2006; Rässler, 2002). The method requires (at 
least partial) common support across surveys for the matching variables, which 
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holds in our samples (see Table O2 of the Online Appendix). We make the as-
sumption that the matching variables are comprehensive in the sense that, condi-
tional on them, sub-sample selection can be regarded as random. This is essentially 
the same MAR assumption underlying weighting methods and, although untesta-
ble, is plausible, given the three surveys’ sample design.   
In practice, we take each survey in turn as a baseline and construct matched 
sub-samples from the other two surveys, yielding six pairs of matched samples. 
The matching algorithm (Leuven and Sianesi 2003) uses one-to-one nearest-neigh-
bour matching, minimising the Mahalanobis distance for the variables age, gender, 
post-compulsory education, partnership, housing tenure and log pre-benefit net 
income. Matching is performed without replacement, to avoid repeated use of the 
same observation from the matched survey, at the cost of possibly reducing the 
size of successfully matched samples. According to available sample size, in each 
round of pairwise matching we impose a caliper (ranging from 0.04 to 0.5) to 
prevent poor matches, equivalent in practice to exact matching of binary variables 
and very close matching for the continuous income and age variables; t-tests for 
the equality of means between each baseline sample and the corresponding 
matched samples were used to confirm the success of the algorithm in balancing 
the conditioning covariates. We also discarded matched pairs of observations whose 
income difference was in the top 5% when matching BHPS to ELSA and the top 
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10% when matching ELSA to BHPS. Means of socio-economic variables and AA 
receipt in the matched samples are given in Table O2 of the Online Appendix. 
We repeated estimation of the system of equations (1), (3) and (4) on each of 
the six pairs of matched samples. Results obtained for the measurement equations 
(1)-(2) confirm the patterns described in Section 4, with mobility indicators play-
ing a dominant role as indicators of latent disability. The three panels of Appen-
dix Table A4 report estimated regression coefficients for the latent disability 
equation (3) obtained from samples mimicking the FRS, ELSA and BHPS sample 
compositions respectively. As in the unmatched samples (Table 3), we obtain 
significant disability gradients in age (positive) and income (negative) consist-
ently across surveys, although some coefficients lose significance in smaller sam-
ples. Using separate t-tests of cross-sample coefficient stability, we would reject 
the null hypothesis of coefficient equality only for the first spline of income coef-
ficient (at the nominal 5% level), when FRS or ELSA are used to mimic the 
BHPS sample composition. However, none of the individual t-tests would be sig-
nificant if a Bonferroni correction were used, and the striking similarity of esti-
mated coefficients is confirmed by the χ2 tests of coefficients’ joint equality: in 
none of the six paired survey comparisons is the null hypothesis rejected.  
 
Estimated coefficients for the AA receipt equation (4) are reported in Appendix 
Table 5. The positive disability gradient in AA receipt found in the unmatched 
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samples (Table 4) is also evident in the matched samples: estimates for the disa-
bility coefficient γ are positive, significant and remarkably similar in size. The 
negative income gradient is also confirmed, except for an insignificant positive 
coefficient when ELSA mimics the BHPS sample composition. The negative as-
sociation between homeownership and receipt of AA is again found whenever the 
coefficient on homeownership is significant. For age, coefficient equality is re-
jected at the 5% level only for the second spline when BHPS observations are 
used to mimic the ELSA sample composition; but such isolated rejections are 
likely to arise from sampling error when large numbers of individual t-tests are 
used, and none would be significant if a Bonferroni correction were used. Joint 
Wald χ2 tests of coefficient equality again fail to reject the hypothesis of coeffi-
cient equality in any of the six pairwise comparisons. 
6 Robustness 
6.1 The number of factors 
In the estimated 1-factor measurement models of Table 2, there is a strikingly 
low correlation between the latent disability index and those indicators which 
might be thought to represent cognitive rather than physical disability. To allow 
for a distinction between physical and cognitive disability, we have also estimated 
a 2-factor model for each sample, following an exploratory factor analysis of the 
disability indicators. The attempt failed for the BHPS, where only a single factor 
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could be detected, arguably because the BHPS disability questions lack complete-
ness and have poor sensitivity to the cognitive dimension of disability. For the 
FRS and ELSA 2-factor models can be estimated (see Appendix Tables A9-A10 
and O3 of the Online Appendix). The second factor appears to distinguish the 
cognitive aspect of disability for the FRS where difficulties in communication, in 
memory/concentration/ learning/understanding and in recognising physical dan-
ger are fairly obviously related to cognitive functioning. Since incontinence could 
stem from physical and/or cognitive problems, we allow for a cross-loading be-
tween the 2 factors for difficulties with continence. In ELSA, the second factor is 
determined from four cognitively-demanding IADLs (using a map, telephone use, 
self-medication, and handling finances) and, as for the FRS, we allow a cross-
loading for continence. It is well known that there are limitations in the extent 
to which IADLs capture difficulties in cognitive functioning (Cromwell et al. 
2003). We find the two factors to be strongly correlated (a similar result for the 
US is reported by Wallace and Herzog 1995). In the 2-factor latent disability 
equations (Table A6) the estimated coefficients for the first factor are close to 
those found in the 1-factor model for ELSA but are generally lower for the FRS, 
particularly for age and home-ownership. Using unmatched samples, we can re-
ject the hypothesis of equal coefficients in the FRS and ELSA models for latent 
disability factor 1 but not factor 2 (Table A6). Results in Table A7 suggest a 
larger role for physical than cognitive influences on AA receipt with statistically 
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insignificant differences between the estimated coefficients in the two surveys (P-
values 0.140 and 0.192, respectively). The 2-factor specification confirms our pre-
vious findings on the relationship of AA receipt to socio-economic characteristics, 
since tests of coefficient equality do not reject the null hypothesis that coefficients 
(휷) of the observed covariates in the 2-factor models are equal to those obtained 
with the 1-factor specification in both surveys. The estimated coefficients of the 
2-factor models are similar in size for FRS and ELSA. Based on a Wald-test, we 
reject the hypothesis of equality for the full AA coefficient vector (휷, 휸) (P-value 
= 0.013) but we do not reject for 휷 alone (Wald P-value = 0.244). Cross-survey 
differences in the magnitude of the coefficients are not large and, for practical 
research purposes, one would draw essentially the same conclusions from the FRS 
and ELSA results. 
6.2 Alternative normalisations 
The 1-factor models set out above were estimated under the normalisation to 
unity of the factor loading associated with difficulties in mobility in each survey. 
Here we discuss the robustness of those findings to two alternative normalizations 
of : in the first, we constrain an alternative factor loading; in the second, we set 
the residual variance of 휂  equal to 1.  
The comparability of estimates of the disability and AA equations can be 
improved by normalising the loadings of more similar questionnaire items. For 
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instance, the FRS and ELSA have questions on the capacity to lift weights (var-
iable LIFTING) which are arguably more similar than those on general mobility. 
When the factor loading for LIFTING is normalised to unity, the concordance 
between the FRS and ELSA disability equation and AA coefficients does indeed 
improve, with the Wald χ2 P-values rising to 0.271 and 0.287 respectively (1-
factor specification, unmatched samples). Details of the estimates are in the 
Online Appendix, Tables O4-O6. However, the scope of this exercise is limited 
by the lack of a directly comparable indicator in the BHPS. 
 
6.3 Proxy cases in the FRS 
Since we are forced to exclude proxy cases from the analysis of ELSA and 
BHPS, we investigate the consequences of also excluding them from the FRS and 
dropping the proxy indicator from the disability measurement equations (see Ta-
bles O7-O9 of the Online Appendix). This has the effect of changing slightly the 
factor loadings on the other indicators. Nevertheless, all factor loadings remain 
positive and highly significant. The largest changes in loadings are for men, where 
the factor loading on lifting increases from 1.005 to 1.039, while those for memory 
problems and recognising when in danger fall from 0.420 to 0.356 and from 0.510 
to 0.355 respectively. The estimated latent disability and AA receipt equations 
are not changed substantially. However, there are some small effects on the sta-
tistical significance of differences between the surveys in the estimated coefficients. 
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In both the disability and the receipt of AA equations, after dropping proxy cases, 
the differences between the FRS and ELSA become smaller but increase slightly 
when FRS is contrasted with BHPS. 
 
7 Conclusions  
Our aim in this study is to contribute to the current policy debate over reform 
prospects for the social care system by investigating the robustness of survey-
based evidence on the targeting of public support for older people with disabilities. 
We have examined the three UK surveys (FRS, ELSA and BHPS) which have 
been the basis for much of the empirical analysis underpinning the debate on 
policy on disability in the pensioner population. Despite differences between the 
three surveys in terms of their questionnaire content, we have found that they 
have a coherent story to tell about the targeting of one form of public support in 
relation to disability, income and other personal and household characteristics. 
We also claim to offer some advance in terms of the statistical modeling meth-
odology typically used in the disability research literature. Adopting a latent 
variable approach, we are able to exploit the existence of multiple – but largely 
arbitrary and individually unreliable – survey indicators, whilst avoiding the com-
mon practice of using ad hoc count indices as disability measures. Results confirm 
that the probability of receiving AA increases strongly with the severity of disa-
bility and decreases with income – especially for those in the top half of the 
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income distribution – after allowing for the socio-economic gradient in health 
that associates higher living standards with lower disability. This is important in 
the context of renewed suggestions that consideration be given to means testing 
AA (Commission on the Future of Health and Social Care in England, 2014). 
Contrary to some suggestions, we can say there is no evidence of people receiving 
AA without any disability revealed by their survey interview. In allowing for two 
latent disability factors we find evidence from the FRS and ELSA that physical 
disability has a larger influence on AA receipt than cognitive disability. Limita-
tions in the BHPS survey instrument meant that we were unable to confirm this 
in the BHPS. This suggests that survey designers should be concerned more to 
ensure that disability indicators capture a range of types of disability rather than 
with the merits of each individual indicator. Our use of Mahalanobis matching 
to improve comparability by removing differences in sample composition also 
provides a valuable reminder of the need to consider sample coverage as a factor 
when reviewing a range of research findings.  
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Appendix: Additional Tables 
Table A1: Survey specific functional limitations indicators D 
Data Source: 
Not receiving AA Receiving  
AA 
Non-recipient/ 
recipient differ-
ence (un-
weighted)† 
un-
weighted 
mean 
 
weighted 
mean 
un-
weighted 
mean 
 
weighted 
mean  
FRS:  Has difficulty with:      
MOBILITY mobility (moving about) 0.251 0.254 0.814 0.813 -0.563 
LIFTING lifting, carrying or moving objects 0.221 0.221 0.745 0.749 -0.524 
DEXTERITY manual dexterity using hands for everyday tasks 0.077 0.077 0.396 0.400 -0.319 
CONTINENCE with continence (bladder control) 0.055 0.056 0.237 0.235 -0.182 
COMMUNICATION communication (speech, hearing or eyesight) 0.039 0.040 0.204 0.200 -0.165 
MEMORY memory/concentration/learning/understanding 0.049 0.050 0.252 0.255 -0.203 
KNOWING DANGER recognising when in physical danger 0.005 0.005 0.068 0.069 -0.062 
OTHER other area of life 0.040 0.040 0.092 0.091 -0.053 
PROXY interviewed by proxy 0.059 0.059 0.121 0.131 -0.063 
 Observations 6,093 651   
ELSA: Has difficulty with:       
WALKING 100 YDS walking 100 yards 0.117 0.121 0.572 0.582 -0.455 
SITTING 2 HRS sitting for about two hours 0.126 0.126 0.285 0.279 -0.158 
CHAIR TRANSFERS getting up from a chair after sitting for long periods 0.282 0.285 0.626 0.618 -0.344 
STAIRS (several flights) climbing several flights of stairs without resting 0.424 0.429 0.821 0.822 -0.397 
STAIRS (1 flights) climbing one flight of stairs without resting     0.161 0.167 0.650 0.653 -0.489 
STOOPING stooping, kneeling, or crouching 0.411 0.415 0.791 0.798 -0.381 
REACHING reaching or extending arms above shoulder level 0.103 0.105 0.344 0.339 -0.241 
PULL/PUSHING pulling or pushing large objects e.g. living room chair 0.183 0.189 0.675 0.686 -0.492 
LIFTING lifting/carrying weights over 10 lbs, e.g. heavy bag 0.281 0.288 0.797 0.806 -0.516 
PICKING-UP COIN picking up a 5p coin from a table 0.049 0.050 0.241 0.249 -0.192 
DRESSING ADL:dressing, including putting on shoes an 0.126 0.128 0.472 0.460 -0.346 
WALKING ADL:walking across a room 0.025 0.027 0.203 0.211 -0.178 
BATHING ADL:bathing or showering 0.128 0.132 0.566 0.568 -0.438 
FEEDING ADL:eating, such as cutting up your food 0.012 0.012 0.092 0.095 -0.08 
BED TRANSFERS ADL:getting in or out of bed 0.044 0.045 0.287 0.280 -0.243 
USING TOILET ADL:using the toilet, including getting up  0.029 0.030 0.179 0.179 -0.15 
CONTINENCE Problem with continence 0.157 0.158 0.336 0.338 -0.179 
USING MAP IADL:using a map to figure out how to get around 0.057 0.061 0.222 0.240 -0.165 
PREP HOT MEAL IADL:preparing a hot meal 0.029 0.031 0.282 0.291 -0.253 
SHOPPING IADL:shopping for groceries 0.083 0.088 0.504 0.515 -0.422 
PHONING IADL:making telephone calls 0.020 0.022 0.095 0.095 -0.075 
MEDICATION IADL:taking medications 0.010 0.011 0.084 0.086 -0.073 
HOUSEWORK IADL:doing work around the house or garden 0.159 0.163 0.650 0.660 -0.491 
MANAGING MONEY IADL: managing money, e.g. paying bills  0.023 0.025 0.154 0.162 -0.131 
 Observations 4,773 369   
BHPS: Health hinders:       
HOUSEWORK   doing the housework 0.089 0.095 0.573 0.557 -0.484 
CLIMBING STAIRS   climbing the stairs 0.105 0.114 0.600 0.601 -0.495 
DRESSING   getting dressed 0.036 0.038 0.173 0.185 -0.137 
WALKING>10 mins   walking more than 10 mins 0.094 0.097 0.520 0.526 -0.426 
How manages...(6-point scale)      
STAIRS   Stairs 1.856 1.914 3.920 3.830 -2.064 
AROUND HOUSE   getting around house 1.350 1.367 2.613 2.551 -1.264 
BED TRANSFERS   getting in/out bed 1.360 1.378 2.547 2.525 -1.187 
CUTTING TOENAILS   cutting toenails 2.555 2.643 4.920 4.915 -2.365 
BATHING   bathing/showering 1.572 1.626 3.280 3.286 -1.708 
WALKING DOWN ROAD   walking down road 1.678 1.720 3.773 3.739 -2.095 
 Observations 967 75   
†  All differences are significantly different from 0 at the 1% level.
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Table A2: Estimates of the disability equation in weighted samples 
Covariates 
Coefficients  Tests and coefficient differences 
FRS ELSA BHPS FRS-ELSA FRS-BHPS ELSA-BHPS 
Spline age 65-73 
0.041†        
(0.013) 
0.033†        
(0.013) 
0.136†        
(0.038) 
0.007          
(0.018) 
-0.096†         
(0.041) 
-0.103†         
(0.04) 
Spline from age 73+ 
0.093†        
(0.008) 
0.101†        
(0.008) 
0.119†        
(0.02) 
-0.008          
(0.011) 
-0.027          
(0.022) 
-0.019          
(0.021) 
Post-compulsory education 
-0.275†        
(0.067) 
-0.306†        
(0.063) 
-0.214         
(0.155) 
0.031          
(0.092) 
-0.061          
(0.169) 
-0.092          
(0.167) 
Income spline to median  
-0.138†        
(0.045) 
-0.055         
(0.054) 
-0.162§        
(0.096) 
-0.083          
(0.07) 
0.024          
(0.106) 
0.108          
(0.11) 
Income spline from median 
-0.354†        
(0.086) 
-0.276†        
(0.075) 
-0.599†        
(0.218) 
-0.078          
(0.114) 
0.246          
(0.235) 
0.323          
(0.231) 
Outright owner 
-0.369†        
(0.065) 
-0.482†        
(0.066) 
-0.14      
(0.16) 
0.113          
(0.093) 
-0.229          
(0.173) 
-0.342‡         
(0.173) 
Variance (휎휐2)  
3.004†        
(0.281) 
2.608†        
(0.238) 
3.376†        
(0.823) 
0.396          
(1.075) 
-0.372          
(0.428) 
-0.768          
(0.896) 
  Sample size Coefficient equality 2(6) 
  6,744 5,142 1,042 3.701 10.579 14.318‡ 
Statistical significance of the coefficient, t-test cross-sample coefficient difference and χ2 statistic:  
† p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. Standard Errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table A3: Estimates of the AA receipt equation in weighted samples 
Covariates 
Coefficients Coefficient differences 
FRS ELSA BHPS FRS-ELSA FRS-BHPS ELSA-BHPS 
Latent disability η 
0.569†        
(0.042) 
0.467†        
(0.035) 
0.505†        
(0.092) 
0.101§         
(0.055) 
0.064          
(0.101) 
-0.037          
(0.099) 
Female 
0.144‡        
(0.066) 
0.238†        
(0.074) 
-0.047         
(0.184) 
-0.095          
(0.099) 
0.19          
(0.195) 
0.285          
(0.198) 
Spline age 65-73 
-0.043†        
(0.008) 
-0.036†        
(0.007) 
-0.088†        
(0.022) 
-0.007          
(0.011) 
0.045§         
(0.023) 
0.052‡         
(0.023) 
Spline from age 73+ 
0.056†        
(0.006) 
0.041†        
(0.007) 
0.022         
(0.016) 
0.015          
(0.009) 
0.034‡         
(0.017) 
0.019         
(0.017) 
Post- compulsory education 
-0.148‡        
(0.066) 
-0.232†        
(0.072) 
-0.099         
(0.155) 
0.084          
(0.098) 
-0.049          
(0.168) 
-0.133          
(0.171) 
(ln) income spline to median  
-0.013         
(0.049) 
-0.071         
(0.053) 
0.002         
(0.097) 
0.057          
(0.072) 
-0.015          
(0.109) 
-0.072          
(0.111) 
(ln) income spline from median 
-0.432†        
(0.12) 
-0.405†        
(0.152) 
-0.375         
(0.25) 
-0.027          
(0.193) 
-0.056          
(0.277) 
-0.029          
(0.292) 
Outright owner 
-0.135‡        
(0.063) 
-0.019         
(0.074) 
-0.244         
(0.171) 
-0.116          
(0.097) 
0.109          
(0.183) 
0.225          
(0.187) 
Married/cohabiting 
-0.038         
(0.066) 
0.087         
(0.077) 
-0.105         
(0.196) 
-0.126          
(0.102) 
0.067          
(0.207) 
0.192          
(0.21) 
χ2( 9) test of coefficient equality 13.015 17.027‡ 13.457 
Statistical significance of the coefficient, t-test cross-sample coefficient difference and χ2 statistic:  
† p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. Standard Errors in parenthesis.  
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Table A4: Estimates of the disability equation in matched samples 
Covariate Coefficient Estimates (standard errors) 
 FRS sample composition  ELSA matched to FRS BHPS matched to FRS 
 FRS ELSA FRS BHPS 
Spline age 65-73 
0.047         
(0.016) 
0.036         
(0.013) 
0.073         
(0.085) 
0.142         
(0.038) 
Spline age 73+ 
0.090         
(0.010) 
0.098         
(0.008) 
0.077         
(0.034) 
0.119         
(0.020) 
Post- compulsory education 
-0.182         
(0.082) 
-0.231         
(0.066) 
-0.001         
(0.264) 
-0.090         
(0.161) 
Income spline to median 
-0.258         
(0.097) 
-0.113         
(0.094) 
-0.662         
(0.667) 
-0.925         
(0.381) 
Income spline from median 
-0.314         
(0.122) 
-0.391         
(0.089) 
-0.308         
(0.323) 
-0.469         
(0.251) 
outright owner 
-0.447         
(0.082) 
-0.491         
(0.068) 
-0.146         
(0.167) 
-0.226         
(0.167) 
χ2 (6) for coefficient equality 1.924 5.548 
Sample size                    4,587 973 
ELSA sample composition FRS matched to ELSA BHPS matched to ELSA 
 FRS ELSA ELSA BHPS 
Spline age 65-73 
0.033         
(0.016) 
0.037         
(0.013) 
0.061         
(0.031) 
0.072         
(0.035) 
Spline age 73+ 
0.096         
(0.010) 
0.098         
(0.008) 
0.082‡        
(0.016) 
0.128‡        
(0.022) 
Post- compulsory education 
-0.205         
(0.079) 
-0.271         
(0.067) 
-0.043         
(0.143) 
-0.257         
(0.171) 
Income spline to median 
-0.125         
(0.084) 
-0.093         
(0.096) 
-0.284         
(0.190) 
-0.608         
(0.382) 
Income spline from median 
-0.340         
(0.118) 
-0.362         
(0.090) 
-0.245         
(0.195) 
-0.512         
(0.268) 
outright owner 
-0.437         
(0.079) 
-0.524         
(0.069) 
-0.442         
(0.148) 
-0.230         
(0.164) 
χ2 (6) for coefficient equality 1.548 6.241 
Sample size                                    4,596 850 
BHPS sample composition FRS matched to BHPS ELSA matched to BHPS 
 FRS BHPS ELSA BHPS 
Spline age 65-73 
0.040‡        
(0.039) 
0.143‡        
(0.037) 
0.044‡        
(0.034) 
0.133‡        
(0.041) 
Spline age 73+ 
0.089         
(0.021) 
0.116         
(0.020) 
0.089         
(0.019) 
0.112         
(0.021) 
Post- compulsory education 
-0.075         
(0.167) 
-0.053         
(0.156) 
0.112         
(0.159) 
-0.091         
(0.174) 
Income spline to median 
-0.444         
(0.425) 
-0.941         
(0.367) 
0.138         
(0.296) 
-0.296         
(0.266) 
Income spline from median 
-0.403         
(0.252) 
-0.423         
(0.249) 
-0.606         
(0.275) 
-0.551         
(0.301) 
outright owner 
-0.457         
(0.182) 
-0.209         
(0.161) 
-0.648         
(0.172) 
-0.318         
(0.183) 
χ2 (6) for coefficient equality 7.681 9.870 
Sample size                                       966 791 
Note: Significance of t-test cross-sample coefficient difference and χ2 statistic: † p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. 
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Table A5: Estimates of the AA receipt equation in matched samples 
Covariate Coefficient Estimates (standard errors) 
FRS sample composition  ELSA matched to FRS BHPS matched to FRS 
 FRS  ELSA FRS  BHPS 
Latent disability η 0.550         
(0.047) 
0.498         
(0.038) 
0.622         
(0.117) 
0.517         
(0.094) 
Female 
0.031         
(0.083) 
0.179         
(0.080) 
-0.037         
(0.181) 
-0.128         
(0.186) 
Spline age 65-73 
-0.031         
(0.010) 
-0.025         
(0.009) 
-0.004         
(0.058) 
0.001          
(0.036) 
Spline age 73+ 
0.062         
(0.008) 
0.050         
(0.007) 
0.023         
(0.021) 
0.025         
(0.016) 
Post- compulsory education 
-0.119         
(0.080) 
-0.209         
(0.080) 
-0.107         
(0.179) 
0.146         
(0.169) 
Income spline to median 
-0.125         
(0.081) 
-0.203         
(0.086) 
-0.349         
(0.434) 
-0.688         
(0.360) 
Income spline from median 
-0.398         
(0.169) 
-0.492         
(0.200) 
-0.644         
(0.339) 
-0.304         
(0.267) 
outright owner 
-0.113         
(0.077) 
0.010         
(0.078) 
-0.223         
(0.173) 
-0.297         
(0.171) 
Married/Cohabiting 
-0.010         
(0.082) 
0.079         
(0.084) 
0.110         
(0.179) 
-0.047         
(0.196) 
χ2 (9) for coefficient equality 6.447  3.000  
Sample size                                      4,587 973 
ELSA sample composition FRS matched to ELSA BHPS matched to ELSA 
 FRS ELSA ELSA BHPS 
Latent disability η 0.581         
(0.051) 
0.480         
(0.038) 
0.658         
(0.119) 
0.508         
(0.101) 
Female 
0.084         
(0.082) 
0.172         
(0.080) 
0.420         
(0.219) 
0.025         
(0.198) 
Spline age 65-73 
-0.028         
(0.010) 
-0.027         
(0.009) 
-0.037         
(0.026) 
-0.003         
(0.032) 
Spline age 73+ 
0.057         
(0.008) 
0.050         
(0.007) 
0.057‡        
(0.019) 
0.021‡        
(0.017) 
Post- compulsory education 
-0.139         
(0.082) 
-0.207         
(0.080) 
-0.542         
(0.209) 
0.075         
(0.180) 
Income spline to median 
-0.154         
(0.080) 
-0.184         
(0.084) 
-0.241         
(0.207) 
-0.388         
(0.196) 
Income spline from median 
-0.415         
(0.170) 
-0.530         
(0.201) 
-0.525         
(0.449) 
-0.232       
(0.311) 
outright owner 
-0.089         
(0.078) 
0.027         
(0.078) 
-0.017         
(0.192) 
-0.251         
(0.178) 
Married/Cohabiting 
-0.066         
(0.082) 
0.084         
(0.082) 
0.023         
(0.224) 
-0.275         
(0.199) 
χ2 (9) for coefficient equality 7.590  11.522  
Sample size                                   4,596 850 
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BHPS sample composition FRS matched to BHPS ELSA matched to BHPS 
 FRS BHPS ELSA BHPS 
Latent disability η 0.519         
(0.098) 
0.530         
(0.096) 
0.566         
(0.100) 
0.510         
(0.103) 
Female 
-0.115         
(0.171) 
-0.131         
(0.184) 
0.059         
(0.202) 
-0.128         
(0.184) 
Spline age 65-73 
-0.005         
(0.032) 
0.001         
(0.035) 
-0.038         
(0.023) 
-0.047         
(0.030) 
Spline age 73+ 
0.048         
(0.017) 
0.026         
(0.016) 
0.057         
(0.017) 
0.032         
(0.017) 
Post- compulsory education 
-0.076         
(0.171) 
0.147         
(0.171) 
-0.388         
(0.210) 
0.050         
(0.175) 
Income spline to median 
-0.223         
(0.335) 
-0.692         
(0.360) 
-0.265         
(0.207) 
-0.381         
(0.206) 
Income spline from median 
-0.524         
(0.374) 
-0.334         
(0.27) 
0.131         
(0.383) 
-0.318         
(0.308) 
outright owner 
-0.259         
(0.176) 
-0.302         
(0.171) 
0.011         
(0.202) 
-0.289         
(0.183) 
Married/Cohabiting 
-0.021         
(0.200) 
-0.031         
(0.195) 
-0.095         
(0.207) 
-0.103         
(0.198) 
χ2 (9) for coefficient equality 3.445  6.619  
Sample size                                       966 791 
Note: Significance of t-test cross-sample coefficient difference and χ2 statistic: † p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. 
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Table A6: Estimates of the latent disability equation for the FRS and ELSA 2-factor 
models  
Covariates 
1 2 
FRS ELSA 
Tests and 
coeffi-
cient dif-
ferences 
FRS ELSA 
Tests and 
coeffi-
cient dif-
ferences 
Spline age 65-73 
0.033†     
(0.003) 
0.035†     
(0.011) 
-0.002          
(0.011) 
0.025      
(0.016) 
-0.015      
(0.013) 
0.040§         
(0.021) 
Spline from age 73+ 
0.064†     
(0.005) 
0.095†     
(0.007) 
-0.031†         
(0.009) 
0.079†     
(0.008) 
0.071†     
(0.009) 
0.008          
(0.012) 
Post-compulsory education 
-0.237†     
(0.051) 
-0.276†     
(0.058) 
0.039          
(0.077) 
-0.142§     
(0.075) 
-0.241†     
(0.069) 
0.100          
(0.102) 
Income spline to median  
-0.103†     
(0.037) 
-0.039      
(0.051) 
-0.063          
(0.063) 
-0.175†     
(0.038) 
-0.119‡     
(0.047) 
-0.056          
(0.061) 
Income spline from median 
-0.293†     
(0.071) 
-0.305†     
(0.070) 
0.013          
(0.100) 
-0.086      
(0.102) 
-0.170§     
(0.090) 
0.084          
(0.136) 
Outright owner 
-0.334†     
(0.053) 
-0.484†     
(0.062) 
0.150§         
(0.081) 
-0.120§     
(0.072) 
-0.135‡     
(0.061) 
0.015          
(0.095) 
2(6) coefficient equality   19.616†   7.423 
Sample size                     6744     5142    
Statistical significance of the coefficient, t-test cross-sample coefficient difference and χ2 statistic:  
† p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. Standard Errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
Table A7: Estimates of the AA receipt equation for the FRS and ELSA 2-factor 
models 
 
Covariates FRS ELSA 
tests and coefficient 
differences 
Latent disability η1 0.508†      (0.039) 0.419†      (0.045) 0.089          (0.060) 
Latent disability η2 0.295†      (0.046) 0.164§      (0.089) 0.131          (0.100) 
Female -0.043†      (0.006) -0.032†      (0.007) -0.012          (0.010) 
Spline age 65-73 0.055†      (0.006) 0.042†      (0.007) 0.013          (0.009) 
Spline from age 73+ -0.166‡      (0.065) -0.222†      (0.072) 0.056          (0.097) 
Post- compulsory education -0.001       (0.048) -0.078       (0.050) 0.077          (0.069) 
(ln) income spline to median e -0.406†      (0.120) -0.421†      (0.153) 0.015          (0.195) 
(ln) income spline from median -0.149‡      (0.063) -0.015       (0.072) -0.135          (0.096) 
Outright owner -0.079       (0.065) 0.084       (0.077) -0.163          (0.101) 
Married/cohabiting 0.183‡      (0.072) 0.271†      (0.075) -0.088          (0.104) 
2(10)  coefficient equality   22.477‡ 
Sample size                    6744 5142   
Statistical significance of the coefficient, t-test cross-sample coefficient difference and χ2 statistic:  
† p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. Standard Errors in parenthesis. 
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Online Appendix:  Further Tables and Identification 
proof 
 
Table O1: Sample means of SES and AA receipt in FRS, ELSA and BHPS  
 
  FRS ELSA BHPS 
  mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Unweighted 
Female 0.559 0.497 0.557 0.497 0.560 0.497 
Age†  74  73  74  
Post-compulsory education  0.505 0.500 0.539 0.499 0.513 0.500 
Ln pre-benefit equivalised in-
come‡ 
6.454 0.806 6.412 0.751 6.551 0.732 
Outright owner 0.664 0.472 0.690 0.463 0.701 0.458 
Married/cohabiting  0.579 0.494 0.565 0.496 0.553 0.497 
Receives AA  0.097 0.295 0.072 0.258 0.072 0.259 
Weighted 
 
Female 0.555 0.497 0.571 0.495 0.561 0.497 
Age†  74  74  74  
Post-compulsory education  0.513 0.500 0.522 0.500 0.495 0.500 
Ln pre-benefit equivalised in-
come‡ 
6.463 0.826 6.391 0.754 6.521 0.746 
Outright owner 0.677 0.468 0.682 0.466 0.672 0.470 
Married/cohabiting  0.573 0.495 0.548 0.498 0.538 0.499 
Receives AA  0.094 0.292 0.077 0.266 0.079 0.270 
Observations 6,746 5,142 1,042 
 
Notes: †To protect confidentiality, FRS and ELSA release data with a top-coding at the age of 80 and 90, respectively. 
Therefore, we report median rather than mean values. ‡ Household income excludes disability and means tested bene^ts 
and it has been equivalised using the modified OECD equivalence scale. 
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Table O2: Sample means of SES and AA receipt in matched samples 
 
  FRS  ELSA FRS  BHPS 
  mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
 FRS sample composition: ELSA matched to FRS BHPS matched to FRS 
 FRS  ELSA FRS  BHPS 
Female 0.561 0.496 0.561 0.496 0.566 0.496 0.566 0.496 
Age† 73  73  74  74  
Post-compulsory schooling 0.530 0.499 0.530 0.499 0.506 0.500 0.506 0.500 
ln pre-benefit equivalised income‡ 6.457 0.582 6.456 0.582 6.576 0.503 6.600 0.500 
Accommodation own it outright 0.690 0.462 0.690 0.462 0.716 0.451 0.716 0.451 
Married/cohabiting  0.572 0.495 0.572 0.495 0.565 0.496 0.565 0.496 
Receives AA 0.088 0.283 0.071 0.257 0.094 0.291 0.072 0.259 
Observations 4,587 973 
 ELSA sample composition: FRS matched to ELSA BHPS matched to ELSA 
 FRS  ELSA ELSA  BHPS 
Female 0.562 0.496 0.562 0.496 0.575 0.495 0.575 0.495 
Age† 73  73  74  74  
Post-compulsory schooling 0.531 0.499 0.531 0.499 0.504 0.500 0.504 0.500 
ln pre-benefit equivalised income‡ 6.458 0.578 6.455 0.582 6.563 0.513 6.533 0.527 
accommodation own it outright 0.690 0.463 0.690 0.463 0.720 0.449 0.720 0.449 
Married/cohabiting  0.574 0.495 0.574 0.495 0.552 0.498 0.552 0.498 
Receives AA 0.089 0.284 0.070 0.255 0.072 0.258 0.066 0.248 
Observations 4,596 850 
 BHPS sample composition: FRS matched to BHPS ELSA matched to BHPS 
 FRS  BHPS ELSA  BHPS 
Female 0.565 0.496 0.565 0.496 0.564 0.496 0.564 0.496 
Age† 74  74  74  74  
Post-compulsory schooling 0.505 0.500 0.505 0.500 0.497 0.500 0.497 0.500 
ln pre-benefit equivalised income‡ 6.575 0.499 6.599 0.496 6.488 0.496 6.513 0.500 
accommodation own it outright 0.716 0.451 0.716 0.451 0.718 0.450 0.718 0.450 
Married/cohabiting  0.566 0.496 0.566 0.496 0.550 0.498 0.550 0.498 
Receives AA 0.085 0.279 0.072 0.259 0.068 0.252 0.078 0.269 
Observations 966 791 
Notes: Based on unweighted selected samples. † To protect confidentiality, FRS and ELSA release data with a top-
coding at the age of 80 and 90, respectively. Therefore, we report median rather than mean values. ‡ Household income 
excludes disability and means tested benefits and it has been equivalised using the modified OECD equivalence scale.   
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Table O3: Factor loadings for the FRS and ELSA 2-factor models and squared cor-
relations of disability indicators with latent indices (휼풒) 
 
Functional limitation 
indicator  
Male Female 
Factor 1 (휂1) Factor 2 (휂2) Factor 1 (휂1) Factor 2 (휂2) 
FRS 푐표푣(휂1, 휂2) 1.172 0.854 
MOBILITY 1    1    
LIFTING 1.586†  2.226†   
DEXTERITY 0.768†  0.736†   
CONTINENCE 0.315† 0.235† 0.363† 0.275† 
COMMUNIC   1    1  
MEMORY   0.837†   0.987† 
DANGER   1.005†   1.078† 
OTHER 0.009  0.144‡ -0.064  0.208† 
PROXY   0.204†   0.270† 
ELSA 푐표푣(휂1, 휂2) 1.058 0.890 
WALK100 1    1    
SITTING 0.394†   0.409†   
CHAIR 0.593†   0.545†   
CLIMBSEV 0.736†   0.689†   
CLIMB1 1.014†   0.918†   
STOOP 0.657†   0.669†   
ARMS 0.511†   0.511†   
PULL/PUSH 1.025†   0.921†   
LIFTING 0.954†   0.919†   
COIN     0.383†   0.44†   
DRESSING 0.673†   0.665†   
WALKING 1.082†   0.980†   
BATH 0.879†   0.736†   
EATING 0.586†   0.431†   
BED  0.897†   0.705†   
TOILET 0.751†   0.592†   
CONTINENCE 0.196† 0.235‡ 0.275† -0.047  
MAP    1.052†  1.031† 
MEAL        
SHOPPING 0.999†   1.129†   
PHONE   1   1  
MEDICATION   1.231†  1.319† 
HOUSEWORK 1.137†   0.938†   
MONEY   1.25†   1.731† 
Statistical signi^cance of the factor loadings: † p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1.  
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Table O4: Factor loadings for the FRS and ELSA 1-factor models with alternative 
factor loading constraints 
FRS ELSA 
Disability Indi-
cator 
Factor loading (St. err.) Disability Indica-
tor 
Factor loading (St. err.) 
Men Women Men Women 
MOBILITY 
0.849†    (0.072) 0.962†    (0.077) 
WALKING 100 
YDS 1.118†    (0.079) 1.077†    (0.039) 
LIFTING 1     - 1     - SITTING 2 HRS 0.422†    (0.034) 0.436†    (0.030) 
DEXTERITY 
0.663†    (0.058) 0.579†    (0.040) 
CHAIR TRANS-
FERS 0.635†    (0.042) 0.582†    (0.035) 
CONTINENCE 
0.360†    (0.035) 0.392†    (0.033) 
STAIRS (several 
flights) 0.792†    (0.050) 0.735†    (0.042) 
COMMUNIC 
0.351†    (0.039) 0.333†    (0.035) 
STAIRS (1 
flight) 1.084†    (0.069) 0.984†    (0.058) 
MEMORY 0.382†    (0.04) 0.380†    (0.035) STOOPING 0.701†    (0.044) 0.715†    (0.040) 
DANGER 0.461†    (0.086) 0.388†    (0.050) REACHING 0.550†    (0.044) 0.547†    (0.037) 
OTHER 0.089†    (0.025) 0.055‡    (0.022) PULL/PUSHING 1.100†    (0.071) 0.987†    (0.050) 
PROXY 0.105†    (0.027) 0.110†    (0.022) LIFTING 1     - 1     - 
   
PICKING-UP 
COIN 0.415†    (0.051) 0.474†    (0.039) 
   DRESSING 0.723†    (0.051) 0.711†    (0.046) 
   
WALK ACROSS 
ROOM 1.154†    (0.151) 1.048†    (0.099) 
   BATHING 0.944†    (0.073) 0.790†    (0.050) 
   FEEDING 0.652†    (0.093) 0.468†    (0.060) 
   
BED TRANS-
FERS 0.962†    (0.093) 0.751†    (0.058) 
   USING TOILET 0.808†    (0.097) 0.631†    (0.054) 
   CONTINENCE 0.327†    (0.032) 0.275†    (0.023) 
   USING A MAP 0.445†    (0.052) 0.375†    (0.031) 
   
PREP. HOT 
MEAL 0.883†    (0.109) 0.886†    (0.081) 
   SHOPPING 1.115†    (0.091) 1.241†    (0.086) 
   PHONING 0.392†    (0.049) 0.357†    (0.049) 
   MEDICATION 0.523†    (0.077) 0.524†    (0.081) 
   HOUSEWORK 1.239†    (0.092) 1.014†    (0.063) 
   
MANAGING 
MONEY 0.496†    (0.061) 0.524†    (0.052) 
Sample size 6,744 5,142 
Statistical signi^cance of the factor loadings: † p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1.  
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Table O5: Estimates of the latent disability equation for the FRS and ELSA 1-
factor models with alternative factor loading constraints 
Covariates 
Coefficients and Standard Errors 
Tests and coefficient differ-
ences FRS ELSA 
Spline age 65-73 
0.042†        
(0.014) 
0.032†        
(0.011) 
0.010          (0.018) 
Spline from age 73+ 
0.100†        
(0.009) 
0.090†        
(0.007) 
0.010          (0.011) 
Post-compulsory education 
-0.307†        
(0.074) 
-0.255†        
(0.055) 
-0.052          (0.092) 
Income spline to median 
-0.180†        
(0.052) 
-0.042         
(0.048) 
-0.137§         (0.070) 
Income spline from median 
-0.369†        
(0.094) 
-0.284†        
(0.066) 
-0.085          (0.115) 
Outright owner 
-0.416†        
(0.071) 
-0.444†        
(0.057) 
0.028          (0.092) 
 Sample size Coefficient equality χ2 (6) 
 6,744 5,142 7.573  
Statistical significance of the coefficient, t-test cross-sample coefficient difference and χ2 statistic:  
† p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. Standard Errors in parenthesis. 
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Table O6: Estimates of the AA receipt equation for the FRS and ELSA 1-factor 
models with alternative factor loading constraints 
Covariates 
Coefficients and Standard Er-
rors  Tests of coefficient equality 
FRS  ELSA FRS-ELSA 
Latent disability η 0.516
†        
(0.041) 
0.522†        
(0.038) 
-0.006          (0.056) 
Female 
0.118§        
(0.065) 
0.252†        
(0.073) 
-0.134          (0.098) 
Spline age 65-73 
-0.040†        
(0.008) 
-0.036†        
(0.007) 
-0.004          (0.011) 
Spline from age 73+ 
0.058†        
(0.006) 
0.046†        
(0.007) 
0.012          (0.009) 
Post- compulsory edu-
cation 
-0.161‡        
(0.065) 
-0.238†        
(0.071) 
0.077          (0.096) 
(ln) income spline to 
median  
-0.007         
(0.048) 
-0.092§        
(0.049) 
0.085          (0.069) 
(ln) income spline from 
median 
-0.390†        
(0.120) 
-0.422†        
(0.154) 
0.032          (0.195) 
Outright owner 
-0.138‡        
(0.062) 
-0.006         
(0.071) 
-0.132          (0.095) 
Married/cohabiting 
-0.077         
(0.064) 
0.087         
(0.076) 
-0.164          (0.100) 
  Sample size 2( 9) test of coefficient equality 
  6,744 5,142 10.841  
Statistical significance of the coefficient, t-test cross-sample coefficient difference and χ2 statistic:  
† p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. Standard Errors in parenthesis. 
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Table O7: Factor loadings for the FRS 1-factor model excluding proxy cases from 
the FRS sample (and the proxy indicator from the measurement model) 
FRS  
Disability Indicator 
Factor loading (St. err.) 
Men Women 
MOBILITY 1     - 1     - 
LIFTING 1.039†    (0.103) 1.203†    (0.123) 
DEXTERITY 0.683†    (0.065) 0.602†    (0.049) 
CONTINENCE 0.343†    (0.036) 0.426†    (0.037) 
COMMUNIC 0.338†    (0.041) 0.317†    (0.036) 
MEMORY 0.356†    (0.039) 0.382†    (0.036) 
DANGER 0.355†    (0.091) 0.408†    (0.063) 
OTHER 0.101†    (0.029) 0.068†    (0.026) 
Sample size 6,308 
Statistical signi^cance of the factor loadings: † p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1.  
 
 
 
Table O8: Estimates of the latent disability equations obtained by dropping proxy 
cases from the FRS sample (and the proxy indicator from the measurement 
model) 
 
Covariates 
Coefficients and Standard Er-
rors Tests and coefficient differences 
FRS  ELSA§§ BHPS§§ 
 FRS-
ELSA 
 FRS-
BHPS 
ELSA-
BHPS§§ 
Spline age 65-73 
0.039†        
(0.014) 
0.035†        
(0.012) 
0.127†        
(0.036) 
0.003          
(0.018) 
-0.089‡         
(0.038) 
-0.092†         
(0.038) 
Spline from age 73+ 
0.084†        
(0.008) 
0.099†        
(0.008) 
0.128†        
(0.020) 
-0.015          
(0.011) 
-0.044‡         
(0.022) 
-0.029          
(0.022) 
Post-compulsory educa-
tion 
-0.301†        
(0.068) 
-0.280†        
(0.061) 
-0.182         
(0.149) 
-0.021          
(0.091) 
-0.119          
(0.164) 
-0.097          
(0.161) 
Income spline to median 
-0.114‡        
(0.052) 
-0.046         
(0.052) 
-0.172§        
(0.104) 
-0.068          
(0.074) 
0.057          
(0.116) 
0.125          
(0.116) 
Income spline from me-
dian 
-0.317†        
(0.088) 
-0.310†        
(0.072) 
-0.558†        
(0.206) 
-0.007          
(0.114) 
0.241          
(0.224) 
0.248          
(0.218) 
Outright owner 
-0.389†        
(0.067) 
-0.487†        
(0.064) 
-0.185         
(0.151) 
0.098          
(0.092) 
-0.204          
(0.165) 
-0.302§         
(0.163) 
  Sample size Coefficient equality χ2 (6) 
  6,308 5,142 1,042 3.411  13.27‡ 14.139‡ 
Statistical significance of the coefficient, t-test cross-sample coefficient difference and χ2 statistic:  
† p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. Standard Errors in parenthesis. §§ Estimates are the same reported in 
Table 3.    
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Table O9: Estimates of the AA receipt equations obtained by dropping PROXY 
cases from the FRS sample (and the proxy indicator from the measurement model) 
Covariates 
Coefficients and Standard Er-
rors Tests of coefficient equality 
FRS  ELSA§§ BHPS§§ 
FRS-
ELSA 
FRS-
BHPS 
ELSA-
BHPS§§ 
Latent disability η 0.573
†        
(0.043) 
0.477†        
(0.035) 
0.538†        
(0.095) 
0.096§         
(0.056) 
0.036          
(0.104) 
-0.06          
(0.101) 
Female 
0.156‡        
(0.069) 
0.251†        
(0.073) 
-0.068         
(0.172) 
-0.095          
(0.101) 
0.224          
(0.185) 
0.319§         
(0.187) 
Spline age 65-73 
-0.041†        
(0.009) 
-0.036†        
(0.007) 
-0.084†        
(0.021) 
-0.004          
(0.011) 
0.043§         
(0.023) 
0.048‡         
(0.022) 
Spline from age 73+ 
0.059†        
(0.006) 
0.046†        
(0.007) 
0.028§        
(0.015) 
0.014          
(0.009) 
0.031§         
(0.016) 
0.017          
(0.016) 
Post- compulsory education 
-0.153‡        
(0.069) 
-0.238†       
(0.071) 
-0.070         
(0.155) 
0.085          
(0.099) 
-0.083          
(0.170) 
-0.167          
(0.171) 
(ln) income spline to median  
-0.044         
(0.063) 
-0.092§        
(0.049) 
-0.041         
(0.090) 
0.048          
(0.079) 
-0.002          
(0.109) 
-0.050          
(0.102) 
(ln) income spline from me-
dian 
-0.493†        
(0.136) 
-0.422†        
(0.154) 
-0.411§        
(0.247) 
-0.071          
(0.205) 
-0.082          
(0.282) 
-0.011          
(0.291) 
Outright owner 
-0.137‡        
(0.065) 
-0.006         
(0.071) 
-0.265         
(0.164) 
-0.131          
(0.097) 
0.128          
(0.176) 
0.259          
(0.178) 
Married/cohabiting 
-0.058         
(0.068) 
0.087         
(0.076) 
-0.171         
(0.182) 
-0.145          
(0.102) 
0.112          
(0.195) 
0.257          
(0.198) 
 Sample size Coefficient equality χ2 (9) 
  6,308 5,142 1,042 13.287  14.957§ 14.844§ 
Statistical significance of the coefficient, t-test cross-sample coefficient difference and χ2 statistic:  
† p < 0.01; ‡  p < 0.05; § p < 0.1. Standard Errors in parenthesis. §§ Estimates are the same reported in 
Table 4. 
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Identification 
 
After using equation (3) to solve out the latent disability variables ηiq from the 
model, the structure can be written in matrix form as: 
εΛυΛΘzD ++=~      (A1) 
uR +++= γυzγΘβ )(~     (A2) 
where Λ, Θ, 휷 and γ are respectively Ks×Q, Q×p, 1×p and 1×Q dimensional coef-
ficient matrices and we have omitted the individual 푖 suffix from the covariates 
z, the latent variables D~ , and R~  underlying the observed ordinal variables D 
and R, and the unobservable random terms υ, 휺 and 푢. Equations (A1)-(A2) to-
gether comprise a system of correlated reduced form (ordered) probit equations, 
from which we can identify the following coefficient matrices and residual covar-
iances: 
ΛΘB =1            (A3) 
γΘβB +=2            (A4) 
ΣΛΩΛC += '11      (A5) 
2
22 σ++= γδγΩγ'C     (A6) 
ΛδΛΩγ'C +=12      (A7) 
where Ω is the covariance matrix of υ, Σ is the diagonal covariance matrix of 휺, 
δ is the vector of covariances between υ and 푢, and 휎2 is the variance of 푢. 
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 Some normalisations are necessary, because the observed variables 푫 and 
푅 do not reveal the scale of D~  and R~  and because the latent η can be replaced 
by arbitrary linear combinations with the loadings Θ and γ transformed accord-
ingly. Without loss of generality, we resolve these indeterminacies by setting C22 
and the diagonal elements of C11 to unity and by imposing the restrictions: 






=
2Λ
I
Λ       (A8) 
Given these normalisations, the first 푄 rows of 푩1 identify Θ. Provided the 
rank of Θ is 푄,  Λ2 can then be found by solving the last 퐾 s -Q equations in (A3). 
This rank condition implies that the 푄 latent factors in the measurement equa-
tions (1) cannot be replaced by a smaller number of linear combinations of the 
factors.  
 Now consider identification of Ω. Write the vector of 푄 diagonal elements 
of Ω as ωd and the vector of (푄 − 1)/2 sub-diagonal elements as ωs . We can con-
struct an identity: vec(Ω) = Sd ωd + Ss ωs where S = (Sd Ss) is a 푄2×푄(푄 + 1)/2 
permutation matrix containing 1s and 0s and vec(.) is the operation of stacking 
the rows of a matrix into a column vector. Let 
1,1
11C  be the leading Q×Q block of 
11C  and note that Σ is diagonal so that ( ) ss ωCS =′ 1,111vec . This determines the 
off-diagonal elements of ω. Now let 2,111C  be the submatrix of 11C  containing ele-
ments from the first Q rows and last Ks-Q columns: then '2
2,1
11 ΩΛC =  and, if cqj 
is the typical element of 
2,1
11C , each of the ωqq can be deduced as 
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s
jq
qr
s
jrqrqjqq c λλωω /





−= ∑
≠
, provided there exists at least one non-zero element in 
the qth column of Λ2, for each q = 1...Q. With  Ω determined, Σ is immediately 
given by (A5). 
 Without further restrictions, this is as far as we can go. Once Θ, Λ, Ω and 
Σ are known, this still leaves 푝 +  2푄 +  1 parameters , γ, δ and 휎2 to be deter-
mined by the 푝 +  푄 +  1 equations in (A4), (A6) and (A7). At least Q further 
restrictions are necessary. Natural possibilities are δ =  푐표푣(υ, 푢)  =  ퟎ or exclu-
sion restrictions on the vector β. The latter requires the existence of covariates 
that can be assumed a priori to influence disability status (relevance) but have 
no causal role in determining benefit receipt (validity). 
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Chapter 3: 
 
Disability costs and equivalence scales 
in the older population in Great Brit-
ain * 
 
Abstract: We use a standard of living (SoL) approach to estimate older people’s disa-
bility costs, using data on 8,000 individuals from the UK Family Resources Survey. We 
extend previous research in two ways. First, by allowing for a more flexible relationship 
between SoL and income, the structure of the estimated disability cost and equivalence 
scale is not dictated by a restrictive functional form assumption. Second, we allow for 
the latent nature of disability and SoL, addressing measurement error in the disability 
and SoL indicators in surveys. We find that disability costs are strongly related to se-
verity of disability, and vary with income in absolute and proportionate terms. Older 
people above the median disability level require an extra £99 per week (2007 prices) on 
average to reach the standard of living of an otherwise similar person at the median. 
Costs faced by older people in the highest decile of disability average £180. 
 
Keywords:   costs of disability, disability indices, standard of living, equiva-
lence scale, structural equation modelling.  
JEL codes: C81, D10, I10.
                                      
* This chapter has been published in the 푅푒푣푖푒푤 표푓 퐼푛푐표푚푒 푎푛푑 푊푒푎푙푡ℎ (Volume 61, Issue 3, pp. 494–
514, September 2015; DOI: 10.1111/roiw.12108) and it is a joint work with Ruth Hancock and Stephen 
Pudney. An earlier version is available as ISER working paper 2012-09, Colchester: Institute for Economic 
and Social Research, University of Essex (https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/publications/working-
papers/iser/2012-09). M. Morciano originated the study, conceptualized ideas, synthesized analyses, and 
interpreted findings. R. Hancock derived the dataset from the Family Resources Survey (FRS). R. Hancock 
and S. Pudney supervised all aspects of its implementation. All authors contributed to the writing of the 
article and reviewing drafts. Earlier versions of this study were presented at International Conference on 
Evidence-Based Policy in Long-Term Care, January 2012, London School of Economics, London; ESRC 
Research Centre on Micro-social Change (MISOC) research Workshop, 9 January 2012, Colchester; 4th 
Conference of the Society for the Study of Economic Inequality (ECINEQ), 18-20 July 2011, Catania (Italy). 
This work was supported by the Nuffield Foundation, by the Australian Research Council and by the 
Economic and Social Research Council through the Research Centre on Micro-social Change (MiSoC). Data 
from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) are made available by the UK Department of Work and Pensions 
through the UK Data Archive. Material from the FRS is Crown Copyright and is used by permission. 
Neither the collectors of the data nor the UKDA bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations 
presented here. 
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1 Introduction 
Disabled people experience significant additional costs as a consequence of their 
disability. This is recognized in social security systems through the provision of 
benefits designed to compensate for disability-related consumption costs. There 
is no consensus on the scale of these costs (Stapleton et al., 2008) and thus it is 
hard to assess how far social security systems compensate for them in practice. 
In the UK, older people with disabilities may be entitled to one of two social 
security benefits which are intended to help with the extra costs of disability: 
Attendance Allowance (AA) and Disability Living Allowance (DLA). AA can be 
claimed only by people aged 65 and over; DLA must be claimed before reaching 
age 65, but if awarded, can continue past age 65.36 AA is paid at one of two rates 
depending on level of disability or care needs. DLA has a care component and a 
mobility component. The care component is payable at one of three levels corre-
sponding to different degrees of care need; the mobility component is paid at one 
of two rates according to mobility needs.37 About a quarter of people aged 65 and 
over receive AA or DLA (Hancock and Pudney, 2013). The benefits are not means 
tested although they can trigger additional entitlements to means-tested benefits 
                                      
36 From April 2013, DLA will start to be replaced by Person Independence Payment which will differ 
from DLA in certain details (Welfare Reform Act 2012) 
37 In 2007, the year to which our data relate, the two rates of AA were £64.50 or £43.15. In 2007 the 
levels of DLA were such that weekly payments ranged from £17.75 to £109.50. 
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through a Severe Disability Premium.38 People with care needs may also be enti-
tled to publicly-funded and largely means-tested social care in their own homes 
or in care homes. Such care is received by only 6% of the older population (Wit-
tenberg et al., 2011).There is continuing international debate on how best to fund 
the care needs of growing numbers of older people (Da Roit and Le Bihan, 2010; 
Gleckman, 2010; Swartz et al., 2012). The role of cash disability benefits in the 
overall system of public support for care needs is an important part of this debate. 
It is therefore important to have methods to derive evidence on the extent to 
which the levels of cash disability benefits compensate for the extra costs that 
different degrees of disability bring. Moreover, when carrying out analysis of the 
distributional impact of tax and social security benefit reforms, it is crucially 
important to make some allowance for these additional living costs. If disability 
benefits are included in income, failure to do so would give a misleadingly favour-
able view of the position of disabled people in the income distribution (Hancock 
and Pudney, 2013).  
At least five different methods have been used to estimate and adjust for the 
costs of disability. One is to exploit the existing benefit system and assume that 
the political process has resulted in an acceptable evaluation of disability costs. 
This implies use of an income measure for distributional analysis which excludes 
                                      
38 Worth up to £48.45 in 2007 for an older disabled p
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any receipt of disability benefit (see Hancock and Pudney, 2013; Hancock et al., 
2013), on the assumption that income from disability benefit is exactly offset by 
the extra costs of disability. However, in practice such payments follow simple 
rules not well tailored to each individual’s specific configuration of impairments 
and they are not necessarily intended to meet the full costs of disability. There 
may also be imperfections in the eligibility judgements made by programme ad-
ministrators and non take-up by potential claimants. Consequently, this ap-
proach may give a poor approximation to disability costs, with underestimation 
in many cases, leading to bias in distributional analysis. Clearly it cannot be used 
to assess the adequacy of existing disability benefit levels. 
A second, judgement-based, approach attempts to estimate the disability costs 
by asking a panel of ‘experts’, or disabled people themselves, to identify disabil-
ity-related costs: see Martin and White, 1988, Thompson et al., 1990, Smith et 
al., 2004 for examples of this approach. The difficulty here is that the appropriate 
costs may depend not only on the nature of the impairments suffered by the 
individual, but also other characteristics that vary across households, and it is 
not feasible to use expert judgement at the level of individual respondents to 
large-scale surveys. Disabled people themselves may also find it difficult to en-
visage and evaluate the counterfactual situation in which their disability is re-
moved but all else remains constant. 
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A third ‘objective’ revealed preference approach constructs an equivalence scale 
by using the consumption pattern (typically the household’s food budget share) 
as an indicator of living standards in a comparison of a sample of disabled people 
with matched individuals who are unaffected by disability. This has been done 
extensively in the context of adjustment for household size and structure, but 
less often for disability (although see Jones and O’Donnell, 1995 for a UK exam-
ple). The main difficulty with this revealed preference method is the need for 
strong assumptions to overcome inherent identification problems (Pollack and 
Wales, 1979; Muellbauer, 1979; Coulter et al., 1992; Banks et al., 1997; Deaton 
and Paxson, 1998). 
A fourth alternative is to use a ‘subjective’ equivalence approach, based on 
individuals’ reported satisfaction with their well-being. Two main types of sub-
jective information have been used: evaluations of standard of living using an 
arbitrary numerical scale; or judgements on the level of income believed necessary 
to reach a specified standard of living (see Stewart, 2009). For the subjective 
approach, there are concerns about the quality of subjective assessments and the 
failure to address problems caused by measurement error. 
In this paper, we pursue a fifth and less widely-used Standard of Living (SoL) 
approach which lies somewhere between these last two approaches. The method 
is closely related to work on material deprivation which seeks to expand the 
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concept of poverty beyond conventional income- or consumption-based constructs 
(see Berthoud et al., 1993; Zaidi and Burchardt, 2005; Cullinan et al., 2011). We 
assume that disabled people, in diverting resources to goods and services which 
are required because of disability, experience a lower SoL than their non-disabled 
counterparts. The absolute costs of disability can be identified as the additional 
income required by a disabled person to reach the same SoL as a non-disabled 
person, holding constant other characteristics, and the relative cost is the ratio 
of this amount to income. As Zaidi and Burchardt (2005) point out, estimates 
depend on the choice of a suitable standard of living indicator and the form of 
its relationship to income and disability status.  
Our aim is to develop and improve the method further in two important re-
spects. First, we allow for a more flexible relationship between income and SoL, 
so that the structure of the estimated disability cost and equivalence scale is not 
dictated by an unduly restrictive functional form assumption. Second, we address 
the problem of measurement error in disability and SoL. Both SoL and disability 
status are typically measured using either a binary classification or a count index 
based on a range of different questionnaire items.39 Although sensitivity analyses 
                                      
39 The Katz activities of daily living (Katz et al., 1963) and Barthel indices (Mahoney and Barthel, 1965) 
are two widely used tools for assessing ability to perform activities of daily living. These indices assign scores 
to self-reported degrees of difficulty in performing a number of activities, such as feeding, dressing, moving, 
bathing etc. Scores for each item are then aggregated. These indices have been criticized for the way reported 
difficulties are aggregated and for not taking account of potential measurement errors in self-reported 
difficulties (Feinstein et al., 1986; Hartigan, 2007). 
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are often used to assess robustness, this is not effective if all the alternatives 
entail similar measurement error biases. To address this we use a latent factor 
model for disability and SoL, which explicitly allows for the existence of meas-
urement errors in the observable indicators.  
Using a two-latent factor structural equation model we estimate the extra cost 
of disability for a representative sample of people over state pension age living in 
private households in Great Britain, who were interviewed in the 2007/8 Family 
Resources Survey (FRS). Ten indicators of ability to afford particular items or 
activities are used to construct a latent continuous index of SoL. The latent SoL 
is modelled as a function of income, (latent) disability, and other characteristics, 
which reflect the many factors which determine an individual’s achieved standard 
of living. In line with previous work (Hancock et al., 2013), disability is assumed 
to be a latent concept which can be measured imperfectly by a vector of survey 
indicators reflecting difficulties in domains of life and is influenced by observed 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the individual. 
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 briefly describes the standard of 
living approach and its usage. Section 3 presents the latent-factor structural 
equation framework we employ. Section 4 describes the data used. Section 5 pre-
 152 
sents estimates of the structural equation model and derives the associated esti-
mated extra costs of disability. Section 6 reports some sensitivity analysis on the 
initial results. The final section draws conclusions.  
 
2 The Standard of Living method  
Berthoud (1991) reviews various early attempts at conceptualizing and quan-
tifying how standard of living (SoL), income and disability are related. Berthoud 
et al. (1993) and Zaidi and Burchardt (2005) formalized this approach, which has 
been used also by Saunders (2007) and Cullinan et al. (2011) for estimating the 
cost of disability in Australia and Ireland respectively. The SoL approach is il-
lustrated in Figure 1, where we compare a positive level of disability D with the 
baseline of non disability, D0. 
 
FIGURE 1: Standard of Living, Income and Disability 
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The two curves plot the relation between income and SoL conditional on disa-
bility, and are assumed to increase monotonically with income. For any given 
value of income, the SoL of the disabled person lies below that of the non-disabled 
person and the vertical distance AC measures the difference in their standards of 
living at the level of income Y. This measure is similar to Sen’s concept of “con-
version handicap” (Doessel and Williams, 2011). The horizontal distance AB pro-
vides a measure of the extra income (∆) required to bring the SoL of the disabled 
person up to the same level as the non-disabled person. 
To formalise this idea, consider the following additively separable SoL function:  
 푆 = 푓(푌 ) − 푔(퐷) + ℎ(푋, 휀) (1) 
where S is the SoL, Y is a measure of financial resources, D is the degree of 
disability status and 푋 and 휀 represent other observable and unobservable indi-
vidual characteristics. Some individuals may be in receipt of disability benefit 
(B), others may not. To allow for this, we decompose income as: 
 푌 = 푌0 + 퐵 (2) 
where 푌0 excludes disability benefits. Now define a reference level of disability 
퐷0 and assume that the reference non-disabled person receives no disability ben-
efit. We now pose the following question: what is the smallest amount of addi-
tional income, over and above 푌0, that would be needed for a person with disa-
bility level 퐷 to achieve the same SoL as he or she would have with income 푌0 
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and disability reduced to the reference level 퐷0? Given the additivity of (1), this 
additional income need, ∆, is independent of 푋 and 휀, and solves the following 
optimisation problem:  
 푚푖푛훥    푠푢푏푗푒푐푡 푡표:  푓(푌0 + 훥) − 푔(퐷) ≥  푓(푌0) − 푔(퐷0) (3) 
In general, the total disability-induced living cost ∆ and the associated pro-
portional equivalence scale 휎 = (푌0 + ∆)/푌0 depend on the levels of both income 
푌0 and disability.  
For the cost ∆ to depend only on severity of disability D (as implied by the 
design of some benefit systems), the income-SoL profile must have the linear form 
푓(푌0) = 훾1푌0, in which case the cost of disability and associated equivalence scale 
are: 
 ∆ = 푔(퐷) − 푔(퐷0)훾1 ;         휎 = 1 +
푔(퐷) − 푔(퐷0)푓(푌0) . (4) 
For the equivalence scale 휎 to depend only on disability would require 푓(푌0 +
∆) = 푓(휎푌0) to be expressible as 푓(푌0) + 푎(휎), for all positive 휎 and some func-
tion 푎(. ). The only function satisfying this property is 푓(푌0) = 훾1ln(푌0), which 
implies the following cost of disability and equivalence scale:40  
 ∆ = 푌0 [푒푔(퐷)−푔(퐷0)훾1  −  1] ;       휎 = 푒푔(퐷)−푔(퐷0)훾1 . (5) 
                                      
40 Strictly speaking, f can be any affine transform of ln( ); but an additive translation has no effect.  
 155 
This is the form usually adopted for equivalence scales designed to adjust for 
demographic differences between households in conventional income inequality 
analysis. Both the linear and log-linear specifications have the advantage of sim-
plicity and incorporate the property of base independence (or invariance of the 
equivalence scale to income level) in additive or multiplicative form (Lewbel, 
1997).  
In addition to these standard forms, we also use a more flexible log-quadratic 
function of the kind that has been found useful in Engel curve studies (Banks et 
al., 1997) and embodies the constant-휎 model as a special case. If 푓(푌0)  is spec-
ified as: 
 푓(푌0)  = 훾1ln(푌0) + 훾2[ln(푌0)]2 (6) 
then the solution to (3) gives the cost of disability and equivalence scale as: 
 ∆ =   푒푥푝 [ −훾1 − 푠푔푛(훾2)√훾12 − 4훾2퐶2훾2  ] − 푌0 (7) 
 
 휎 =  푌0−1 푒푥푝[ −훾1 − 푠푔푛(훾2)√훾1
2 − 4훾2퐶2훾2  ] (8) 
where 퐶 = −[훾1ln(푌0) + 훾2[ln(푌0)]2 + 푔(퐷) − 푔(퐷0)]. Note that this solution re-
quires the condition 퐶 ≤ 훾12/4훾2 to be satisfied.  
This emphasises the importance of the specification used to relate SoL to in-
come and the need to allow for the possibility of departures from the simple 
assumptions of linear or log-linear forms.  
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3 A statistical model  
We use the following two-latent factor simultaneous equation model: 
 푆푖푞 = ퟏ(휆푞휑푖 + 휁푖푞) (9) 
 퐷푖푘 = ퟏ(휇푘휂푖 + 휉푖푘) (10) 
 휑푖 = 푓(푌푖; 휸) + 훼1휂푖 + 휶2풙푖 + 휀1푖 (11) 
 휂푖 = 휷풛푖 + 휀2푖 (12) 
where 푖 denotes sampled individuals (푖 =  1 . . .푁), 푓(. ) represents the linear, 
log-linear or log-quadratic function and 휸 contains the corresponding coefficients. 
The latent measure of SoL is 휑i which underlies the observed SoL indicators 
Si1...SiQ , and the latent disability index ηi generates observed disability indicators 
Di1...DiK. The parameters qλ and kµ are factor loadings associated with the Siq and 
Dik indicators respectively. iqζ and ikξ  are the measurement errors associated 
with the SoL and disability indicators. The indicator function 1(.) maps the la-
tent indices on the right-hand side of the measurement equations (9) and (10) 
into the observed binary indicators of SoL and disability.  
Observable covariates representing personal characteristics and household cir-
cumstances appear in vectors ix  and iz . They contain socio-economic and de-
mographic influences on living standards and disability respectively. In this model 
socio-economic factors have both a direct and an indirect effect on SoL. Income, 
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for example, has the direct effect of increasing resources available for consumption; 
this is captured by the function 푓(푌푖; 휸). Income also has an indirect influence 
on disability, through the term 휷풛푖, which then increases disability-related costs 
through the term 훼1휂푖. The use of a latent disability model allows us to separate 
these direct and indirect effects. Note that the income concepts relevant to the 
direct and indirect paths are different. The direct effect involves current resources 
available for consumption, which includes receipt of disability benefit. In contrast, 
modeling of the indirect effect requires a long-term concept of economic resources 
reflecting the cumulative effect of past living standards on the current health 
state. Since disability precedes the receipt of disability benefit, it follows that the 
latter should be excluded from the income variable used to capture the indirect 
causal path. 
We use the standard normalisations 푐표푟푟(휀1, 휀2) = 0 and 푣푎푟(휀1) = 푣푎푟(휀2) =
 1 for the structural errors and assume the measurement errors iqζ  and ikξ  to be 
independent. Because units of measurement for 휑 and 휂 are arbitrary, we show 
coefficient estimates in standardized form. The variance of the latent SoL index 
in (11) is (1 − 푅휑2 ), where Rφ2 is the squared multiple correlation of 휑, so the 
standardised form of φ implies multiplying each coefficient by a factor 
(1 − 푅휑2 )−1/2, so that each coefficient is interpretable as the change in φ in stand-
ard deviation units, produced by a 1-unit increase in the value of the covariate. 
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Disability 휂 is also a latent construct, with variance 푣푎푟(휷풛푖) + 1 = (1 − 푅휂2), 
where 푅휂2 is the squared multiple correlation of the disability equation. Therefore 
the standardized coefficient of 휑  on 휂  is 훼1푆푇퐷 = 훼1√[(1 − 푅휂2) (1 − 푅휑2 )⁄ ] , 
which can be interpreted as the change in 휑 (in standard deviation units) gener-
ated by a 1-standard deviation increase in 휂. 
 
4 Data 
The data are from the 2007-8 Family Resources Survey (FRS): a large UK 
household survey collecting detailed income and assets information from respond-
ents and asking questions covering difficulties due to ill-health or disability. The 
survey also includes a series of questions aimed at measuring material deprivation 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2009). For this paper we restrict the anal-
ysis to households in Great Britain where all members are aged over state pension 
age (65 for men; 60 for women) and the household contains only a single person 
or a couple. The age restriction is imposed in order to limit endogeneity bias 
which may arise for younger adults for whom disability may cause a reduced 
income by limiting labour market participation.41 In estimating equations (11) 
and (12) we measure income at the household level assuming that all members 
of the households benefit to the same extent from total household income. This 
                                      
41 For a discussion on this point we refer, amongst others, to Goldman (2001) and Adams et al. (2003). 
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is less likely to be true for households containing members other than a single or 
couple pensioner. After dropping a few cases where relevant information is miss-
ing the resulting sample contains 8,183 individuals (5,812 households). About 
58% of the sample are partnered and the remainder live alone. We retain proxy 
cases (4.8%) where the required data was provided by a proxy respondent (often 
a carer). Dropping proxy cases would bias the sample towards the less severely 
disabled. 
Deprivation indicators are derived from a set of questions about items or ac-
tivities, seen as potential ‘necessities’; households who did not have the items or 
do the activities were asked whether this was because they did not want them or 
because they could not afford them. They were also given the option of saying 
that an item or activity did not apply to them.42 From these household-level 
indicators, we created individual-level indicators in which each household mem-
ber is assigned the values of the deprivation indicators of their household. Each 
indicator is set to 1 if the respondent answered “We/I would like to have this 
but cannot afford this at the moment” and 0 otherwise. Thus we allow for differ-
ences in preferences to explain non consumption rather than assuming that non 
consumption always implies deprivation. However, it has been suggested (McKay, 
2004, 2008; Berthoud et al., 2009) that certain segments of the population with 
                                      
42 Taking the ability to afford to replace worn out furniture as an example, respondents who rent furnished 
properties may not be responsible for replacing furniture and therefore select ‘does not apply’. In fact only 
2.5% of the sample replied ‘does not apply’ to at least one of the deprivation indicators. 
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lowered expectations, such as disabled older people, may be less likely than others 
to admit to being unable to afford particular activities or goods. We have carried 
out two sensitivity analyses by: (i) using a restricted subset of the indicators; and 
(ii) using a less stringent interpretation of the responses. Results are given in 
section 6 below.  
In estimating equations (9)-(12), we invert these deprivation indicators to con-
struct the SoL indicators, Siq, taking the value 0 if the respondent cannot afford 
the activity/good and 1 otherwise. Sample statistics corresponding to the two 
alternative definitions of deprivation are shown in Appendix Table A1. Overall, 
35% of the sample report an inability to afford at least one item, a proportion 
which rises to 80% under the less stringent interpretation. 
FRS respondents are asked whether they have a health problem or disability 
and, if they answer ‘yes’ they are asked if they have significant difficulties in each 
of nine areas of life. The prevalence rates for these disability indicators are re-
ported in Appendix Table A1. Overall, 53% of the sample reported having no 
disability and 20% reported three or more difficulties. The most common diffi-
culties are those concerning physical impairment (difficulties in mobility; with 
lifting, carrying or moving objects). 
The explanatory covariates used in the SoL and disability equations are sum-
marised in Appendix Table A2. The income indicator Y used in the SoL equation 
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represents the resources of the household currently available for meeting the con-
sumption needs of the household members. We use a household-level income 
measure, net of direct taxes and housing costs, similar to the “After Housing Cost” 
measure used in the official Households Below Average Income analysis (DWP, 
2009) and also by Zaidi and Burchardt (2005). This measure represents the dis-
posable income available for spending on the items and activities used as indica-
tors of SoL. We argue that the treatment of housing as a fixed cost is reasonable 
in our target population, since adjustment of housing as a response to disability 
often takes the form of transition into the care home sector or moving into a 
multi-generation household. Nevertheless, we report a sensitivity test in section 
6 below.  
Our income measure includes income from investments (interest, rent, divi-
dends, private pensions, annuities). It includes disability benefits since, as argued 
earlier, they are available, like any other income component, to be used to main-
tain SoL (see also Zaidi and Burchardt, 2005; Stapleton, 2008 and Cullinan et al., 
2011). Disability benefits comprise the non-means-tested Attendance Allowance 
and Disability Living Allowance, an estimate of income attributable to the Severe 
Disability Premium component of means-tested pensioner benefits and other mi-
nor disability-related benefits that are received by a small number of older people 
in our sample.  
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The income measure used as a covariate in the disability equation also includes 
income from investments, since interest, rent, dividends, private pensions and 
annuities are returns on assets accumulated over the lifecycle and are, conse-
quently, good indicators of past access to resources with a cumulative positive 
influence on health. For the same reason, we also include a measure of financial 
wealth43 in the disability equation and a dummy variable to indicate home own-
ership. Note that the income measure used as a covariate in the disability equa-
tion excludes current receipt of disability benefits, since those are a consequence, 
rather than a determinant, of current disability. Rather than use an arbitrary 
equivalence scale to adjust income for household composition, we include a 
dummy variable to indicate whether the household contains a single person or a 
couple in the disability and SoL equations. In line with previous work (Zaidi and 
Burchardt, 2005; Stewart, 2009), we also use a set of personal characteristics 
including age, gender, level of education, home ownership and marital status, 
together with regional dummies to reflect geographical differences in cost of living 
and in health. 
  
                                      
43 Deposit and saving account balances, stocks, bonds, certificate deposits and other savings held by the 
household. The information recording the amount of liquid wealth in FRS was severely affected by non-
response, which we deal with by imputation based on grossing up investment income. Financial wealth is 
not used as a covariate in the SoL equation. 
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5 Parameter Estimates and Analysis  
5.1 Estimates of the Structural Equation Model  
Estimation results for the model comprising equations (9)-(12) are presented 
in Appendix Tables A3-A5.44 The log-quadratic form of the SoL equation fits the 
data best. The estimated measurement equations (9) and (10) using this form of 
the SoL equation, are summarised in Appendix Table A3. They show respectively 
the factor loadings 휆q which capture the effect of the latent standard of living 
index 휑 on the indicators Sq , and the factor loadings μk associated with the dis-
ability score 휂. We also report the squared correlation of each indicator with the 
underlying latent construct. The factor loadings are all positive and highly sig-
nificant. Being unable to afford to replace/renew durable goods or to keep the 
home in a decent state of decoration are the most sensitive indicators of the latent 
SoL construct 휑; the inability to afford house insurance, hobbies or leisure activ-
ities are the least sensitive. The highest correlation with the latent disability 
construct is found for indicators of difficulties with mobility, lifting and dexterity, 
while lower correlations are found for indicators of cognitive disability.  
Results reported in Appendix Table A4 show that the conditional mean of η 
increases almost linearly with age, although we allowed for non-linearity using a 
spline function of age, with a single node at the median age 73 observed in the 
                                      
44 Estimates were computed using the robust maximum likelihood estimator of Mplus 6.11 (Muthén and 
Muthén, 2010). 
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sample. The structural estimates provide no evidence of a significant relation 
with gender. Indicators measuring economic well-being are jointly significant at 
the 1% level: more educated individuals experienced a low level of disability as 
well as those with high current pre-disability benefit income. A negative relation 
between wealth and disability emerges, both in terms of housing wealth (captured 
by owner-occupation) and financial wealth.   
Income and receipt of disability benefits by decile of latent disability are dis-
played in Table 1. Average weekly post-disability benefit household income (푌 ) 
is reported per-capita and without adjustment for household composition. The 
association between disability and socio-economic status is widely recognized (see 
for instance Cutler et al., 2011 and Goldman, 2001 for a review) although the 
extent to which this association reflects causality is still in debate (Conti et al., 
2010). Similarly we find that there is a strong association between disability and 
per-capita income which declines monotonically until the fifth decile of 휂 and is 
almost flat afterwards. Thus poor health and low income are strongly associated 
even if the measure of income used, as here, includes the disability benefit that 
individuals receive. The last three columns of Table 1 show the percentage of 
individuals in the sample in receipt of any disability benefit by decile of latent 
disability, the proportions of those recipients who are in each disability decile 
and the average amount of disability benefits received by individuals in each 
disability decile. The proportion of individuals in the sample who receive these 
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benefits ranges from under 2% in the lowest disability decile to 50% in the top 
decile. Overall, amongst those in the upper half of the disability distribution the 
percentage is 27%. Although current disability benefits appear well targeted on 
disabled people, a significant proportion of those who face severe disability do 
not receive disability benefits. Non take-up of disability benefits among disabled 
people has been noted elsewhere (Pudney, 2010, Currie and Madrian, 1999) and 
the receipt of disability benefit may often be delayed by several years after disa-
bility onset (Zantomio, 2013).  
Table 1: Mean income and receipt of disability benefits by deciles of latent 
disability 
Decile of 휂 ̂
Mean Ya 
£s pw 
% of indi-
viduals re-
ceiving disa-
bility bene-
fits 
% of individual dis-
ability benefit re-
cipients in each 
disability decile  
Average amount of 
disability benefitb 
received (£s pw) 
Per cap-
ita 
Unadjusted 
for household 
composition 
1 263.90 442.90 1.8 1.2 1.20 
2 206.00 353.10 3.2 2.0 1.90 
3 187.40 309.10 3.6 2.3 2.30 
4 162.80 257.70 5.0 3.2 2.70 
5 141.30 203.80 6.9 4.4 4.00 
6 148.70 221.50 10.3 6.6 6.30 
7 172.20 264.10 15.5 10.0 10.00 
8 175.50 263.80 24.1 15.4 15.70 
9 174.10 255.50 35.6 22.8 23.50 
10 181.70 264.10 50.1 32.1 37.80 
Mean for deciles 6 to 10 170.40 253.80 27.1 86.9 18.60 
Notes: Statistics computed over a sample of 8,183 FRS 2007-8 respondents. All monetary values are 
rounded to the nearest 10p and expressed in 2007 prices.   
a. Household income including disability benefit. 
b. Measured at the individual level.  
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Estimates for the regression coefficients of the SoL equation are reported in 
Appendix Table A5, using three different functional forms of f(푌 ): the linear-in-
income (model 1); the linear-in-log income (model 2); and the quadratic-in-log 
income model (model 3). Age, level of education, home ownership, marital status 
and region of residence are found to be highly significant at the 1% level and 
their signs, for the most part, are as expected. A gender dummy is not significant. 
Here, we focus on the structural parameters of interest in deriving the equivalence 
scale (Table 2). The structural estimates of the 훼1 and 휸 provide strong evidence 
that latent disability and current income affect the SoL. Increased disability is 
associated with lower values of the SoL index, while income is positively associ-
ated with the SoL, no matter which functional form is used. Holding other vari-
ables constant, a 1-standard deviation increase in disability 휂 produces a reduc-
tion of 0.233 standard deviations in 휑 using model 1, 0.254 using model 2 and 
0.236 using model 3. The estimated income coefficients imply that a £10 increase 
in weekly income increases SoL by 0.03 standard deviations in model 1 and in 
model 2; a 10% increase in net income produces an increase of about 0.0631 
standard deviations in the SoL. In model 3, the coefficient associated with the 
added square of log household income is significant at the 1%, implying a signif-
icant non-linear relationship of income and the SoL index 휑. Thus, controlling 
for disability level, disability costs appear to vary with income in both absolute 
terms and as a proportion of income. 
 167 
At the bottom of Table 2 we report the number of free estimated regression 
parameters, the maximized log-likelihood and its correction for non normality 
factor, the Akaike information criterion AIC and the Bayesian Information crite-
rion BIC for the model comprising equations (9)-(12). According to these 
measures the quadratic-in-log form (model 3) fits the data best but, as the plots 
in Appendix Figure A1 show, its implications are remarkably close to those of 
the linear specification. 
We might also want to include covariates in the SoL equation which capture 
the value of any informal (i.e. unpaid for) and subsidised formal care received by 
the person, as such care may affect the living standard a disabled person can 
achieve from a given level of income. Informal care received by another member 
of the household can be ignored as it represents a within-household transfer rather 
than an addition to household resources. The FRS contains limited information 
on receipt of informal care from non-household members and formal care although 
whether and how much that care was subsidised by the state is not directly 
recorded. We experimented with adding covariates for hours of informal care 
received from non-household members and hours of care from a Local Authority 
or nurse, in the SoL equation (income entered in log-quadratic form). None of 
the estimated coefficients was statistically significant at the 5% level and the 
estimated coefficients for latent disability and income were only very marginally 
changed by the inclusion of these additional covariates. In subsequent analysis 
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we therefore use the models without covariates measuring receipt of care. 
 
Table 2: The standard of living equation: parameter estimates (in standard-
ised form) for latent disability and income 
Parameter(s): 
 Model (1) 
linear in Y 
Model (2) 
linear in ln(Y) 
 Model (3) 
quadratic in ln(Y) 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
       
훼1푆푇퐷 -0.233*** 0.016 -0.254*** 0.016 -0.236*** 0.016 
훾1푆푇퐷 0.003*** 0.001 0.631*** 0.026 -2.610*** 0.201 
훾2푆푇퐷         0.307*** 0.019 
Free parameters 74 74 75 
Log-likelihood -38718.413 -38759.401 -38694.623 
Correction for 
non-normality 
factor 
1.004 0.992 0.994 
AIC 77584.826 77666.803 77539.247 
BIC 78103.552 78185.529 78064.983 
Notes: Significance: * = 10%; ** = 5%, *** = 1%. Models also include regional dummy vari-
ables and controls for socio-economic characteristics which are reported in Appendix Table A5. 
The R2 of model (1), (2) and (3) are 0.384; 0.334; and 0.382, respectively. 
 
 
 
5.2 Disability Costs and Equivalence Scales 
Using the parameter estimates in Table 2, we can derive the relative/absolute 
costs of disability for any reference level of disability D0 as the minimal compen-
sating amount (3). First, we calculate the model-based posterior prediction 휂 ̂as 
the estimate of the expectation of η conditional on all observed information for 
the individual. Then we calculate the estimate of disability cost as (4), (5) or (7) 
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evaluated at the point 휂 ̂and thus the means of these estimated costs by decile of 
휂.̂45 
Since we use a continuous measure of disability, the definition of D0 is less 
straightforward than when using a dichotomous indicator. We can think of D0  
as a reference level of disability above which some financial compensation is 
judged appropriate, but how should this reference level be chosen? Table 3 re-
ports the prevalence of reported difficulties by decile of 휂.̂ As noted in section 4, 
about 53% of the sample reported having no disability. All individuals who fall 
in the highest four deciles of 휂 ̂reported at least one disability, most having a 
difficulty with mobility, lifting, carrying or moving objects. The mean number of 
reported disabilities increases non-linearly with position in the latent disability 
distribution. It is clear from Table 3 that there is a definite discontinuity at the 
median and, as a consequence, we adopt the median level of 휂 ̂(D0 = 0.972) as 
our reference level. Appendix Figure A2 shows the empirical kernel distribution 
of the predicted disability index 휂 ̂from the log-quadratic model.  
Estimated costs of disability are presented in Table 4. There are 260 cases (out 
of 8,183 in the estimation sample) where the condition 퐶 ≤ 훾12/4훾2 in equation 
(8) is violated. All have a combination of low income (mean £88 compared to 
                                      
45 Note that this is a conservative estimate, for the log-linear and (to a lesser extent) the log-quadratic 
model. Because of the convexity of the 푒푥푝(. ) function in (5) and (7), the true average cost will be 
understated: to a degree that depends on the posterior variance of 휂. 
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£290 for the full sample) and low estimated latent disability (mean 0.65 com-
pared to 1.40). In the calculations reported below, we set their disability costs to 
zero (dropping cases with very low income and disability leads to virtually iden-
tical estimates).  
Table 3: Self-reported difficulties by decile of 휂 ̂
  % of those who reported 
Number of difficulties 
reported 
Decile of 휂 ̂ any difficulties difficulties with mobility, lifting,  
carrying or moving objects  
1 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 
2 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 
3 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 
4 0.2% 0.0% 0.00 
5 5.5% 0.0% 0.06 
6 63.2% 2.3% 0.67 
7 100.0% 91.8% 1.22 
8 100.0% 98.4% 2.22 
9 100.0% 100.0% 3.03 
10 100.0% 100.0% 4.97 
Mean 46.9% 39.2% 1.22 
Notes: Statistics computed over a sample of 8,183 FRS 2007-8 respondents. 
 
Average estimated disability costs (∆) and the equivalence scale (휎) computed 
among people upper the 50% of the disability distribution are displayed in Table 
4 by deciles of 휂 ̂(panel a) and by deciles of household income (panel b) for each 
of the three model variants. From panel a), we see that on average, a person in 
the upper 50% of the disability distribution requires an additional £90 to reach 
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the same standard of living as a comparable person at the median level of disa-
bility, according the linear model. Average disability costs are about £17 per 
week in the sixth decile of the disability distribution, rising to £164 in the top 
decile. For the log-linear specification the estimated disability costs are higher 
(about £154 per week for those in the upper 50% of disability) and they increase 
more sharply with disability. The log-quadratic model generates estimates which 
are much closer to those of the linear model, but with slightly higher values in 
the upper tail of the disability distribution. The estimated average cost of disa-
bility among the upper 50% of disabled people is about £99 per week; in the top 
decile of disability it is £180. Panel b) of Table 4 reports equivalence scales and 
disability costs among disabled people by deciles of per capita pre-disability ben-
efit income. It demonstrates that the flexible log-quadratic model allows for a 
more complex relationship between income and estimated disability costs/equiv-
alence scales than the other two models. Under the log-quadratic model the esti-
mated costs of disability are greatest for the lowest and highest income decile. 
The estimated equivalence scale is largest for the lowest income decile. 
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Table 4: Estimated costs of disability and average equivalence scale among 
disabled peoplea, by deciles of latent disability and by deciles of per capita in-
comeb 
Panel a) 
Decile of latent disability, 휂 ̂
Model (1)  
linear in Y 
Model (2)  
linear in ln(Y) 
Model (3)  
quadratic in ln(Y) 
∆ 
£s pw 
σ 
∆ 
£s pw 
σ 
∆ 
£s pw 
σ 
6 17.40 1.11 23.10 1.10 22.10 1.21 
7 62.00 1.35 95.10 1.38 67.80 1.40 
8 91.00 1.50 149.60 1.60 98.00 1.54 
9 116.30 1.72 193.10 1.83 126.10 1.78 
10 163.70 2.06 307.50 2.36 179.90 2.17 
Mean among disabled people  90.00 1.55 153.60 1.65 98.70 1.62 
Panel b) 
Decile of per capita pre-
disability benefit income 
(% of disabled people in 
each decile) 
mean Yc 
£s pw  
Model (1)  
linear in Y 
Model (2)  
linear in ln(Y) 
Model (3) quad-
ratic in ln(Y) 
Per-cap-
ita 
Unadjusted 
for house-
hold compo-
sition 
∆ 
£s pw 
σ 
∆ 
£s pw 
σ 
∆ 
£s pw 
σ 
1  (60.1%) 95.10 141.50 95.60 2.16 81.50 1.72 115.60 2.65 
2  (59.6%) 109.40 180.20 88.10 1.63 106.10 1.64 89.70 1.65 
3  (56.7%) 127.60 204.50 89.80 1.56 120.70 1.65 90.90 1.57 
4  (63.8%) 136.20 186.60 87.30 1.58 111.30 1.63 87.90 1.57 
5  (55.0%) 149.30 211.40 89.20 1.51 133.20 1.65 91.00 1.51 
6  (52.1%) 167.90 249.50 92.70 1.47 155.00 1.68 96.20 1.47 
7  (46.2%) 192.90 287.40 89.90 1.39 167.40 1.65 95.40 1.41 
8  (42.7%) 226.40 344.70 88.80 1.31 205.80 1.63 100.80 1.34 
9  (33.2%) 270.00 403.50 90.10 1.27 246.90 1.64 108.60 1.31 
10 (30.4%) 412.10 594.90 88.10 1.17 377.80 1.63 130.20 1.23 
Mean among disabled 
people 
170.40 253.80 90.00 1.55 153.60 1.65 98.70 1.62 
Notes:  
a. Disabled people defined as those in the upper 50% (deciles 6-10) of the distribution of disability, 휂.̂ 
b. Income deciles computed over the pre-disability benefits income distribution of the whole population 
which includes non-disabled people.  
c. Y is household income including disability benefit.  
Estimates of ∆ are unadjusted for household composition. All monetary values are rounded to the near-
est 10p and expressed in 2007 prices. The reference disability level for computing ∆ and σ is the median. 
 
It is clear that the equivalence scale, 휎 increases with disability.46 If we define 
a disabled person as someone with a disability in the top half of the disability 
                                      
46 By construction,  obtained using model 1 and 2 is lower than 1 for those individuals who fall below 
the median level of disability [!"# < !" #] and increases afterwards. However, nothing prevents the 
equivalence scale derived from model 3 for some people with disability level below D0 from being greater 
than 1. That is because the equivalence scale derived from specification 3, while increasing in disability, is 
decreasing in income. In practice this occurs for only 1.07% of the sample. 
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distribution, an older disabled person requires, on average, an increase of about 
55% of net weekly pre-disability household income (Y0) to reach the same stand-
ard of living as a comparable non-disabled person, according to the linear model. 
Average disability costs are about 11% of Y0 in the sixth decile of the disability 
distribution, rising to 106% in the top decile. For the log-linear specification, 
estimated disability costs are about 65% higher on average in the disabled pop-
ulation and increase more sharply with disability. The log-quadratic model gen-
erates estimates which are much closer to those of the log-linear model, but with 
slightly lower values in the upper tail of the disability distribution. The average 
extra cost of disability is about 62% of the net weekly pre-disability household 
income. 
 
6 Sensitivity analysis  
In this section we assess the sensitivity of our results to: (i) the assumption 
that the costs of disability and the equivalence scale are independent of household 
composition; (ii) the income definition; and (iii) the construction of the SoL meas-
ure.  
Demographic invariance. The three models of the previous section imply in-
variance of the equivalence scale to household size and structure. This has the 
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advantage that a benefit system with the same property does not create incen-
tives for potential claimants to change their household type to increase their level 
of entitlement (Pendakur, 1999). We test whether estimates of the best-fitting 
quadratic model are sensitive to the assumption of demographic invariance by 
using a two-group analysis where we allow the parameters of the SoL equations 
(9) and (11) to differ for respondents from single-person and two-person house-
holds. In contrasting this with the unrestricted model, the Akaike information 
criterion suggests that the unrestricted model provides a slightly better balance 
of model fit and parsimony. Panel (1) in Table 5 shows the equivalence scale and 
the extra cost of disability computed for single people and couples, by disability 
index η. It should be noticed however, that about 58% of single people, compared 
with 44% of couples, belong to the top four deciles of 휂̂. Thus single people 
(mainly widows) on average experience higher disability levels than people in 
couples (see also Zaidi and Burchardt, 2005). On the other hand, household in-
come (not adjusted for household composition) of people in couples is generally 
higher than for single people. So that the reduction in the living standard caused 
by a given disability level is higher (lower) in relative (absolute) terms for single 
people than couples.  
Housing wealth and housing costs. A further sensitivity analysis makes some 
allowance for housing wealth. We re-estimate equations (9)-(12) adding to the 
income variables in equations (11) and (12) an annual return from the (estimated) 
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house wealth of 2% and 4%, respectively.47 This increases the household income 
measure only for the 76% of people who are owner occupiers. Estimates of equiv-
alence scales and the extra costs of disability using a 2% and 4% return on hous-
ing wealth are remarkably close to the base case and are reported in panel (2) of 
Table 5. We also test the extent to which our estimates are sensitive to the 
treatment of housing costs in the income measure. On average, housing costs 
(which are the sum of gross rents, council tax payments, costs of insurance on 
structure of property and mortgage interest payments net of housing benefit and 
council tax benefits) are of about £8 lower for disabled people compared with 
the non-disabled counterpart. Using a “Before Housing Costs” income measure 
(see discussion in section 4) yields an estimate of the average extra cost of disa-
bility among disabled people of £93 (about £6 lower than when income is meas-
ured after housing costs). 
SoL indicators. We used two sensitivity tests focused on disability measure-
ment. First, dropping the indicators for “hobby or leisure activity”, “holidays 
away from home” and “friends and family round” produced very little change in 
                                      
47 Estimates of housing wealth are derived by estimating an interval regression using recorded Council 
Tax band information and a set of controlling characteristics available in the FRS. Council Tax is a local 
property tax for which all domestic properties have been valued and the value placed in a band. This 
regression gives us a vector of estimated coefficients with we use to derive homeowners’ expected housing 
wealth conditional on being in the respondent council tax band, evaluated at the time when their properties 
were last valued (1991 for England and Scotland and 2005 in Wales). Finally, observed regional changes in 
house prices between then and 2007 are applied to yield estimated housing wealth in 2007 prices. Return on 
housings wealth is then computed at a weekly basis (dividing the assumed annual return by 52). 
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the estimates.48 Second, we used a less stringent interpretation, setting each in-
dicator to 0 even in cases where respondents replied “We/I do not want/need 
this”. This produced a slightly lower coefficient (-0.272) for disability, a higher 
훾1푆푇퐷 (-1.793) and lower 훾2푆푇퐷 (0.217), yielding an estimate of the extra cost of 
disability among disabled people of about 89% of their household income. Results 
are shown in panel (4) of Table 5. 
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis: mean costs of disability and equivalence scale 
by deciles of η 
Decile 
of 휂 ̂
(1) (2) Returns from Housing wealth (3) 
Couples   Singles 
2% 4% 
SoL indicator = 0 if 
does not want/ have 
/ or cannot afford 
to, 1 otherwise 
(N=4,752) (N=3,438) 
∆ 
£s pw 
σ 
∆ 
£s pw 
σ 
∆ 
£s pw 
σ 
∆ 
£s pw 
σ 
∆ 
£s pw 
σ 
6 23.60 1.11 14.70 1.15 21.40 1.20 21.70 1.20 29.90 1.23 
7 74.00 1.31 55.40 1.42 66.30 1.39 67.30 1.40 100.70 1.56 
8 108.20 1.43 80.60 1.57 96.10 1.52 97.40 1.53 148.90 1.78 
9 139.00 1.55 102.40 1.82 123.50 1.76 125.20 1.77 192.20 2.13 
10 197.10 1.82 147.40 2.25 176.30 2.14 178.90 2.15 281.30 2.74 
Mean 
for dec-
iles 6 
to 10 
107.60 1.44 80.60 1.65 96.70 1.60 98.10 1.61 150.50 1.89 
Notes: Estimates of ∆ are unadjusted for household composition. All monetary values are rounded to the 
nearest 10p and expressed in 2007 prices. 
 
 
 
7 Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper, we have applied the standard of living approach to estimate the 
cost of disability among older people in Great Britain and extended previous 
                                      
48 We estimated 	α

%&'
,γ

%&'
	and	γ

%&'
 as -0.236, -2.660 and 0.311 respectively, compared with -0.236, -
2.610 and 0.307 for the baseline model. 
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research by developing a two-latent factor structural model to estimate equiva-
lence scales for disability. Disability is treated as a latent construct which is 
measured imperfectly by a vector of survey indicators and is influenced by ob-
served socio-economic characteristics. Ten indicators of deprivation are used as 
observable counterparts of the latent continuous index of SoL, which varies in 
relation to household income and disability. Our approach allows us to construct 
a base-dependent equivalence scale (i.e. one which varies by income level) which 
takes account of the severity of disability. The restrictions on preferences imposed 
by the assumption of a base-independent equivalence scale for disability are not 
supported by our data. This implies that the extra income that disabled people 
on higher incomes need to be as well off as their non-disabled counterparts is 
lower than the equivalent sum needed by disabled people on lower incomes. Our 
application is the first, in our knowledge, to derive an equivalence scale for disa-
bility using a log-quadratic function on income of the kind that has been used in 
Engel curve studies.  
The results show that the extra costs of disability are substantial, and rise with 
severity. Using the 2007/8 wave of the FRS we estimate that an older disabled 
person, defined as someone above the median level of disability for all older people, 
requires a net household income around 62% higher than that of a comparable 
person with a median level of disability to reach the same standard of living. This 
corresponds to around £99 per week on average as an allowance for the additional 
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costs that households with a disabled member face. These additional costs where 
disability is in the highest decile of disability average £180 under our preferred 
model. The latter is comparable with disability costs for highly disabled pension-
ers estimated by Zaidi and Burchardt (2005) which ranged from £122 to £190 
(converted to 2007 prices from £104 to £162 in 2002 prices).  
Only about 27% of those whom we estimate to face disability-related costs, are 
in receipt of disability-related cash benefits. In line with previous findings 
(Berthoud et al., 1993; Thompson et al., 1990) we find evidence that, although 
disability benefits are received mainly by people who do indeed face disability 
costs, they do not meet the full costs of disability for recipients, and a high 
proportion of people with severe disability do not receive disability benefits at all.  
We have also investigated the sensitivity of our estimates to various aspects of 
the econometric specification, the measurement of SoL and the treatment of hous-
ing wealth and costs. Estimates obtained using the preferred quadratic model are 
remarkably close to those obtained when a simple linear-in-income form is used. 
The estimates are sensitive to whether the disability costs and equivalence scales 
are constrained to be the same for single people and couples: the reduction in 
living standards for a given disability level appears to be higher (but not parallel) 
for single people than for couples. This is in contrast to Zaidi and Burchardt 
(2005) who found that disability costs were higher for single people than for 
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couples. As a consequence there is more divergence between the our and their 
estimates when single people and couples are distinguished. Zaidi and Burchardt 
found that highly disabled single pensioners faced extra costs of around £189 
(2007 prices) compared with our estimate for single pensioners in the highest 
decile of disability of £147. The equivalent comparison for couples is £122 against 
our higher figure of £197. Thus while there is evidence that disability benefits 
systems should discriminate between single people and couples, more research is 
needed before firm recommendations for policy can be made. Our estimates are 
only marginally sensitive to the inclusion of the return on housing wealth in 
income.  
The estimated equivalence scale is very sensitive to the way answers to survey 
questions on deprivation are interpreted. If we were to interpret all cases of non-
possession as equivalent to deprivation, we would estimate that an older disabled 
person requires a net household income around 89% higher than a comparable 
non-disabled person to reach the same standard of living, compared with 62% 
when the index is based only on explicit inability to afford.  
Our clear – and robust – conclusion is that disability costs faced by older people 
in Britain are large and increase strongly with severity of disability. Comparisons 
of the incomes of disabled and non-disabled older people must make adequate 
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allowance for these costs if meaningful inferences about their relative living stand-
ards are to be drawn. 
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Appendix: Additional tables 
TABLE A1: Summary statistics for standard-of-living and disability 
Standard-of-living* 
Do you (and your family/and your partner) have... Cannot afford to… 
Do not want/ have / 
or cannot afford to … 
Enough money to keep your home in a decent state of 
decoration? 
0.083  (0.276) 0.101  (0.302) 
Hobby or leisure activity? 0.036  (0.187) 0.254  (0.435) 
Holidays away from home one week a year? 0.162  (0.368) 0.436  (0.496) 
Household contents insurance? 0.049  (0.217) 0.109  (0.312) 
Friends/family round for drink or meal at least once a 
month? 
0.068  (0.252) 0.413  (0.492) 
Make savings of £10 a month or more? 0.214  (0.410) 0.404  (0.491) 
Two pairs of all-weather shoes for each person in the 
household? 
0.022  (0.146) 0.038  (0.190) 
Replace any worn out furniture? 0.153  (0.360) 0.323  (0.468) 
Replace or repair broken electrical goods? 0.104  (0.306) 0.179  (0.383) 
Money to spend each week on yourself, not on your fam-
ily? 
0.079  (0.270) 0.118  (0.322) 
Disability 
 Does this health problem(s) or disability(ies) mean 
that you have significant difficulties with any of 
these areas of your life? Please read out the numbers 
from the card next to the ones which apply to you. 
Mean 
Standard Devia-
tion 
difficulty in mobility (moving about) 0.327 0.469 
difficulty with lifting, carrying or moving objects 0.301 0.459 
difficulty with manual dexterity using hands for daily 
tasks 
0.120 0.325 
difficulty - continence (bladder/bowel control) 0.071 0.256 
difficulty with communication (speech, hearing or eye-
sight) 
0.089 0.285 
difficulty with memory/concentration/learning/under-
standing 
0.063 0.242 
difficulty with recognising when in physical danger 0.013 0.114 
difficulty with your physical co-ordination 0.109 0.312 
difficulty in other area of life 0.123 0.328 
Notes: Statistics computed over a sample of 8,183 FRS 2007-8 respondents. * Standard deviation in 
brackets. 
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Table A2: Sample means and standard deviations of covariates 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Age of adult last birthday 73.54 7.431 
Female 59.2% 0.491 
No. of years in FT education beyond school living age 1.02 1.676 
Whether Partnered 58.0% 0.494 
Area of Residence:    
  North East  4.6% 0.209 
  North West and Merseyside  10.9% 0.312 
  Yorks and Humberside  8.4% 0.277 
  East Midlands  7.5% 0.263 
  West Midlands  8.3% 0.276 
  Eastern  8.8% 0.283 
  London  6.9% 0.253 
  South East  12.2% 0.327 
  South West  8.7% 0.282 
  Wales  5.3% 0.225 
  Scotland  18.4% 0.387 
Net household income including disability benefits but af-
ter deducting housing costs (£ pw)a 
283.70 176.69 
Net household income excluding disability benefits and af-
ter deducting housing costs (£ pw) (‘Pre-disability benefit 
income’)b  
268.20 177.67 
Home Ownership 75.1% 0.432 
Financial wealth (in £) 20,886  63,376  
Notes: Sample means computed over the 8,183 respondents. Monetary values are in 2007 prices and 
rounded to the nearest 10p. 
a. Computed as the sum across all household members of: cash income from private and state pensions, 
investments and savings, other market income, disability and means-tested state benefits minus income tax 
and housing costs. Housing costs are the sum of gross rents, council tax payments, costs of insurance on 
structure of property and mortgage interest payments net of housing benefit and council tax benefits.  
b. Pre-disability benefits income is computed by deducting disability benefits currently received by all 
household members from household income.  
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Table A3: Standard of living and disability measurement equations 
Indicator 
Factor 
Loading 
R2 
Standard of Living 
enough money to keep your home in a decent state of decoration 1.229*** 0.710 
hobby or leisure activity 0.860*** 0.545 
holidays away from home one week a year 1.139*** 0.677 
household contents insurance 0.864*** 0.547 
friends/family round for drink or meal at least once a month 0.972*** 0.604 
make savings of £10 a month or more 1.001*** 0.618 
two pairs of all weather shoes for each person in the HH 0.895*** 0.564 
replace any worn out furniture 1.789*** 0.838 
replace or repair broken electrical goods such as fridge, washing ma-
chine 
1.615*** 0.809 
money to spend each week on yourself, not on your family 1.080*** 0.654 
Disability 
difficulty in mobility (moving about) 2.138*** 0.840 
difficulty with lifting, carrying or moving objects 2.435*** 0.872 
difficulty with manual dexterity using hands for daily tasks 1.327*** 0.669 
difficulty - continence (bladder/bowel control) 0.766*** 0.402 
difficulty with communication (speech, hearing or eyesight) 0.656*** 0.330 
difficulty with memory/concentration/learning/understanding 0.813*** 0.431 
difficulty with recognising when in physical danger 0.737*** 0.384 
difficulty with your physical co-ordination 1.382*** 0.686 
difficulty in other area of life 0.465*** 0.198 
Significance: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%; R2 is the squared correlation between the indicator 
(Sq or Dk) and the latent variable (ϕ or η). Estimates are from the quadratic in ln(Y) model 
specification. 
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Table A4: Estimates of the structural parameters of the disability equation 
Covariate(s): Coeff. S.E. 
Spline age 73† 0.033*** 0.002 
Spline age 73 and over † 0.033*** 0.003 
Female -0.005  0.028 
Post-compulsory schooling -0.036*** 0.009 
(ln) pre-disability benefit income -0.114*** 0.028 
Home ownership -0.299*** 0.034 
(ln) financial wealth -0.029*** 0.004 
Note: Significance: * = 10%; ** = 5%, *** = 1%; †Cut-off set to 73, the median age in the sample. Model 
also includes controls for region of residence and marital status. R2=0.127. Estimates are obtained using the 
quadratic in ln(Y) model specification. 
 
Table A5: Parameter Estimates from the Standard of Living Equation in the 
Three Variants 
Covariate(s): 
Model (1)  
Linear in Y 
Model (2)  
Linear in ln(Y) 
Model (3)  
Quadratic in ln(Y) 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
η -0.277*** 0.020 -0.29*** 0.020 -0.281*** 0.020 
(in s.d. units) -0.233*** 0.016 -0.254*** 0.016 -0.236*** 0.016 
linear in Y 0.003*** 0.000     
(in s.d. units) 0.003*** 0.000     
linear in ln(Y)   0.790*** 0.036 -3.424*** 0.272 
(in s.d. units)   0.631*** 0.026 -2.610*** 0.201 
quadratic in ln(Y)     0.400*** 0.027 
(in s.d. units)     0.307*** 0.019 
Female -0.005 0.033 0.002 0.033 -0.004 0.033 
(in s.d. units) -0.004 0.026 0.002 0.027 -0.003 0.026 
Spline age 73a 0.034*** 0.004 0.03*** 0.004 0.034*** 0.005 
(in s.d. units) 0.026*** 0.003 0.025*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.004 
Spline age 73plusa 0.037*** 0.004 0.038*** 0.004 0.037*** 0.004 
(in s.d. units) 0.029*** 0.003 0.031*** 0.003 0.029*** 0.003 
Post-compulsory 
schooling 
0.043*** 0.012 0.062*** 0.011 0.041*** 0.012 
(in s.d. units) 0.034*** 0.009 0.051*** 0.009 0.032*** 0.009 
Home owner 0.497*** 0.037 0.481*** 0.037 0.486*** 0.037 
(in s.d. units) 0.39*** 0.030 0.393*** 0.030 0.382*** 0.029 
Married/cohabiting -0.195*** 0.041 -0.222*** 0.039 -0.238*** 0.040 
(in s.d. units) -0.153*** 0.031 -0.181*** 0.032 -0.187*** 0.031 
Notes: Significance: * = 10%; ** = 5%, *** = 1%. a. Cut-off set to 73, the median age in the sample. 
All models also contain controls for region of residence.  
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Figure A1: Estimated form of the Income-SoL profile 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Kernel Density Estimator of η 
 
Notes: vertical line represents the reference level of disability (D0).  
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Chapter 4: 
 
 
Socio-economic disparities in cohort-
year trends in disability and receipt 
of disability benefits at old-age: Evi-
dence from the UK* 
 
 
Abstract: Public programmes of support for disabled people are facing increasing fi-
nancial pressure in contemporary societies.  A fundamental question is how much of 
their growth can be explained by trends in the underlying prevalence and severity of 
disability. A two-latent factor structural equation approach is employed to estimate the 
(birth-)cohort-year effects in physical and cognitive functionings and in the receipt of 
non means-tested cash disability benefits (DBs) for older people born between 1924 and 
1945. We found that the overall slightly increasing cohort-year trend in physical and 
cognitive disability hides diverging trends by socio-economic status (SES), with relevant 
indirect effects on DBs receipt. The direct cohort-year effect on DBs receipt is mainly 
attributable to an increase among the better educated individuals. Results have im-
portant implications for current and planned policy reforms aimed at supporting people 
with care needs.  
 
 
 
Keywords: disability, disability benefits, birth-cohort trends, latent factor, structural 
equation model.
                                      
* I am grateful for comments and suggestions from Ruth Hancock and Stephen Pudney. This research 
was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant no. ES/K003852/1: “Disability and care 
needs in the older population: disability benefits, social care and well-being”).  Data from the Family 
Resources Survey (FRS) are made available via the Department of Work and Pensions through the UK 
Data Archive. Material from the FRS is Crown Copyright and has been used by permission. The 
responsibility for the analysis and the views expressed lies entirely with the author. 
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1 Introduction 
Like the UK, many countries have experienced substantial growth in the num-
ber of people receiving disability-related benefits. Health/disability status deter-
mines eligibility for disability programmes, but it is still debated how much of 
the growth in their rolls is down to demographic and epidemiological pressures. 
The general conclusion, at least for insurance-based disability programmes49 tar-
geted to the working age population, is that the growth in their rolls has primarily 
been driven by factors unrelated to the ageing of the population and its underly-
ing disability (Autor, 2011; Black et al., 2002; Bound & Burkhauser, 1999; Burk-
hauser & Daly, 2011; Burkhauser & Daly, 2012; Burkhauser et al., 2014; 
Haveman & Wolfe, 1984; Juhn, 1992; McVicar, 2008; Parsons, 1980), though a 
recent analysis of US data has challenged this finding (Pattison & Waldron, 2013).  
Much less attention has been paid to the dynamics of social security benefits 
that are intended to partially compensate for the extra costs of living with a 
disability. In the UK, there are two alternative non-contributory tax-free non-
means-tested social security disability-related cash benefits (DBs): the Disability 
Living Allowance (DLA), claimable for disabled people aged 16 to 64 (although 
                                      
49 Insurance-based disability benefits represent earnings replacement for working age individuals who 
have lost their ability to work and are generally conditional on workers past earnings and contributions.  
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receipt can continue beyond 65), and the Attendance Allowance (AA), a benefit 
similar to the DLA but claimed only from age 65.  
AA and DLA are at the core of a considerable policy debate. The rapid growth 
in DLA rolls and its advocated leakage (i.e. benefits being received by the non-
disabled) led to its replacement by the Personal Independence Payment (PIP), 
which (from 2013) has introduced a regular reassessment of the disability condi-
tion over time. AA reform prospects include the options of freezing its value (not 
uprated with inflation), making the benefit subject to income tax, tightening its 
eligibility criteria or introducing reassessment or means-testing for new claimants 
(Commission on the Future of Health and Social Care in England, 2014; Lloyd, 
2014; Wanless, 2006). Moreover, the devolution process will provide complete 
autonomy to the Scottish Parliament in determining the structure and value of 
AA and DLA/PIP benefits.50  
It has been reported that the bulk of DBs recipients in the UK are older people 
(Berthoud, 2009; Burchardt, 1999; Falkingham et al., 2010; HMSO, 1988). During 
the period 2002 to 2012, the number of older recipients increased by more than 
half a million (+31%), albeit no structural reforms were implemented. Population 
trends could explain only part of this growth: expressed as a share of the 65+ 
population, AA/DLA caseloads have increased by 3 percentage points (+14%). 
                                      
50 see www.smith-commission.scot.  
 192 
 
 
This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the major driver 
mechanisms behind such a growth. 
The natural starting point for this enquiry is the observation of trends in old-
age disabilities. It is commonly assumed that advances in medicine, technology 
and access to public health together with increased safety at work and a lower 
proportion of the workforce in manual jobs mean no increase in prevalence of 
disability. However, the observed prevalence of disability can increase if the life-
expectancy of disabled people increases, even if the onset of disability remains 
stable (Crimmins et al., 2009; Jarvis & Tinker, 1999). It is also possible, for 
example, that unfavourable conditions during infancy and childhood for the old-
est cohorts had preselected the strongest members, thus suggesting an increasing 
trend. Additionally, it has been argued that increasing exposure to unhealthy 
environments (e.g. the obesogenic features of the modern environment) and as-
sociated conditions in younger compared with older cohorts, might have serious 
implications for age at onset of chronic health problems and therefore in the 
prevalence of functional disabilities in later life (Crimmins & Beltrán-Sánchez, 
2011; Martin et al., 2010; WHO, 2011). Not surprisingly, empirical evidences on 
trends in disability is mixed, with no consensus yet emerging. 
The prevalence of disability is known to vary between subgroups of the popu-
lation. Regardless of the socio-economic status (SES) indicator in use, results 
tend to show that older people with low SES are more likely to experience health 
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problems and to die at a younger age than their counterparts (for a review see 
e.g. Feinstein (1993);WHO (2014)). However, the strong relation between SES 
and health (the so-called SES gradient in health; Deaton (2002)) is clouded when 
considered in the context of the ageing population; some prior studies report a 
convergence of health inequality by SES, while others demonstrate a persistent 
or diverging gap over time (e.g., Freedman et al., 2002; Martin et al., 2012; 
Morciano et al., 2015; Schoeni et al., 2001; Schoeni et al., 2005).  
The key interest for our analysis is whether there is any trend in SES inequal-
ities in disability that might lead to relevant trends in the composition of those 
potentially entitled to DBs. This is important mainly for two reasons. First, de-
spite the non-means-tested nature of DBs, it has been found that their take-up 
is higher among older people with low SES than those with more education or 
higher incomes and wealth (Hancock et al., 2015; Hancock & Pudney, 2014; 
Morciano et al., 2015; Pudney, 2010). Therefore the impact on DB rolls would be 
rather different in magnitude if an epidemiological pressure came from low SES 
individuals, rather than from those better off. Secondly, given the significant 
changes in the living conditions of the oldest population, it is also important to 
assess whether, conditional on disability and other relevant characteristics, ine-
qualities in DBs take-up (due, for example, to stigma effects) are widening or not. 
In terms of “target efficiency” of the system, the answers to such questions have 
profoundly different policy implications.  
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By following multiple birth-cohorts over multiple time points, we examine 
(birth-) cohort-year effects in physical and cognitive functioning and in the re-
ceipt of DBs for the 65 and over population in the UK. In doing so, we use 
individual-level data from those born between 1924 and 1945 as observed in the 
Family Resource Survey (FRS) carried out from 2002/3 to 2011/12. These data 
contain detailed information of relevance for our study and have the advantage 
of covering a large national non-institutionalised population sample which yields 
more precise estimates of the phenomena of interest.  
We employ a latent variable structural approach. It incorporates a latent var-
iable representation of the individual’s unobservable and multidimensional disa-
bility in a system of structural equations where the latent dimensions of disability 
(together with observable characteristics) determine receipt of DBs. The individ-
ual’s disability is characterised by correlated physical and cognitive dimensions 
that are measured by potentially error-contaminated self-reported functional dif-
ficulty (FD) indicators.  
Historical trends are driven by a confluence of age, (birth-) cohort, and time 
effects. Regardless of the data available, attempts to capture all three effects are 
faced with the identification problem that a person’s age added to their birth 
year gives the current year, so that there is an exact linear relationship between 
the age, cohort, and time effects. We addressed this linear dependency by means 
of an additively separable age-cohort specification which assumes period effects 
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are the same for each age level and cohort. By exploiting the range of different 
SES indicators in the data (measures of educational attainment, income compo-
nents, and home-ownership) we also assess the presence of SES-related cohort 
diverging trends in physical and cognitive disabilities and DBs receipt, by means 
of interaction terms between birth-cohort and SES. 
As we will document in section 4, we find a diverging gap in physical and 
cognitive disability between the socio-economically advantaged and disadvan-
taged in later life, with relevant indirect effects on DBs receipt. It would suggest 
that the growth rolls of DBs observed in the last decade among older people in 
the UK comes mainly from the significant epidemiological pressure exerted from 
successive cohorts of low SES individuals. Controlling for disability and SES, we 
also found evidence of a small, but significant, direct cohort effect on DBs receipt. 
It mainly comes from better-educated individuals who might be taking more ad-
vantage of their level of education in navigating the DB system or might have 
lowered the perceived stigma from claiming benefits.  
Our results have important implications for current and planned policy of the 
UK-DB system. The relevance of cohort-year effects also suggest that projections 
of the future number of disabled and the associated costs of disability pro-
grammes by shift-share analyses that use conditional rates observed at a single 
point in time could lead to severe underestimation.  
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Figure 1 illustrates the main motivation of this paper. We smooth the age 
trajectories of the reported number of functional difficulties (FD) (panel a) and 
of DBs receipt (panel b) of those cohorts observed in our data. Two facts are 
immediately apparent. First, different cohorts experience substantially similar 
profiles as they age, with both the number of reported FD and the probability of 
receiving DBs increasing sharply with age. Second, at a given age, successive 
cohorts of older people (women in particular) experience a systematic increase in 
the average number of FD reported as well as in the receipt of DBs. This may 
reflect a general tendency in the reporting propensity; alternatively it may reflect 
real differences between cohorts.  
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 describes the statistical 
approach in use. The pseudo-panel used for the empirical application is presented 
in section 3. In section 4 we report the main findings. Finally, section 5 summa-
rises and highlights the main policy implications.  
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Figure 1: Age trajectories of the number of FD reported and the rate of 
receipt of DBs by birth-cohort and gender 
Panel a)  
 
Panel b)  
 
Notes: Local weighted averages generated by gender and grouped-birth-cohorts specific 
smoothed local linear regressions (Cleveland, 1979) with bandwidth set equal to 0.8. Source: see 
section 3 for details.  
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2 Model specification & main assumptions 
Consider a multi-equation model with 휼푖 = (휂푖1 …휂푖푄) being an unobserved 
Q-dimensional “true” disability and 푟푖 being the latent propensity to receive DB 
(AA or DLA) for a representative sample of individuals aged 65 and over, 푖 =
1, . . . ,푁 :  
 휂푖푞 = 휷ퟏ푞푿풊 + 휀1푖푞 (1) 
 푟푖 = 휷ퟐ푿풊 + 훾1휂푖1 + ⋯ + 훾푄휂푖푄 + 휀2푖 (2) 
 
where 휀1, 휀2 have zero mean, unit variances and are serially independent, 푿 is a 
vector of exogenous variables assumed to be correlated with the outcome of in-
terest. For identification, either at least one exogenous variable in (1) does not 
appear in (2) or 휀1 and 휀2 are assumed independent (Hancock et al., 2015).  
In this model, 휂푖푄 and 푟푖  are not directly observable. Instead we have a vector 
of functional disability indicators 푫 of length 퐽, reflecting disability 휂푖1 … 휂푖푄. 
We assume that 푫 contains binary indicators but the framework can be easily 
extended to Likert-scale response indicators without loss of generality.  
The measurement component for disability can be expressed as follow: 
 퐷푖푗 = ퟏ (휆푗1휂푖1 + ⋯+ 휆푗푄휂푖푄 + ξ푖푗) (3) 
 
where the parameters 휆푗푞 are factor loadings associated with the 퐷푖푗 indicators. 
The indicator function 1(. ) maps the latent index on the right-hand side of the 
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measurement equation (3) into the observed indicators of disability. Identifica-
tion of the system of equations in (3) is achieved by imposing 퐸 (ξ푗) = 0 and 
퐶표푣 (휂푞, ξ푗) = 0 and normalising the scale of the q-latent index by constraining 
one of its factor loading or by setting its residual variance to 1.  
DB receipt is modelled by a probit specification. 퐵푖 is a binary variable indi-
cating the actual receipt of DBs (so 퐵푖 = 1 if the individual receives DBs and 0 
otherwise) we have that 퐵푖 = 1  if 푟푖 ≥ 0, 퐵푖 = 0 otherwise.  
As detailed in section 3, the vector 푿 includes the observable personal charac-
teristics required to define the cohort-specific SES gradient in disability and DBs 
receipt.  
Linear models that attempt to capture the contemporaneous effects of age (푎푖푡), 
birth-cohort (푐푖) and time (푡) face an identification problem following from the 
identity, 푎푖푡  + 푐푖 = 푡.51 Age represents biological and physiological factors asso-
ciated with the ageing process, affecting equally all individuals of the same age. 
Year of observation (period) represents contemporaneous conditions that have 
an effect on individuals of all ages.52 Year of birth (cohort) represents the cumu-
lative influence of past conditions on a group of individuals that ages with a 
similar timing.  
                                      
51 See e.g. Glenn (1976). Bell and Jones (2013) provide a recent review of the numerous, but still 
unsatisfactory, attempts to “solve” this identification problem. 
52 These may be associated, for example, with advances in medical knowledge, development of new 
diagnostic methods, access to health facilities, improvements in sanitary conditions, life conditions and other 
environmental conditions. 
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Our analysis involves two assumptions on age, cohort, and period variables. 
The first assumption rules out the cross terms among these variables.53 The sec-
ond assumption is that period effects capture transient events which are assumed 
to be the same for each age level and cohort. Such events can be absorbed in the 
residual terms 휀1, 휀2, allowing the effects of the inter-cohort and inter-age dispar-
ities to be isolated. If period effects actually show a trend, our estimates of 푎푖푡 
and 푐푖 needs to be reinterpreted as composite effects of 푎푖푡, 푐푖 and 푡.54 Since we 
do not want to rule out this potential source of bias, we refer to cohort-year and 
age-year effects throughout the paper without imposing further (untestable) as-
sumptions.  
In our application we also tested for the presence of SES-specific cohort-year 
trends, by adding interactions between ci and the SES indicators used in the 
analysis. It is important to note that under the assumption that the transient 
events occur uniformly across all SES groups,55 unobservable period effects would 
not bias the coefficients associated with the interaction terms.  
                                      
53 In fact, if the effects are not assumed to be additive (e.g. younger people are more/less exposed than 
the oldest ones to advances in medical knowledge), they would lead to a more complex set of assumptions 
that age effects vary systematically among the periods and cohorts, that period effects vary systematically 
among age levels and cohorts, and that cohort effects vary systematically among age levels and period. 
54 For example, positive period effects in disability may be driven by increased exposure to risk factors 
(i.e. obesity) or by medical advances that increase life expectancy of the disabled population without 
reducing their level of disability. Assuming positive age and birth-cohort effects, such period effects would 
bias upward their estimated effects. Conversely, negative period effects due for example to medical advances 
that prevent the onset of disability or that reduce the disabling effects of chronic conditions would bias 
downward the estimated effects of 푎푖푡 and 푐푖. 
55 SES-differentials in the exposure to the transient events might occur because of unequal access to 
medical advances between the socioeconomically advantaged and disadvantaged. However, this should not 
be the case - at least in principle - in countries like the UK with universal public healthcare systems. 
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We estimate the system comprising equations (1) and (3) simultaneously al-
lowing for the discrete nature of the dependent variables, using robust maximum 
likelihood.56 The path diagram of the estimated model is available in the Appen-
dix Figure A1. Gender-specific models were estimated to allow for possible gender 
differences in the reporting of FDs (Crimmins et al., 2011; Oksuzyan et al., 2010; 
Zaninotto et al., 2010).  
 
3 Data 
3.1 The Family Resources Survey  
We used data from a pooling of ten years of the Family Resources Survey 
(FRS). Despite the cross-sectional nature of the FRS data, it has the advantages 
of covering a large national population sample and containing a full range of 
questions relevant to the study. The FRS is sponsored by the Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP) (Department for Work and Pensions, various years), 
is used to derive official income and poverty statistics (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2013b) and provides the basis for most official statistics on welfare and 
disability programme targeting (Kasparova et al., 2007). Each cross-sectional 
survey uses the Postcode Address File (PAF) as a sampling frame, and data are 
collected mainly in face-to-face interviews, performed by trained interviewers, 
                                      
56 We use the command gsem with robust (unclustered) estimator as implemented in Stata 13.1 MP. 
We used a probit link function in equation (3). 
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from a large representative sample of individuals (on average about 45,000 indi-
viduals aged 16+ per year) living in private households in the UK. The overall 
response rate was on average around 60 percent (Department for Work and Pen-
sions, 2013a) and data were adjusted for possible differential non-response using 
weights constructed by DWP.57  
Analyses were carried out using data for respondents aged 65 and over, born 
between 1924 and 194558, interviewed in one of the ten surveys carried out from 
2002/3 to 2011/12.  
Following Hancock et al. (2015), we include in the analysis proxy cases (partici-
pants who were not able to provide responses themselves) since they are likely to 
include some of the most severely disabled respondents. After deleting a few cases 
where relevant information was missing, a sample of 96,733 was selected. 
Respondents to the FRS were asked whether they have any long-standing59 
illness, disability or infirmity. Respondents who answered “yes” were then asked 
if that means they have significant difficulties in the following areas of life:60 
mobility (moving about); lifting, carrying or moving objects; manual dexterity 
                                      
57 Weights control for differential response by demographic characteristics such as age, sex, marital status, 
region of residence, Council Tax Band (as a proxy for income) and housing tenure.  
58 To protect FRS respondents’ confidentiality, age was top-coded at the age of 80, necessitating the 
exclusion of those born before 1924. 
59 Long-standing is used here to refer to “anything that has troubled you over a period of at least 12 
months or that is likely to trouble you over a period of at least 12 months”. 
60 The following question wording is used: “Does this/do these health problem(s) or disability(ies) mean 
that you have substantial difficulties with any of these areas of your life? Please read out the numbers from 
the card next to the ones which apply to you.” 
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(using your hands to carry out everyday tasks); continence (bladder and bowel 
control); memory or ability to concentrate, learn or understand; recognising when 
you are in physical danger; physical co-ordination (e.g. balance); other health 
problem or disability. All eight self-reported functional difficulty (FD) indicators 
available in the FRS are included in 푫. A binary variable on whether interview 
was taken by proxy is also included in 푫, possibly capturing the health-related 
dimensions of not taking part in the interview in person.  
Observations are made on individuals of age 65 and over. The sample was 
divided into birth-cohorts, with some cohorts observed in more time periods than 
others because of the imposed age restriction. Table 1 presents a Lexis diagram 
for the observed 21 birth-cohorts by age and year of the interview. To simplify 
the exposition of results, 푐푖 was set to 1 for the first birth-cohort in our sample, 
the 1924 cohort and increased by 1 for each successive year-cohort.  
As indicators of SES, we used the level of education (compulsory education 
versus post-compulsory education),61 home-ownership and net household income. 
Income was constructed as the sum of wages and salaries, self-employment in-
come, public pensions, social security income and capital income (interest, rent, 
                                      
61 It should be noted that the distribution of educational attainment among today’s older people is likely 
to be highly skewed. This is because the majority of them left school at the minimum permitted age. 
Educational attainment may therefore discriminate only between the most advantaged and the rest of the 
older population. We therefore decided not to differentiate further beyond the compulsory education to 
avoid unreliability of estimates due to small sample cell sizes. 
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dividends, private pensions and annuities), less income tax payments. We ex-
cluded income from disability benefits which, in the UK, are paid by the state to 
disabled older people in recognition of the extra costs that disability brings and 
so are a consequence, not a cause, of disability (Hancock et al., 2015; Hancock & 
Pudney, 2014). Home-ownership and income from capital represent returns on 
assets accumulated over the lifecycle and are consequently good indicators of past 
access to resources with an expected cumulative positive influence on health 
(Morciano et al., 2015). Income is aggregated across all household members and 
divided by the square root of the number of people in the household to adjust for 
differences in household size.62 Given the skew of the income distribution, we 
follow common practice and enter income in log transformed form. We also con-
trol for country (within the UK) of residence of the respondents. 
                                      
62 Since the majority of households in our analysis consist of one or two adults, applying other commonly 
used scales, such as the OECD modified equivalence scale, would not yield substantially different results. 
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Table 1: Lexis diagram of the observed cohorts by age and year of interview 
Cohort 
of birth 
Age 
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80+ 
1924                           2002 2003 2004 
1925             2002 2003 2004 2005 
1926            2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1927           2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1928          2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1929         2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1930        2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1931       2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1932      2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1933     2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  
1934    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012   
1935   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012    
1936  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012     
1937 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012      
1938 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012       
1939 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012        
1940 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012         
1941 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012          
1942 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012           
1943 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012            
1944 2009 2010 2011 2012             
1945 2010 2011 2012                           
Source: Data on 65+ respondents born between 1924-1945, interviewed in the FRS survey from 2002/3 - 2011/12. 
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3.2 Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 shows the main characteristics of the study population disaggregated 
by gender. Differences between genders were almost all significant at the 1% level. 
Women, who represented about 55% of the total sample, reported higher disabil-
ity prevalence than men at both the extensive (the probability of being function-
ally disabled) and intensive margins (the severity of functional disability, among 
disabled). They also reported higher prevalence of the four most common types 
of FD (mobility, lifting, dexterity, co-ordination), although three less common 
types (incontinence, communication, memory) were reported a little more fre-
quently by men. Specifically, women reported higher prevalence of 1+ and 4+ 
FDs and, among disabled, higher average severity (number of FDs reported) 
compared with men, reflecting significant gender differences for all FD indicators 
with the exception of the item “recognising when in physical danger”, for which 
no significant difference was found. 
The median age of respondents in the sample was 73 for men and 74 for women. 
Mean household income (expressed in 2012 prices) was £367 per week for men 
and £321 for women. The majority of respondents were home-owners (80% for 
men; 76% for women), most had a post-compulsory school qualification (67% for 
men; 65% for women), and most were resident in England (84%).  
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Socio-economic differentials in the prevalence of FDs were marked as shown in 
Table 3. The proportions reporting at least one FD, four or more FDs and the 
average number of reported FDs among those with at least one FD (severity), 
were higher among people without post-compulsory education, non-home-owners 
and those in the poorest quartile of the income distribution. Receipt of DBs shows 
an even great gradient with SES, reflecting the higher prevalence of functional 
disabilities or the stronger incentive to claim DBs for low-income households.  
Table 4 reports the prevalence and severity of functional disability, and means 
of the SES variables according to birth-cohort and age group. For each age group 
apart from 80+, the prevalence of disability was slightly lower in successive birth-
cohorts. However, the severity of disability among those who reported it, in-
creased significantly for successive cohorts within all age groups. Successive birth-
cohorts of older people reported significant improvements in SES, mainly in the 
percentage of individuals reporting post-compulsory education.  
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Table 2: Functional Difficulties (FDs) and selected socio-economic indi-
cators in the pooled sample of FRS 
 Men Women 
Difference 
 Mean 
Standard 
error 
Mean 
Standard 
error 
Mobility 31.2% 0.463 35.7% 0.479 -0.034*** 
Lifting 28.3% 0.450 33.0% 0.470 -0.036*** 
Dexterity 10.9% 0.311 14.6% 0.353 -0.034*** 
Co-ordination 9.9% 0.299 11.5% 0.319 -0.011*** 
Communication 9.8% 0.297 8.8% 0.283 0.014*** 
Incontinence 8.4% 0.277 7.5% 0.263 0.011*** 
Memory 7.8% 0.268 7.0% 0.255 0.011*** 
Recognise when in 
danger 
1.6% 0.126 1.9% 0.137 -0.001  
No FDs reported 56.7% 0.495 53.9% 0.499 0.019*** 
1 or more FDs re-
ported 
43.3% 0.495 46.1% 0.499 -0.019*** 
4 or more FDs re-
ported 
9.4% 0.292 10.8% 0.310 -0.008*** 
number of FDs 
(among disabled) 
2.49 1.516 2.60 1.516 -0.073*** 
Median age a 73 5.114 74 5.246 -1*** 
Equivalised pre-disa-
bility benefit house-
hold incomeb 
366.72 322.57 321.18 272.07 41.122*** 
Post-compulsory 
school 
67.9% 0.467 65.0% 0.477 0.008** 
Home-ownership 79.9% 0.401 75.7% 0.429 0.04*** 
England 83.9% 0.368 83.3% 0.373 0.014*** 
Wales 5.5% 0.227 5.4% 0.225 0.002 
Scotland 8.2% 0.275 8.8% 0.283 -0.013*** 
Northern Ireland 2.4% 0.154 2.5% 0.157 -0.003* 
In receipt of AA 7.35% 0.261 11.62% 0.320 -0.043*** 
In receipt of DLA 8.02% 0.272 7.68% 0.266 -0.034** 
In receipt of AA or 
DLA 
15.05% 0.358 18.95% 0.392 0.039*** 
Source: Weighted data on 65+ respondents born between 1924-1945, interviewed in the FRS survey from 2002/3-2011/12. Unweighted 
sample size: 52,229 women and 44,504 men. Notes: a To protect confidentiality, FRS data were released with a top-coding at the age of 80. 
Therefore, we report median rather than mean values. Consequently, a Pearson chi-squared test of the equality of the medians of the 
difference between men and women was performed. b (£ pw, 2012 prices) For definition of household income see text.  Level of significance: 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 3: Prevalence and severity of disability by SES 
SES indicator 
Reporting at 
least 1 FD 
Reporting at 
least 4 FDs 
Average 
number of re-
ported FDs 
(among disa-
bled) 
In receipt of 
disability ben-
efits (DBs) 
Education         
 Compulsory education 56.3% 14.6% 2.70 24.6% 
 Post-compulsory education 39.0% 8.0% 2.45 13.5% 
Home-ownership     
 Non-home-owner 59.5% 15.3% 2.70 29.1% 
 Home-owner 40.6% 8.7% 2.49 13.8% 
Quantiles of pre-disability incomea     
 Poorest 25% 49.2% 11.0% 2.55 19.7% 
  Richest 25% 32.4% 6.8% 2.44 8.6% 
Overall 44.9% 10.2% 2.55 17.2% 
Source: Weighted data on 65+ respondents born between 1924-1945, interviewed in the FRS survey from 2002/3-2011/12. Unweighted sample size: 52,229 
women and 44,504 men. Notes: Differences between groups were all statistically significant at 1% level. a For definition of household income see text.
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Table 4: Birth-cohort trends in prevalence and severity of disability and SES by age-group 
Cohort of 
birth 
  Age group 
65-69 70-74 75-79 80+ 
Functional disa-
bility 
SES indicator 
Functional disabil-
ity 
SES indicator 
Functional disabil-
ity 
SES indicator 
Functional disabil-
ity 
SES indicator 
Preva-
lence 
(a) 
Severity 
(b) 
Educa-
tion (c) 
Income 
(d ) 
Home-
owner-
ship 
(%) 
Preva-
lence (a) 
Severity 
(b) 
Educa-
tion (c) 
Income 
(d ) 
Home-
owner-
ship 
(%) 
Preva-
lence (a) 
Severity 
(b) 
Educa-
tion (c) 
Income 
(d ) 
Home-
owner-
ship 
(%) 
Preva-
lence (a) 
Severity 
(b) 
Educa-
tion (c) 
Income 
(d ) 
Home-
owner-
ship 
(%) 
1924 . . . . . . . . . . 0.55 2.23 0.35 283.46 0.70 0.60 2.79 0.37 286.46 0.67 
1925 . . . . . . . . . . 0.55 2.28 0.38 285.42 0.70 0.59 2.87 0.36 283.31 0.68 
1926 . . . . . . . . . . 0.50 2.32 0.39 301.22 0.73 0.60 2.96 0.39 291.07 0.70 
1927 . . . . . . . . . . 0.48 2.34 0.37 295.69 0.74 0.61 2.91 0.41 299.16 0.72 
1928 . . . . . 0.44 2.22 0.36 286.53 0.77 0.47 2.37 0.40 305.15 0.75 0.61 2.87 0.39 308.43 0.74 
1929 . . . . . 0.49 2.15 0.37 311.40 0.73 0.47 2.50 0.42 318.02 0.77 0.62 2.98 0.40 309.40 0.74 
1930 . . . . . 0.40 2.13 0.39 318.15 0.77 0.48 2.56 0.43 331.82 0.78 0.62 2.84 0.42 313.55 0.75 
1931 . . . . . 0.41 2.28 0.45 323.76 0.79 0.48 2.47 0.44 334.77 0.78 0.60 2.93 0.43 299.07 0.76 
1932 . . . . . 0.43 2.14 0.44 319.71 0.78 0.48 2.58 0.48 335.58 0.80 0.63 3.01 0.45 329.87 0.78 
1933 0.39 1.94 0.60 353.00 0.78 0.39 2.30 0.59 338.21 0.79 0.46 2.64 0.60 340.80 0.79 . . . . . 
1934 0.36 2.03 0.83 328.56 0.79 0.41 2.44 0.85 333.79 0.80 0.45 2.70 0.87 351.90 0.81 . . . . . 
1935 0.37 2.14 0.88 340.19 0.79 0.40 2.38 0.88 351.87 0.80 0.41 2.49 0.88 335.13 0.79 . . . . . 
1936 0.35 2.30 0.91 354.11 0.80 0.40 2.44 0.90 353.13 0.80 0.42 2.42 0.88 344.85 0.83 . . . . . 
1937 0.36 2.19 0.92 367.81 0.81 0.40 2.57 0.91 347.47 0.81 0.42 2.62 0.92 351.38 0.82 . . . . . 
1938 0.36 2.23 0.93 393.31 0.81 0.40 2.48 0.91 356.63 0.81 . . . . . . . . . . 
1939 0.35 2.39 0.93 381.99 0.81 0.38 2.46 0.93 362.13 0.81 . . . . . . . . . . 
1940 0.34 2.38 0.94 386.78 0.81 0.37 2.33 0.94 353.50 0.79 . . . . . . . . . . 
1941 0.33 2.46 0.94 395.87 0.80 0.35 2.21 0.95 358.50 0.79 . . . . . . . . . . 
1942 0.32 2.45 0.95 413.92 0.82 0.34 2.55 0.97 411.81 0.84 . . . . . . . . . . 
1943 0.32 2.45 0.95 406.14 0.81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1944 0.29 2.48 0.96 441.57 0.81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1945 0.31 2.45 0.96 421.56 0.81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tests for Stationarity  
(p-values)                   
ADF 0.99 0.16 0.62 0.75 0.04 0.99 0.53 0.52 0.89 0.59 0.81 0.48 0.97 0.66 0.27 0.65 0.00 0.99 0.01 0.86 
PP 0.53 0.03 0.09 0.88 0.03 0.72 0.53 0.71 0.93 0.79 0.53 0.47 0.97 0.65 0.52 0.66 0.01 0.99 0.95 0.88 
Source: Weighted data on 65+ respondents born between 1924-1945, interviewed in the FRS survey from 2002/3-2011/12. Unweighted sample size: 52,229 women and 44,504 men. Notes: a % of people 
reporting at least one FD; b number of FDs reported among those who reported at least one FD; c % of individuals reporting post-compulsory school; d equivalised pre-disability benefit household income 
(£ pw, 2012 prices). See text for the income definition. We tests for time-trends in the data using both the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips–Perron (PP) tests (null hypothesis of a unit 
root) with two lagged difference terms included in the covariate lists. Experiments with fewer or more lags in the augmented regression yield similar conclusions.
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3.3 The number of factors 
Disability is a multidimensional concept, with some controversy over the num-
ber of dimensions needed for empirical analysis (see e.g. Fitzgerald et al. (1993); 
Johnson and Wolinsky (1993); Spector and Fleishman (1998)) and the way that 
multiple domains of functioning develop together and interrelate (see e.g. Bruce 
et al. (1994); Verbrugge and Jette (1994)).  
Table 5: Measures of model fit and residual variances for the one and 
two- factor models 
Model N. of parameters 
Chi-Square 
RMSEA  SRMSR χ2 df 
P-
value 
1-factor 9 8218.224 27 0.000 0.056 0.094 
2-factor 17 574.423 19 0.000 0.017 0.023 
Model compared  
1-factor against 2-factor 5478.891 8 0.000     
Notes: df (Degree of freedom); RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation); SRMSR (Stand-
ardized Root Mean Square Residual). 
 
We ran an Exploratory Factor Analysis63 for the dimensionality of disability 
(i.e. to extract the set of Q-latent constructs from the observed 푫 indicators in 
our sample)64 before estimating the SEM model comprising equations (1)-(3). The 
eigenvalues-greater-than-1 rule suggested the exploration of a two-factor model 
(eigenvalues 5.079 and 1.271). Table 5 shows goodness-of-fit indices and strongly 
                                      
63 In the robustness checks of an empirical investigation of target efficiency of Attendance Allowance in 
England,  Hancock et al. (2015) explored the use of a two-factor measurement model to distinguish between 
the physical and cognitive aspects of disability. In this paper we extend that research.  
64 The analyses were run in Mplus 7.11 using Maximum Likelihood extraction method and a geomin 
rotation. For identification, latent residual variances were constrained to 1. 
 212 
 
 
suggests a model with two distinct disability dimensions, although the one-factor 
model also meets conventional standards for good fit.  
Conceptually, the two-factor model provided a plausible factor structure (Ta-
ble 6). The highest loadings for the first factor are for those indicators that de-
scribe mainly physical functional difficulties associated with “mobility”, “lifting” 
and “dexterity”. With the exception of the indicators “incontinence” and “co-
ordination” the loadings associated with the first factor are double in magnitude 
than those associated with the second factor. We call this factor 
푝ℎ푦푠푖푐푎푙 푑푖푠푎푏푖푙푖푡푦 to emphasise its high correlation with the physical function 
indicators collected in the FRS.  
Table 6: Loadings for the two factor model 
  Geomin rotated loadings 
 1 2 
  Physical Cognitive 
Mobility 0.879 0.015 
Lifting 1.036 -0.085 
Dexterity 0.768 0.091 
Incontinence 0.340 0.394 
Communication 0.146 0.623 
Memory 0.126 0.737 
Recognise when in danger -0.007 0.874 
Co-ordination 0.512 0.363 
Interviewed by proxy -0.274 0.526 
Correlations among factors 0.615 
Notes: All loadings and the correlation among factors were significant at 5% level. For identification 
purposes, latent residual variances were constrained to 1. 
 
The highest loadings for the second factor are for indicators of cognitive diffi-
culties such as “recognise when in danger”, “memory” and “communication”. In 
the vector 푫, we also included a binary indicator of whether survey information 
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was collected by proxy for participants who were not able to provide responses 
themselves. We found that this indicator is strongly related to the second factor, 
possibly capturing the fact that, while physically impaired individuals might be 
more likely to be at home during the interview (Stoop, 2005), poor cognitive 
functioning is an obstacle to survey response. We label this second factor 
푐표푔푛푖푡푖푣푒 푑푖푠푎푏푖푙푖푡푦.  
We found evidence of a weak (item loadings just above 0.30) cross-loading for 
“incontinence”, perhaps reflecting that incontinence could be driven by both 
physical and cognitive impairments. Considering also its relatively small loadings, 
we decided to discard this indicator from subsequent analyses.65 Recalculation of 
the loadings and the correlation, while not leading to substantial differences, re-
sults in a clearer factor structure66 with all physical (cognitive) difficulty indica-
tors loaded strongly in the physical (cognitive) factor and relatively less strongly 
in the other.67  
We finally tested whether estimates of the best-fitting two-factor model are 
sensitive to the assumption of gender invariance. This was done by using a two-
                                      
65 Stevens (2009), for example, recommends interpreting only factor loadings with an absolute value 
greater than 0.4. 
66 Allowing for a cross-loading also increases the computational complexity of the model. Previous 
attempts to use such a specification failed because convergence was not achieved after 216 hours by the 
likelihood optimiser available in STATA 13 MP16 in an e-cluster setting.  
67 A commonly employed approach to measuring disability status consists of summing the responses from 
D. The reliability of a sum-score disability index (Cronbach’s alpha) for the sample as a whole is 0.754, 
which lies within the bounds of what is considered to be the acceptable value, ranging from 0.70 to 0.95 
(Bland & Altman, 1997; Nunnally et al., 1967). The reliability of the scale constructed using the indicators 
which might be thought to represent physical disability is 0.760 whereas we found low reliability for the 
scale for cognitive disability (0.490) reflecting the complexity of its measurement. 
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group analysis which allows the factor loadings of the 푫 indicators to differ ac-
cording to the gender of the respondent. The goodness-of-fit tests suggested that 
the unrestricted model (in which the gender-specific parameters were allowed to 
be freely estimated) provides a better balance between model fit and parsimony.  
 
4 Estimation results 
In this section we present findings from the estimation of the gender-specific 
two-factor latent variable structural equation model comprising equations (1)-(3). 
We begin with the baseline model (푚표푑푒푙 퐴) in which birth-cohort 푐푖 was en-
tered linearly to assess the presence of cohort-year shifts. We also include SES 
indicators in 푿 to capture SES-inequality in both latent disability and receipt of 
DBs. We then checked the presence of SES-specific paths by birth-cohort by 
introducing interaction terms of 푐푖 with SES indicators (푚표푑푒푙 퐵). 
4.1 Model fit 
As detailed in Table 7, specification of model B was found to fit the data better 
for both women and men.68 
                                      
68 We also tested whether introducing in model B interaction terms of age with SES indicators provides 
a better fit. This model would capture the extent to which advantage protects against over-time health 
decline due to ageing. It would also test whether SES differential in birth-cohort trends of disability and 
DBs receipt remains significant when controlling for SES-age differentials. With respect to model B we got 
a slight improvement in AIC (271604.41 for women; 222558.86 for men) but a deterioration in the BIC 
criterion (272131.40 for women; 223059.11 for men) which penalises non-parsimonious models more heavily 
than AIC. Using this specification, the coefficients associated with 푐푖 and SES-cohorts interactions were 
significant at 1% level while coefficients of age and SES-age interactions were only marginally significant. 
Estimates and test results are available upon requests.  
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Table 7: Fit measures and residual variances for the two-latent factor 
SEM models 
Goodness of fit    
Women Men 
Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Observations 52,229 44,504 
Log-likelihood -135922 -135755 -111349 -111225 
Degree of freedom (Df) 46 55 46 55 
AIC 271936.54 271619.19 222790.31 222560.86 
BIC 272344.26 272106.68 223190.66 223039.54 
 
4.2 The disability model 
4.2.1. The measurement equations 
Estimates of the two-factor measurement model of equation (3) are shown in 
Table 8 for women and men separately, and for models A and B, respectively.69  
All factor loadings 휆푗푞 are positive and highly significant, with virtually no 
difference between the loadings estimated for models A and B. The 휆푗푞 are sig-
nificantly different for women and men, meaning that there are gender-specific 
health/disability processes or differential reporting behaviours by men and 
women. In all models considered, the scale of each latent disability variable was 
normalised by setting one of its loading to 1, leaving the variances of the latent 
disability variables and their correlation unconstrained. The estimated variance 
휎̂(.)2  is found to be greater among men than women, mainly for physical disability, 
                                      
69 A sum-score index orders individuals in a very similar way to the Empirical Bayes prediction of latent 
disability (see later). The correlation between the two indices for physical (cognitive) disability is 0.97 (0.68) 
for women and 0.96 (0.71) for men with the scatterplots in Appendix Figure A2 that approximate straight 
lines. 
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η1.70 The covariance between the two latent factors is positive and highly signif-
icant, implying a correlation between the two dimensions of disability of about 
0.33 for women and 0.26 for men.71   
4.2.2. The structural component of disability  
Tables 9 and 10 report the gender-specific coefficients 휷ퟏ from the latent phys-
ical and cognitive disability equations.  
In model A, increasing age raises the conditional mean of both latent physical 
η1 and cognitive η2 disability indices. While there is clear evidence of a negative 
SES-gradient with physical disability, the gradient with cognitive disability  - 
albeit still significant - is less pronounced. There is evidence of substantially 
higher physical disability in Wales, but other geographical differences are modest, 
albeit sometimes statistically significant.  
When birth-cohort is entered linearly, being born one year later is associated with 
an increase in both physical and cognitive disability. Cohort-year effects in phys-
ical disability are almost three times higher for women than for men. On the 
other hand, birth-cohort changes in cognitive disability are very similar for men 
and women.  
                                      
70 This is mainly due to the great impact that η1 is causing to the loading “lifting” for women, being 
more than four times higher than the estimated impact for men. Reported prevalence of this FD among 
women was about 4 percentage points higher than for men (see Table 2). 
71 It should be noticed that correlation is dimensionless while covariance is expressed in units obtained 
by multiplying the units of the two latent variables. 
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Table 8: Estimates from the measurement equations for physical and cognitive disability 
 Factor Loadings (휆푗) 
Women Men 
Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Physical disability (η1) 
Mobility 
1 1 1 1 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
Lifting 
4.475*** 4.528*** 0.989*** 0.995*** 
(0.095) (0.094) (0.073) (0.067) 
Dexterity 
0.694*** 0.695*** 0.521*** 0.527*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.029) (0.027) 
Co-ordination 
0.521*** 0.522*** 0.421*** 0.426*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.020) 
Cognitive disability (η2) 
Communication 
1 1 1 1 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
Memory 
1.215*** 1.216*** 1.317*** 1.317*** 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.049) (0.049) 
Recognize when in danger 
1.380*** 1.384*** 1.163*** 1.169*** 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.054) (0.054) 
Interviewed by proxy 
0.156*** 0.147*** 0.116*** 0.112*** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
휎̂η12  3.767*** (0.105) 3.740*** (0.103) 5.975*** (0.586) 5.809*** (0.516) 휎̂η22  1.063*** (0.046) 1.049*** (0.046) 1.120*** (0.051) 1.111*** (0.051) 휎̂η1,η2      1.324*** (0.037)     1.307*** (0.036) 1.755*** (0.093) 1.720*** (0.085) 
Significance: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%; the first factor loadings associated with “Mobility” and “Communication” are set to 1 to normalise the scale of the latent indices 
η1  (physical disability) and η2 (cognitive disability). Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Specification B allows us to test for the presence of SES-related birth-cohort 
trends. The coefficients on the interaction terms, which measure the difference in 
the slope of birth-cohort for different SES as compared with the slope for the 
reference category, indicate birth-cohort trends which differ by SES for both di-
mensions of disability.72 The statistical significance of the interactions of birth-
cohort and current income and home-ownership are - for both dimensions of dis-
ability - greater than those of the interactions with educational attainment, which 
resulted not statistically significant at conventional levels. For income, the coef-
ficient on the interactions show that successive cohorts of high-income individuals 
experienced a significant reduction in latent disability level.73 A similar result is 
found for the interaction of birth-cohort and home ownership, with very similar 
magnitudes estimated for women and men. 
Figure 2 shows the kernel distribution of the Empirical Bayes (EB) predic-
tions74 of individuals’ latent physical and cognitive disability score from model B. 
A similar shape is found for women and men, although the distribution for women 
is shifted to the right. Particularly for men, the density of the physical index is 
less spatially concentrated than the density of the cognitive disability index, in 
                                      
72 In linear models, the statistical significance of the interaction effect can be tested with a single t-test 
on the coefficient associated with the interaction (Ai & Norton, 2003). 
73 As in many other studies, the analysis relies on the reliability of self-reported disability. In the absence 
of objective measures of disability or anchoring vignettes (d’Uva et al., 2011; King et al., 2004) we are not 
able to investigate the possibility that SES differences in reporting disability have changed across birth-
cohorts. 
74 EB predictors of the latent variables η1 and η2   are the means of the empirical posterior distribution 
with the parameter estimates 휷ퟏ(.) replaced with their estimated model parameters 휷ퟏ(.)̂. 
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line with the greater variance estimated for η1 than for η2 and with the higher 
value of 휎̂η12  estimated among men than women (see Table 8). 
Table 9: Estimates from the disability equations, Women 
 Physical disability 
 (η1) 
Cognitive disability  
(η2)  Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Age 
0.077*** 0.075*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Post-compulsory school 
-0.282*** -0.297*** -0.157*** -0.202*** 
(0.012) (0.022) (0.020) (0.038) 
Log household incomea 
-0.146*** 0.178*** 0.040* 0.303*** 
(0.009) (0.020) (0.018) (0.036) 
Home ownership 
-0.564*** -0.257*** -0.252*** -0.047 
(0.013) (0.021) (0.019) (0.035) 
Scotland 
-0.041** -0.042** -0.032 -0.032 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) 
Wales 
0.417*** 0.416*** 0.027 0.026 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.037) (0.037) 
Northern Ireland 
-0.064** -0.075*** -0.105** -0.110** 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.036) (0.036) 
Birth-cohort 
0.028*** 0.212*** 0.017*** 0.172*** 
(0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.017) 
Birth-cohort * post-com-
pulsory school 
 -0.002  0.003 
 (0.002)  (0.004) 
Birth-cohort * income 
 -0.029***  -0.026*** 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
Birth cohort * home 
ownership 
 -0.031***  -0.022*** 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
Notes: a For definition of household income see text. See Table 8 for estimated variances of η1 and η2 
and their estimated correlation. Standard errors in parenthesis. Level of significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
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Table 10: Estimates from the disability equations, Men 
 Physical disability 
 (η1) 
Cognitive disability  
(η2)  Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Age 
0.074*** 0.072*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Post-compulsory school 
-0.254*** -0.345*** -0.049* -0.093* 
(0.032) (0.063) (0.022) (0.044) 
Log household incomea 
-0.581*** 0.062 -0.191*** 0.006 
(0.034) (0.053) (0.018) (0.038) 
Home ownership 
-0.850*** -0.447*** -0.241*** -0.009 
(0.050) (0.067) (0.021) (0.043) 
Scotland 
-0.016 -0.021 -0.036 -0.038 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.025) (0.025) 
Wales 
0.533*** 0.524*** 0.079* 0.077* 
(0.059) (0.058) (0.039) (0.039) 
Northern Ireland 
-0.038 -0.059 -0.182*** -0.188*** 
(0.049) (0.050) (0.040) (0.041) 
Birth-cohort 
0.009* 0.353*** 0.018*** 0.130*** 
(0.004) (0.027) (0.003) (0.018) 
Birth-cohort * post-
compulsory school 
 0.002  0.002 
 (0.006)  (0.004) 
Birth-cohort * income 
 -0.056***  -0.017*** 
 (0.005)  (0.003) 
Birth-cohort * home 
ownership 
 -0.036***  -0.022*** 
 (0.001)  (0.004) 
Notes: a For definition of household income see text. See Table 8 for estimated variances of η1 and η2 
and their estimated correlation. Standard errors in parenthesis. Level of significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Figure 2: Kernel density distribution of the Empirical Bayes (EB) pre-
dictions of the latent disabilities scores by gender 
 
In Figure 3, we compare the implications of the estimated model B, for illus-
trative hypothetical men and women, living in England at the age of 73. A set of 
gender-specific diagrams show the separate impacts of education (a), income (b) 
and home-ownership (c), before showing the joint impact of SES on cohort-year 
trends (d).  
Graph (a) of Figure 3 reports the gender-specific estimated trend for illustrative 
individuals with and without post-compulsory education, all with median income 
and assumed to be home-owners. Three important messages clearly emerge. First, 
the level of physical and cognitive disability is higher for the lower-educated 
individual. Secondly, the educational gap can be observed at any birth-cohort 
and it is more apparent for physical disability (reflecting the higher estimated 
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association of educational attainment with η1 than with η2). Thirdly, the up-
ward birth-cohort trend in physical disability is almost independent of educa-
tional level (i.e. the two lines are parallel). The birth-cohort trend of η2 is only 
slightly upward, at a rate which is slightly higher among those with post-com-
pulsory education.  
Graph (b) in Figure 3 isolates the effect of income. The representative individ-
uals are those at the 25th (low), 50th (median) and 75th (high) percentiles of the 
income distribution observed in the whole sample.75 All individuals are assumed 
to have only compulsory education and are home-owners. The between-cohort 
income gaps in terms of both physical and cognitive disability are increasing. The 
trend in the predicted mean of η1 and η2 across birth-cohorts is steep and up-
ward for the low-income man and woman but less pronounced for the median-
income individuals. For the high-income woman the trend is almost flat. For the 
high-income man it is significantly downward in η1 and almost flat for η2.  
Graph (c) isolates the effect of home-ownership. The two illustrative individu-
als used for this exercise are assumed to have median income and have only 
compulsory education. The trend in the predicted mean of η1 and η2  across 
birth-cohorts for the non-home-owner man and woman is steep and upward. The 
homeowner benefits from a more favourable upward birth-cohort trend in both 
                                      
75 Their income (in logs) is 5.30, 5.56 and 5.95, respectively.  
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dimensions of disability, which becomes virtually flat for the woman with cogni-
tive disability and the man with physical disability. 
The inspection of the effect of the three dimensions of SES in this piecemeal 
way does not take into consideration that, in reality, such dimensions are highly 
correlated and therefore it might provide a partial – even if useful - representation 
of the underlying birth-cohort trends. The final graph (d) shows birth-cohort 
trends for three illustrative men and women who might appear to be more rep-
resentative. As before, they are assumed to live in England at the age of 73: at 
the 25th (low SES), 50th (median SES) and 75th (high SES) percentiles of the 
income distribution in the sample. Both median- and high-SES individuals have 
post-compulsory education and are home-owners. The low-SES individual has 
only compulsory education and is not a home-owner. The trend in the predicted 
mean of η1 and η2 across birth-cohorts for the low-SES man and woman is steep 
and upward. For the median-SES man and woman there is only a slightly upward 
trend. For high-SES woman the trend is almost flat; the trend for physical disa-
bility of the high-SES man is significantly downward. 
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Figure 3a: Predictions of the latent disability index by cohort of birth and SES for illustrative women aged 73 
  
Notes: For definition of the illustrative individuals see text. 
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Figure 3b: Predictions of the latent disability index by cohort of birth and SES for illustrative men aged 73
 
Notes: For definition of the illustrative individuals see text. 
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4.3 The benefit receipt model 
 
Table 11 reports structural parameters (γ1, γ2, 휷ퟐ) for the observed pattern of 
receipt of DBs (AA or DLA). They are semi-reduced form, representing both the 
take-up behaviour of disabled individuals and the decision-making of benefit 
claim assessment. They also include the possible reconsideration of the claim (by 
DWP or by external tribunals) in the case that the claim was unsuccessful at its 
initial attempt (Pudney, 2010) and possible errors in reporting behaviours.  
The structural approach in use enables 휷ퟐ to account only for the direct effect 
of 푿 on DBs receipt, net of their indirect effects through their gradient with 
η1 and η2, captured by the coefficients 휷ퟏ(.) in equation (1).    
Receipt of DB is clearly disability-related. Physical disability consistently 
emerges as the dominant variable in explaining DBs receipt. The t-statistic asso-
ciated with η1 (η2) is about 41 (11) for women and about 20 (9) for men. Con-
trolling for latent disability, the estimated probability of receiving DBs increases 
with age but is significant (at the 1% level) only for women.  
In line with findings documented elsewhere (Hancock et al., 2015; Morciano et 
al., 2015; Pudney, 2010), the probability of receiving DBs declines significantly 
by SES for women and men. Although AA/DLA are non-means-testing benefits, 
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it seems that, controlling for disability status, SES-related differences in claim 
behaviour76 make the AA/DLA programmes indirectly dependent on income.  
For model A, receipt of DBs has a positive and similar birth-cohort trend for 
both women and men. For a given level of disability and holding other factors 
fixed, we found a cohort-year increases the probability of receiving DBs by about 
0.3%. This direct effect77 translates to an increase in the probability of receiving 
DBs of about 6.6% for the latest cohort of men and women born in 1945 relative 
to the one born in 1924. The total effect, estimated as the sum of the direct effect 
plus the indirect cohort-year effect on cognitive and physical disability on DBs 
receipt, is about 0.6% per cohort-year for women and 0.4% for men, correspond-
ing to an increase in the probability of receiving DBs of about 13.2% and 8.8% 
for the cohort of women and men born in 1945 relative to the one born in 1924. 
Based on the results of model B in Table 11, conclusions on the interaction 
effects are less straightforward to interpret than those for the latent disability 
equations, given the non-linearity of the probit function used for modelling DBs 
receipt (Ai & Norton, 2003) and the possible conflicting deductions that, even in 
linear models, can be drawn when using a F-test instead of a simpler t-test. 
                                      
76 Entitlement to AA/DLA should be independent of SES and therefore should not have a direct impact 
in the awarding process. The AA/DLA claim form does not explicitly require such information although 
they might be deducted and used by programme administrators. On the other hand, the likelihood of 
appealing against an unsuccessful claim might be positively related to SES.   
77 The term “direct effect” is meant to quantify the effect that is not mediated by other variables in the 
model including cohort-year effects in physical and cognitive disability. 
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Misleadingly, if we simply look at single coefficients associated with the interac-
tion terms we will conclude that SES-cohort interactions are not significant for 
men. However, tests of no interaction effects78 are rejected at the 1% level for all 
SES variables interacted also for men.  
We estimate a negative, albeit negligible, coefficient for the interactions with 
income and housing wealth, implying attenuated birth-cohort trend in the receipt 
of DBs for homeowners with high income. On the other hand, the coefficient 
associated with the interaction with level of education is positive for women and 
men. This would suggest that successive cohorts of more educated individuals are 
more likely to be in receipt of DBs, ceteris paribus.  However, the effect is par-
tially counterbalanced by the negative relationship of level of education with DBs 
receipt.   
                                      
78 We carried out Wald tests for nonlinear models where the coefficients associated with birth-cohort, the 
SES variable and its interaction are tested to be zero. 
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Table 11: Estimates from the DBs receipt equation 
  Women Men 
  Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Latent physical disability (η1) 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.065*** 0.066*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Latent cognitive disability (η2) 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.033*** 0.033*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age  
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post-compulsory school 
-0.031*** -0.064*** -0.023*** -0.034*** 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) 
Log household incomea 
-0.009** 0.007 -0.014*** -0.019** 
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
Home-ownership 
-0.061*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.067*** 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) 
Cohabitation 
-0.018*** -0.018*** -0.006 -0.005 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Scotland 
0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Wales 
0.061*** 0.061*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Northern Ireland 
0.132*** 0.137*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Birth-cohort  
0.003*** 0.007* 0.003*** -0.002 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Birth-cohort * post-compulsory 
school 
 0.004***  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Birth-cohort * income 
 -0.001*  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.001) 
Birth-cohort * home-ownership  
 -0.000  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant 
-0.499*** -0.809*** 0.003 -0.245*** 
(0.050) (0.060) (0.055) (0.066) 
휎̂푅2  0.106*** 0.106*** 0.092*** 0.092*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 52,229 44,504 
Notes: a For definition of household income see text. Level of significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
We make use of a graphical presentation to better assess the implications of 
specification B. Figure 4 highlights the main findings for the illustrative men and 
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women mentioned above, assumed to have a level of physical and cognitive dis-
ability set at the 90th percentile of the disability indices (η1̂, η2̂) as predicted in 
the whole sample. First, at a given level of disability, the direct effect of SES on 
DBs receipt can be assessed from the SES-related differences in the predicted 
probabilities of receipt at any birth-cohort. Secondly, it is clear that the depicted 
positive birth-cohort trend in receipt of DBs differs only slightly according SES. 
For low SES, it is found almost flat for both women and men. On the other hand, 
a positive birth-cohort trend is found for median- and high-SES individuals, 
mainly thanks to a positive cohort-by-educational attainment effect in the receipt 
of DBs, in particular for women. For example, the ratio of the estimated proba-
bilities of receipt for low-SES to median-SES for the cohort of women born in 
1924 is 1.07 (.62/.57) which reduces to 1.03 (.62/.60) for the latest cohort. For 
men, we found a similar birth-cohort trend (see model A) but weaker evidence of 
diverging birth-cohort trends by SES. The ratio of the estimated probability of 
receipt of DBs for low-SES to median-SES for the cohort of men born in 1924 is 
only 1.08 (.57/.53); the same ratio computed for the latest cohort born in 1945 is 
1.04 (.59/.57). 
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Figure 4a: Predictions of the probability of receiving DBs by cohort of birth and SES for illustrative highly disabled 
women aged 73
 
Notes: For definition of the illustrative individuals see text. η1and η2 set at their 90th percentile of the gender-specific values. 
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Figure 4b: Predictions of the probability of receiving DBs by cohort of birth and SES for illustrative highly disabled men 
aged 73 
 
Notes: For definition of the illustrative individuals see text. η1and η2 set at their 90th percentile of the gender-specific values. 
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5 Summary and policy implications 
 
We have analysed cohort-year effects in physical and cognitive disability and 
in the receipt of AA/DLA of older people born between 1924 and 1945 by pooling 
data from the Family Resource Surveys (FRS) carried out from 2002/3 to 
2011/12.  
The econometric approach in use incorporates a two-latent factor representa-
tion of the individual’s disability in a system of structural equations. The indi-
vidual’s disability is characterised by correlated physical and cognitive dimen-
sions that are measured by potentially error-contaminated self-reported FD indi-
cators. Physical and cognitive disability, together with observable characteristics, 
determine receipt of DBs.  
Our findings yield the following clear-cut messages that are relevant for current 
and planned policy reforms aimed at supporting older people with care needs.  
Controlling for age and other relevant characteristics, we found evidence of a 
significant increase in physical and cognitive disability among the successive co-
horts of older people in the UK. Increasing exposure to risk factors (e.g., obesity) 
and associated conditions might be the leading determinant. On the other hand, 
it is also possible that unfavourable conditions during infancy and childhood for 
the older cohorts had preselected the strongest members, explaining the observed 
increase for the younger compared with the older ones. It also should be noticed 
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that prevalence of disability can also increase if the life expectancy of successive 
cohorts of people disabled earlier in life increases, even if the age of onset of 
disability is stable.  
Whatever the reason underlying such a trend, the immediate policy implication 
that can be drawn is that it would not be prudent for policy-makers to count on 
future reductions in the prevalence of disability among elderly people to offset 
the rising demand for long-term care that will result from population ageing. It 
is also worrying to note that even a steady-state approach that projects the future 
number of disabled and the associated costs of disability programmes by using 
conditional rates observed at a single point in time could lead to severe underes-
timation. Previous projections of the public cost of long-term care in the UK have 
not taken cohort-year trends into account (e.g., Karlsson et al., 2006; Pickard et 
al., 2007; Wittenberg et al., 2011). 
The overall birth-cohort increase in disability hides a diverging gap between 
the socioeconomically advantaged and disadvantaged in later life. This is partic-
ularly evident for physical disability, especially for men: it increases among low 
SES individuals and decreases among high-SES individuals. This study provides 
no information about how such widening in SES differences in disability origi-
nated. Increasing exposure to unhealthy environments for low-SES individuals 
have been widely documented (Lynch et al., 1997) but our findings might also 
reflect a reduction in mortality among low-SES disabled people. Additionally, our 
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data cover only the private household population and we do not account for 
trends in the de-institutionalisation of care for older people. Some of the most 
severely disabled people live in care homes and there is evidence that some as-
pects of socio-economic advantage (e.g. home-ownership) reduce the risk of care 
home entry (Hancock et al., 2002). If there were a substantial decrease in the 
proportion of the older population in care homes, it would partly explain the 
trends reported here. However, comparison of the 2001 and 2011 Census of the 
UK population shows that the (small) percentage of people over 65 resident in 
“medical and care” establishments fell only very slightly from 3.8% to 3.3%.79 
Even if all of this reduction consisted of low-SES individuals, it would explain 
only a very small part of the trends we find for the household population. What-
ever the reason(s), if this widening trend continues it could have important im-
plications for the future costs of the public system of care and support for people 
with care needs, since low-SES disabled individuals are more likely to be entitled 
to public support for the costs of their care. 
The growth in AA/DLA receipt would not be inherently problematic if it were 
to reflect a rising incidence of physical and cognitive impairments or a lowering 
- among disabled - of the administrative and individual barriers associated with 
                                      
79 Calculated from 2001 and 2011 Census data available at:  
http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/ods-web/standard-outputs.html (Scotland); 
http://www.nisra.gov.uk//Census/2001%20Census%20Results/StandardTables.html (Northern Ireland) 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/census/2011/census-data/index.html (England and Wales). 
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their take-up. In both cases, in fact, target efficiency of the DB programmes is 
maintained or even improved.  
We found that receipt of AA/DLA is strongly related to severity of (mainly 
physical) disability and increases with age. At old-age, long-term AA/DLA re-
ceipt often reflects the “absorbing state” of the underlying disabling conditions 
and the frailty associated with ageing. The message we draw is that the net effect 
on the public budget of reforms which introduce a regular re-assessment of the 
disabling condition at old age needs to be carefully designed, since the financial 
implication of such reforms crucially depends on the extent to which savings from 
the reduction in the leakage problems are able to offset the additional costs in-
duced by the re-assessments.  
Our econometric approach has allowed the separation of cohort-year and SES 
effects directly related to DBs receipt from the indirect ones that they would 
have via disability. We found that receipt of AA/DLA declines significantly by 
SES through a direct effect, due to take-up behaviours, and an indirect effect due 
to the SES-gradient with disability. Thus, reforms that include the options of 
making the benefit subject to income tax (Lloyd, 2014) or introduce means-test-
ing for new claimants (Commission on the Future of Health and Social Care in 
England, 2014), while increasing administrative costs and stigma-related target 
inefficiencies, might have little impact on the financial sustainability of the sys-
tem. 
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For a given level of disability and holding other factors fixed, we found a very 
small, albeit statistically significant, direct effect in the probability of receiving 
DBs of about 0.3% per cohort-year. It translates to an increase in the probability 
of receiving DBs of about 6.6% for the latest cohort of men and women born in 
1945 relative to the one born in 1924. Accounting for the indirect cohort-year 
effect exerted thought disability, we estimate a total cohort-year effect in the 
probability of receiving DBs of about +13.2% and +8.8% for the cohort of women 
and men born in 1945 relative to the one born in 1924.  
When allowing for SES-differential birth-cohort trends in DBs receipt, we find 
a statistically significant, albeit small, difference in the cohort-by-educational at-
tainment effect and virtually no cohort-year changes by economic factors (income 
and home-ownership). This would suggest that later cohorts of individuals, at a 
given level of disability, might be taking more advantage of their level of educa-
tion in navigating the disability benefits system or that they have lowered the 
perceived stigma from claiming benefits. In this view, the cohort-year effects we 
estimated might have had the desired effect of reducing inequality in the DBs 
take-up and thus improving target efficiency of the system.  
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Appendix 
Figure A1: The path diagram of the two-latent factor model 
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Figure A2: Correlation between Empirical Bayes and sum-score disability 
scale (two-latent factor) 
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Conclusions and implications for fu-
ture research 
 
 
There is a pressing need for robust evidence to inform the policy discussion 
around the public system of care and support for older people with care needs. 
One of the difficulties faced by researchers is that concepts like “disability” and 
“well-being” involved in this kind of research cannot be observed directly. Instead 
researchers must draw inferences on them by using a battery of imperfect survey 
indicators. The measurement noise in these indicators could cause bias in analyt-
ical results and lead to distorted policy recommendation, if the appropriate sta-
tistical methods are not used.  
This thesis presented four empirical studies applied to the economics of disa-
bility in old age that make use of Structural Equation Models (SEM) with latent 
variables. Commonly employed in psychology and the social sciences, this ap-
proach is becoming increasingly important in economics, although it is still un-
derused in health-related studies (Wang & Wang, 2012).  
From the applied point of view, a latent factor SEM recognises that important 
theoretical concepts (e.g. disability) are latent rather than directly observable. 
By defining structural relations between indicators and embedding those latent 
concepts in a set of simultaneous equations, this approach is able to capture 
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multiple latent variables simultaneously (Chapters 1 and 3) and operationalise a 
multi-dimensional notion of disability (Chapters 2 and 4). It can also handle 
difficult data with a sparse and noisy set of observed indicators (Chapters 1 and 
2); allow the testing of hypotheses on the correlation among latent factors (Chap-
ter 1); provide a basis for testing parameter invariance across different surveys 
(chapter 2) and population sub-groups (Chapter 3); and generate estimates of 
direct, indirect and total effects (Chapter 4). The traditional reluctance of econ-
omists to use self-reported subjective information can be overcome by allowing 
for the presence of measurement errors in the set of indicators used to operation-
alise latent concepts and by accounting for different respondents’ behaviour in 
the self-evaluation activity demanded in a survey.  
There are, however, some important drawbacks to this approach. One could 
argue that it is usually hard to interpret latent indexes because they have no 
natural scale. In all chapters we have shown that this problem can be handled 
naturally by ranking sample members according to their model-based posterior 
prediction of the latent constructs. Going beyond classical “data-driven” statis-
tical techniques (e.g. principal component analysis), such indexes can supersede 
or complement more common weighted count measures that use equal, arbitrary 
or expert opinion weights (Decancq & Lugo, 2013). 
In the empirical applications presented here the indicators of the underlying 
latent variables were generally found to be strongly correlated and to capture 
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plausibly a single latent construct. However, there were some cases of indicators 
that were poorly correlated with the hypothesised construct, with low factor load-
ings and large error variances. This can signal poor indicator quality, but it can 
also be a symptom of underspecifying the number of latent factors: there is multi-
dimensionality of the latent concept, and the dimensions are not perfectly corre-
lated. Chapters 2 and 4 show the relevance of this issue in conceptualising the 
dimensionality of disability: allowing for two (rather highly correlated) dimen-
sions plausibly interpreted as physical and cognitive disability improved the ex-
planatory power of the model and our understanding of the underlying process.  
 
A great deal of influential health research has been based on survey data and 
the increase of drop-out rates among older people in longitudinal studies, albeit 
mostly neglected by applied researchers, is a matter of concern.  
The analysis of survey participation proposed in Chapter 1 has shown how 
understanding the process of “being surveyed” is not straightforward but offers 
a way of dealing with panel attrition. It highlights the importance of considering 
carefully individuals’ attitudes and beliefs towards survey participation and the 
relationship of those attitudes with the outcomes of interest. But attitudes are 
themselves theoretical concepts which are only imperfectly measured by available 
indicators. As far as the econometric framework is concerned, this is one of the 
first applications of a latent factor SEM to the study of survey participation and 
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it should be interpreted as a call for further research. Results from Chapter 1 
have immediate implications for future applied research. We have showed that 
the effect of non-response is to bias downwards estimates of the prevalence of 
disability and receipt of related benefits and to attenuate the estimated socio-
economic gradient in health. Handling (or at least recognising) this potential 
source of bias is of paramount importance in applied research aiming to formulate 
policy recommendations. Contact with the ELSA survey designers has confirmed 
their willingness to consider ways of retaining participants and enhancing the 
weighting adjustment procedure, by building upon this research. 80 However, 
whether new weights would help in other research areas is a matter for specula-
tion. Future research should assess how generalisable our conclusions on sample 
selection bias are in static and dynamic analyses on mental health, life satisfac-
tion, well-being and other outcomes highly correlated with respondents’ engage-
ment.81  
 
                                      
80 The collaboration would also enable the use of information not currently available to researchers which, 
by being good predictors of future non-response (e.g. number of calls before arranging an interview, interview 
length, interviewers’ characteristics and their perception on respondents’ level of engagement), would be 
valuable instruments for informing post-collection adjustment procedures for non-response.  
Derived weights from this chapter will shortly be made publicly available through the UK Data Archive. 
81 The analysis can make use of many surveys given that psychometric indicators and data on the 
respondents’ level of engagement are now collected and publicly available for many multi-purpose surveys. 
As an example, it would interesting to assess the relevance of sample selection problems in the UK compo-
nent of the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) following the decision 
of selecting SILC new sample units from the FRS.   
 249 
 
 
Chapter 2 showed that, despite the considerable differences between three ma-
jor surveys in the number of disability questions they use, the wording of those 
questions, the way they select their samples and the way they handle cases where 
the subject is unable to answer personally, the results give a similar statistical 
picture of the relationship between disability and receipt of the main disability 
benefit received at old-age, the Attendance Allowance. This robustness is a very 
encouraging finding for policy analysts, given the proliferation of disability scales 
(mainly in the clinical epidemiologic literature), the cost of designing new ques-
tionnaires and of collecting reliable information through surveys; and the “almost 
irresistible pressure [on politicians] to cherry-pick – or even misrepresent – evi-
dence”82.  
The statistical approach proposed in Chapter 2 could easily be extended in 
other research domains, dealing with situations where conflicting results emerge 
from indicators available in different surveys, but also when changes in the 
questionnaire occurring from one sweep to another of the same survey prevents 
direct identification of changes of the same underlying phenomenon through time. 
This is particularly relevant to work based on the Family Resources Survey, 
which has recently changed the design of questions on functional difficulties and 
standard of living.  
                                      
82 Hancock, R., Morciano, M., Pudney, S., & Zantomio, F. (2013). “Is cherry-picking disability data at 
all fruitful?”, Society Central, https://societycentral.ac.uk/2013/07/04/is-cherry-picking-
disability-data-at-all-fruitful/. 
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Chapter 3 showed how statistical well-being models can be used to estimate 
the extra costs of normal functioning associated with disability.  
The clear result is that current public provision of cash disability benefits falls 
considerably short of total disability costs for older disabled people in Great Brit-
ain. Future research could make use of these estimates to assess the targeting 
and redistributive efficiencies of existing disability-related public programmes 
and ways in which to improve their policy design.  
From an econometric point of view it would be interesting to extend the esti-
mation procedure of the extra costs of disability in two dimensions. A panel 
dimension of the data could allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity (see 
e.g., Cullinan et al., 2011) and permit a better understanding of the dynamics of 
disability and the process of adaptation (Easterlin, 1974) or “physical condition-
neglect” (Sen, 1985, p.21) of standards of living.  
Together with measures of individual happiness and life satisfaction, a survey 
such as the ELSA collects two types of measure to assess household welfare: the 
budget share for three types of good (income spent on food, clothes and leisure), 
and deprivation indicators similar to the FRS ones.83 Such measures, while cap-
turing different (but related) concepts of “well-being” (see e.g., Decancq et al., 
                                      
83 As an example: “please say how often you find you have too little money to spend on: First choices of 
food items; Have family and friends round for a drink or meal; Have an outfit to wear for social or family 
occasions; Keep your home in a reasonable state of decoration; Replace or repair broken electrical goods; 
Pay for fares or other transport costs to get to and from places you want to go; Buy presents for friends or 
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2015; Pudney, 2011) are likely to provide very different estimates of valuations 
obtained through the compensating or equivalent variation principle. A direction 
of research is likely to discuss the “existence” and the “meaning” of such valua-
tions, which can be empirically grounded in the ELSA data systematically.  
 
Chapter 4 documented the relevance of birth-cohort trends in physical and 
cognitive functionings and in the receipt of non-means-tested cash disability ben-
efits in old age in the UK. It shows the existence of diverging trends of functional 
disability by socio-economic status, with a steep increase in physical and cogni-
tive disability among the disadvantaged. If such trends are likely to persist in the 
future, they would have tremendous implications for future costs of public pro-
grammes aimed at supporting people with care needs.  
Projecting the economic implications of reforms of the system of care and sup-
port requires “realistic” assumptions on the evolution of disability for the coming 
decades.84 The setup used in this chapter could be a promising way forward to 
build a dynamic microsimulation model that, while being better embedded in 
existing theoretical frameworks, could provide projections under a wide range of 
scenarios. 
                                      
family once a year; Take the sorts of holidays you want; Treat yourself from time to time”, with potential 
responses being: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Often and Most of the time. 
84 “Making projections into the future [...] requires a theory of how things unfold [...]. These should draw 
on the latest and best research. Moreover, the causal stories have to be empirically grounded and represented 
quantitatively [...]. Members of the research community have to be engaged.” (Harding & Gupta, 2007). 
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Chapter 4 also provides evidence that, controlling for disability, the probability 
of receiving cash disability benefits has increased only slightly, with a more fa-
vourable trend for the better educated and virtually no cohort-year changes by 
economic factors (income and home-ownership). This might indicate differences 
in claiming behaviour, in assessment criteria, or in the way receipt is reported in 
a survey. Further research should explore these aspect further, for example using 
FRS data linked with Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) administrative 
data.85   
Finally, the current policy discussion on whether and how to integrate disabil-
ity benefits (currently administered by the DWP) with the Local Authority-ad-
ministered system of social care (Barker, 2014) should be fed with analyses. It 
has often been suggested that, in comparison with social care, disability benefits 
are not well targeted to those disabled and in most financial need (see e.g., 
Department of Health, 2009, 2013; Wanless, 2006) in the light of supposed better 
target efficiency achieved by LA-subsidised care services. The new information 
on receipt of social care collected within the HSE and the ELSA would enable 
the joint evaluation of the target efficiency of the two programmes and might be 
used to inform the public debate.  
 
  
                                      
85 A linked dataset has recently been provided by the Department for Work and Pensions. 
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